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some	 illustrious	men	 or	 the	 immortal	 gods	 or	 the	 general	 interest	 of	 the	 state;	





strong	 contributor	 to	 living	 a	 flourishing	 human	 life.	 In	 order	 for	 the	 defence	 to	 be	
successful	and	the	thesis	believable	this	calls	for	a	somewhat	in	depth	understanding	of	
its	 constituents.	Understanding	what	 is	meant	 by	 ‘balance’,	 ‘wonder’	 and	 ‘a	 flourishing	
life’	is	key,	but	it	is	the	notion	of	wonder	that	will	receive	the	most	sustained	attention.	
	 Since	 wonder	 is	 the	 centrepiece	 of	 this	 thesis	 presenting	 a	 preliminary	
identification	of	wonder	 is	 in	order.	Wonder	 is	a	sudden	experience	 that	 intensifies	 the	
cognitive	 focus	 and	 awareness	 of	 ignorance	 about	 a	 given	 object.	 It	 is	 typically	 an	
unsettling	yet	delightful	experience	that	makes	one	aware	that	 there	might	be	more	to	
the	perceived	object	that	meets	the	eye.	That	wonder	is	delightful	is	supported	by	various	
philosophical	 sources	 and	one	might	begin	by	pointing	out	 that	 in	 the	Poetics	 Aristotle	




translation	 states	 that	 ‘awe	 is	 pleasurable’	 (Aristotle,	 1995,	 XXIV	 1460a17).	 This	 is	
confusing	and	draws	attention	to	the	curious	fact	that	in	the	literature	wonder	and	awe	
are	 in	 some	 cases	 used	 interchangeably.	 To	 complicate	matters	 literary	 scholar	 Dennis	
Quinn	informs	us	that	admiration	and	wonder	are	also	sometimes	used	interchangeably	
(Quinn,	 2002,	 p.	 4)	 meaning	 that	 when	 we	 read	 for	 example	 Aristotle’s	 The	 ‘Art’	 of	
Rhetoric	where	he	writes	‘that	which	excites	admiration	is	pleasant’	(Aristotle,	1926,	III.	i.	
9—ii.	3)	it	is	important	to	keep	in	mind	that	it	is	possible	to	read	this	particular	citation	as	
‘that	 which	 excites	 wonder	 is	 pleasant’.	 This	 paints	 a	 somewhat	 muddled	 picture	 of	
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wonder	but	also	adds	to	the	allure	of	the	subject	as	it	invites	us	to	begin	to	think	about	‘a	
taxonomy	 of	 altered	 states’	 specifying	 possible	 distinctions	 between	wonder,	 awe	 and	














is	 granted	 or	 inflicted	 (Verhoeven,	 1972,	 p.	 13)	 and	 in	 this	 respect	 wonder	 is	 not	
something	we	can	will	ourselves	to	experience;	however	it	is	something	we	might	have	a	
talent	for	(Verhoeven,	1972,	p.	27).	Philosopher	Paul	Martin	Opdal	is	of	a	similar	opinion	
as	 he	 speaks	 of	 children	 having	 a	 capacity	 for	 wonder	 that	 might	 be	 turned	 into	
philosophical	reflection	(Opdal,	2001,	p.	332).	Further	still	it	seems	plausible	that	one	can	
develop	a	balanced	sense	of	wonder1	that	transcends	childhood	wonderments	and	brings	




reductive	adult.	 To	harbour	a	balanced	 sense	of	wonder	 involves	being	able	at	 least	 to	













rightly	 so.	For	Aristotle	virtue	 is	 connected	 to	 the	notion	of	 the	mean,	which	 is	 located	
between	 excess	 and	 deficiency.	 Experiencing	 a	 sense	 of	 wonder	 while	 pondering	 that	
bachelors	are	not	married	is	wondering	in	excess.2	It	is	to	wonder	foolishly	or	immaturely	
and	such	wonder	would	rest	uneasily	with	any	sensible	person.	To	believe	that	so-called	
experts	or	authorities	would	have	 the	answer	 to	all	questions	and	 that	one	can	escape	
wonderment	by	consulting	such	would	be	to	harbour	a	deficient	sense	of	wonder	which	




done	 if	 a	 richer	 account	 is	 to	 see	 the	 light	 of	 day.	 It	would	 be	 interesting	 to	 see	what	






Philosophy’	 (Anscombe,	1958).	 In	 the	article	 she	presented	human	 flourishing	as	a	new	
translation	of	the	old	Greek	word	‘eudaimonia’	which	Aristotle	thought	to	be	the	highest	
good	or	the	very	goal	of	human	life.	Until	Anscombe’s	publication	eudaimonia	had	been	
translated	as	 ‘wellbeing’	 (taken	to	be	almost	synonymous	with	 ‘happiness’),	which	gave	
the	 concept	 a	 distinctly	 subjective	 feel.	 The	 new	 translation	 worked	 in	 the	 opposite	
direction	and	suggested	that	although	the	 idea	of	human	flourishing	 in	a	modern	sense	
does	 not	 encompass	 presenting	 a	 complete	 objective	 account	 of	 what	 characterises	 a	










good	enough	 to	have	experienced	 for	example	 two	years	of	 absolute	bliss	 in	a	 lifetime	
while	the	remaining	time	was	for	want	of	a	better	word	dreadful.		
There	are	at	least	two	reasons	why	an	inquiry	into	the	linkage	between	a	balanced	




to	 examine	 the	 possibility	 that	 a	 life	 encompassing	 a	 balanced	 sense	 of	wonder	might	
flourish	 to	 a	 larger	 degree	 than	 a	 life	 embracing	 wonderment	 in	 excess	 or	 no	
wonderment	whatsoever.	A	balanced	sense	of	wonder	could	harness	the	positive	sides	of	
wonderment,	which	 in	 turn	can	be	used	as	 inspiration	 for	how	to	 live	a	 flourishing	 life.	
Such	wonder	might	facilitate	a	critical	openness	towards	the	world,	which	in	turn	would	
help	keep	 the	notion	of	human	 flourishing	 free	 from	negative	constraints.	 In	addition	a	
balanced	sense	of	wonder	may	prompt	the	discovery	of	new	sources	of	flourishing	and	in	
effect	prove	the	antidote	to	complacency.	Most	people	will	over	time	become	set	in	their	
ways	and	develop	a	scope	of	vision	that	may	reach	far	but	 is	still	 limited	by	habits	 that	
one	might	 be	 unaware	 of.	 A	 balanced	 sense	 of	wonder	 could	 prompt	 openness	 to	 the	
positive	sides	of	everything	from	religious,	political,	scientific	or	philosophical	thoughts	to	
particular	cultural	outlooks,	ways	of	life	or	praxis.	
	 So	 far	 I	have	 said	very	 little	about	wonder.	Wonder	 is	a	 captivating	 subject	 that	
has	 received	 increased	 academic	 attention	 in	 recent	 times	 (Bollert,	 2010;	 Deane-
Drummond,	 2006;	 Evans,	 2012;	 Fisher,	 2003;	 Fleischman,	 2013;	 La	 Caze,	 2013;	 Nadis,	
2005;	Norris,	 2001;	 Pasquale,	 2003;	 Prinz,	 2013;	Quinn,	 2002;	 Rubenstein,	 2008;	 Tallis,	




phenomenon3	 and	 it	 can	 spring	 from	 various	 situations.	 Witnessing	 something	
spectacular	like	a	rainbow,	the	aurora	borealis,	the	birth	of	a	child	or	the	success	of	a	free	
solo	 climber4	may	 very	well	 produce	 a	 sense	 of	 wonder.	 To	 reflect	 upon	 something	 is	











they	 are	 huge	 and	 difficult	 questions	 that	 have	 a	 tendency	 to	 lift	 us	 up	 above	 the	
immediate	 practicalities	 of	 life	 and	make	 us	 think	 about	 our	 place	 in	 the	 universe	 and	
what	we	are	doing	with	the	time	given	to	us.	Another	reason	why	wonder	is	fascinating	
arises	from	the	curious	fact	that	no	discipline	within	academia	has	claimed	it	as	its	own.	
Despite	 having	 been	 addressed	 by	 a	 variety	 of	 different	 scholars	 hailing	 from	different	
disciplines	wonder	remains	itinerant	and	unsettled.	To	illustrate	just	how	widespread	and	
diverse	 the	academic	 interest	 in	wonder	 is	one	 could	 start	by	drawing	attention	 to	 the	
discipline	of	philosophy.	Philosophy	has	a	long-standing	relationship	with	wonder,	which	
goes	back	to	Plato	and	Aristotle.	Their	writings	support	the	idea	that	philosophy	begins	in	




lies	 beyond	 the	 limits	 of	 rational	 engagement	 and	 that	 this	 is	 key	 in	 terms	 of	
understanding	 spirituality	 (R.	 C.	 Fuller,	 2006,	 p.	 14).	 Furthermore	 Fuller	 observes	 that	
experiences	 of	 wonder	 ‘are	 principal	 sources	 of	 what	 historians	 variously	 call	 nature	
religion	 or	 aesthetic	 spirituality’	 (Fuller,	 2012,	 p.	 85).	 This	 is	 to	 say	 a	 sensibility	 to	 the	
sacredness	of	nature;	the	mystical	or	a	particular	pantheistic	feeling	toward	the	universe	
may	 emerge	 from	 wonderment	 (Fuller,	 2012,	 p.	 85).	 In	 addition	 theologian	 and	




field	 of	 aesthetics	where	 objects	 such	 as	 the	 Elgin	Marbles5	 have	 inspired	wonder	 and	
indeed	 helped	 generate	 new	 wonders	 like	 John	 Keats’s	 poem	 ‘On	 Seeing	 the	 Elgin	







philosopher	Howard	 L.	 Parsons	writes:	 ‘A	 scientist	 can	 find	a	molecule	or	protozoan	or	
child	 or	 galaxy	 wonderful	 because	 he	 can	 be	 excited	 by	 the	 known	 and	 imagined	
meanings	that	his	scientific	community	has	surrounded	him	with’	(Parsons,	1969,	p.	89).	









Scientific	 discoveries	 and	 developments	 like	 these	 can	 produce	 what	 Dawkins	 calls	 a	
feeling	of	 ‘awed	wonder’,	which	he	deems	one	of	 the	uppermost	experiences	a	human	
being	can	experience	(Dawkins,	2006,	p.	xii).	Now	leaving	aside	the	question	of	whether	
there	 is	 such	a	 thing	as	a	hierarchy	of	experiences	 that	 can	 support	Dawkins’	 view	and	
what	such	a	hierarchy	actually	looks	like	it	is	safe	to	say	that	not	everyone	would	readily	





as	 much	 as	 one	 might	 agree	 with	 Dawkins	 and	 think	 his	 conjunction	 fitting	 for	 the	
experience	he	is	describing	one	would	be	inclined	to	think	it	peculiar	because	as	much	as	
it	is	possible	to	merge	awe	and	wonder	it	is	also	possible	to	view	awe	and	wonder	as	two	








fixated	 on	 disciplinary	 lenses	 but	 look	 to	 wonder	 as	 something	 that	 digs	 beyond	 the	
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disciplinary	 barriers	 of	 academia.	 Perhaps	 wonder	 in	 this	 regard	 is	 initially	 best	
understood	 by	 evoking	 the	 image	 of	 the	 primordial	 soup	 advocated	 by	 evolutionary	
scientists.	 It	 is	a	place	of	origin.	It	 is	a	state	of	mind,	which	potentially	can	give	rise	to	a	
desire	 for	 inquiry	 and	 for	 the	 academically	 inclined	 subsequent	 works	 be	 they	 either	
scientific	or	artistic	in	outline	or	composition.	
	 A	 thesis	usually	 abides	 to	 some	 school	of	 learning	 and	 the	 inquiry	 conducted	 in	
this	 thesis	 is	 a	 philosophical	 one	 taking	 place	 within	 a	 medical	 humanities	 context.	
Medical	 humanities	 ‘is	 a	 name	 for	 a	 conscious	 habit	 of	 thought,	 a	 willingness	 to	 see	
medicine	painted	upon	a	very	wide	canvas	—	the	canvas	of	human	experience	 in	all	 its	
complexity,	 diversity,	 and	 unpredictability’	 (Evans,	 2002,	 p.	 447).	 It	 represents	 a	 field,	
which	roughly	speaking	provides	new	perspectives	on	medicine	 through	the	 lens	of	 the	
humanities	 and	 social	 sciences	 and	because	 it	 is	 a	 field	 that	welcomes	 interdisciplinary	
work	it	provides	a	suitable	environment	for	the	study	of	wonder.	Now	philosophy	is	hard	
to	 define	 but	 one	 area	 that	 has	 been	 a	 part	 of	 philosophy	 at	 least	 since	 the	 time	 of	
Socrates	 is	 concept	 analysis	 and	 the	 critical	 scrutiny	 of	 ideas.	 Since	 the	 success	 of	 this	
thesis	 relies	partly	on	a	 clear,	 rigorous	presentation	of	particular	 key	 concepts,	 notions	
and	ideas	evoking	a	philosophical	enquiry	as	a	‘method’	to	make	the	thesis	believable	is	
apt.	 To	 strengthen	 this	 notion	 one	 might	 point	 out	 that	 since	 philosophy	 has	 a	 long	
history	 of	 addressing	wonder,	 balance	 (understood	 as	 virtue)	 and	 human	 flourishing	 it	
seems	a	good	choice	to	turn	to	philosophy.	In	addition	it	must	be	said	that	the	philosophy	
or	 philosophical	 lens	 through	 which	 I	 am	 going	 to	 explore	 wonder	 qualifies	 as	 Neo-
Aristotelian,	 meaning	 that	 it	 draws	 on	 the	 work	 of	 Aristotle	 and	 a	 selection	 of	
contemporary	philosophers	to	whom	Aristotle	is	a	substantial	source	of	inspiration.	Other	






1,	 The	 Lure	 of	 Wonder	 aims	 at	 providing	 the	 reader	 a	 preliminary	 understanding	 of	
wonder.	 The	 chapter	 opens	 with	 the	 presentation	 and	 brief	 examination	 of	 seven	




wonder.	 Thirdly	 I	 shall	 attempt	 to	 make	 the	 reader	 appreciate	 that	 conceptions	 of	
wonder	 change	 over	 time	 by	 taking	 a	 brief	 look	 at	 the	 history	 of	 wonder.	 The	 fourth	
movement	will	examine	a	selection	of	altered	states	by	addressing	wonder’s	relationship	
with	awe,	horror,	the	sublime,	curiosity,	amazement,	admiration	and	astonishment	with	a	
view	 to	 further	 clarifying	 what	 wonder	 is.	 This	 is	 followed	 by	 an	 examination	 of	 the	
‘enemies	 of	 wonder’	 in	 order	 to	 make	 clear	 why	 we	 sometimes	 avoid	 wonderment.	
Finally	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 presenting	 a	 preliminary	 understanding	 of	 wonder	 that	
transcends	 naïve	 sentiments	 and	 crude	 rationalisations	 I	 shall	 draw	 attention	 to	 some	
contemporary	 writers	 on	 wonder	 and	 their	 views	 on	 the	 subject.	 Furthermore	 I	 shall	
highlight	additional	research	questions,	which	I	intend	to	answer	in	the	coming	chapters	
including	if	wonder	can	be	exclusively	seen	as	an	emotion;	what	the	role	of	imagination	in	
wonder	 is	 and	 in	 what	 sense	 wonder	 contributes	 to	 human	 flourishing.	 Thus	 the	 first	
chapter	by	no	means	provides	the	final	word	on	wonder,	but	is	merely	a	stepping-stone	
to	further	investigations	into	the	subject	matter.	
	 Chapter	 2,	 Wonder	 and	 Emotion	 investigates	 in	 what	 respect	 we	 may	 label	
wonder	as	an	emotion	and	if	it	is	possible	to	label	it	exclusively	so.	First	I	elaborate	on	the	
rationale	for	addressing	wonder	as	an	emotion	and	next	I	address	the	nature	of	emotions.	
Subsequently	 I	 commit	 to	 the	 cognitive	 approach	 to	 emotions	 represented	 by	
contemporary	philosopher	Aaron	Ben-Ze’ev	and	later	explore	an	idea	put	forward	by	the	
likewise	 contemporary	 philosopher	 Adam	 Morton	 depicting	 wonder	 as	 an	 epistemic	
emotion.	 I	 then	 apply	 Ben-Ze’ev’s	 cognitive	 approach	 and	 Adam	 Morton’s	 notion	 of	
wonder	 as	 an	 epistemic	 emotion	 to	 some	 of	 the	 examples	 depicting	 wonder	 as	 an	
emotion	 provided	 in	 the	 first	 section	 in	 order	 to	 show	 in	 what	 respect	 the	 examples	
reflect	 wonder	 as	 an	 emotion.	 Finally	 I	 shall	 explore	 what	 we	may	 call	 other	 faces	 of	
wonder	and	argue	that	as	much	as	it	can	be	said	that	wonder	qualifies	as	an	emotion	and	
indeed	 an	 epistemic	 emotion	 wonder	 does	 not	 qualify	 exclusively	 as	 such	 because	
wonder	may	indeed	also	be	looked	upon	as	a	mood,	a	value	and	an	attitude.	
	 Chapter	 3,	Wonder	 and	 Imagination	 begins	 by	 recapturing	 and	 expanding	 the	
rationale	for	investigating	imagination	in	connection	with	wonder.	This	is	followed	by	an	
introduction	 to	 imagination	 that	 aims	 to	 clarify	 the	 vastness	 of	 the	 subject	 matter.	
Subsequently	 I	 shall	 present	 and	 comment	 on	 the	 work	 on	 imagination	 done	 by	
philosophers	Mary	Warnock,	 Ronald	Hepburn	 and	 Roger	 Scruton	 in	 order	 to	 present	 a	
modern	account	of	imagination.	My	choice	of	philosophers	rests	on	the	fact	that	they	are	
all	 contemporary	 thinkers	who	 through	 their	 individual	work	have	expressed	a	 singular	
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and	 bold	 view	 of	 imagination	 that	 when	 synthesised	 will	 help	 us	 establish	 in	 what	
capacity	 a	modern	 conception	 of	 imagination	 is	 involved	 in	 the	wondering	 or	wonder-
filled	experience.	
	 Chapter	4,	Implications	of	the	Role	of	Imagination	in	Wonder	examines	an	array	of	
new	 examples	 from	 art,	 space-travel	 and	 philosophy	 that	 are	 particularly	 wonder	
provoking	with	the	purpose	not	only	to	 further	solidify	how	the	 imagination	 is	active	 in	
wonderment	 but	 also	 to	 show	 how	 an	 experience	 of	 wonder	 may:	 1)	 influence	 our	
perception;	 2)	 increase	 our	 moral	 scope	 and	 sensitivity;	 and	 3)	 facilitate	 what	 I	 call	 a	
wondrous	afterglow.	
	 Chapter	5,	Wonder	and	Human	Flourishing	engages	with	three	contemporary	neo-









to	 MacIntyre	 and	 finally	 to	 Nussbaum	 we	 will	 see	 a	 continuing	 exploration	 of	 human	
nature	 that	 will	 bring	 about	 a	 refined	 notion	 of	 what	 human	 beings	 have	 in	 common	
rather	 than	 where	 they	 differ.	 The	 picture	 of	 human	 flourishing	 that	 emerges	 from	
engaging	with	 these	 contemporary	 thinkers	will	 be	 utilised	 as	 a	 reference	 point	 in	 the	
second	half	of	 this	chapter	which	examines	how	wonder	can	be	a	source	of	 flourishing.	
The	 second	half	 starts	with	a	 survey	of	what	 it	means	 for	 something	 to	be	a	 source	of	
flourishing	and	I	shall	engage	with	the	following	candidates:	literacy,	friendship,	humour	
and	 physical	 exercise.	 Following	 this	 brief	 engagement	 I	 shall	 argue	 that	 wonder	 also	
qualifies	as	a	source	of	 flourishing	by	 looking	at	how	wonder	may	evoke	reverence	and	




previous	 chapters	 and	 concludes	 that	 cultivating	 a	 balanced	 sense	 of	 wonder	 strongly	
contributes	 to	 human	 flourishing.	 Additionally	 it	 offers	 some	 perspectives	 on	 possible	
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in	 detail	 at	 specific	 scenarios	 in	 which	 wonder	 emerges.	 Here	 I	 present	 and	 interpret	





phenomena.	Over	 the	 course	 of	 three	 consecutive	 nights	 from	November	 10th	 through	
November	 12th	 1833	 one	 of	 the	most	 spectacular	meteor	 showers	 in	 recorded	 history	






ever	beheld.	 It	did	appear	as	 if	every	star	had	 left	 its	moorings,	and	was	drifting	
rapidly	 in	 a	 westerly	 direction,	 leaving	 behind	 a	 track	 of	 light,	 which	 remained	
visible	for	several	seconds.	Some	of	those	wandering	stars	seemed	as	large	as	the	
full	moon,	or	nearly	so,	and	in	some	cases	they	appeared	to	dash	at	a	rapid	rate	
across	 the	 general	 course	 of	 the	main	 body	 of	meteors,	 leaving	 in	 their	 track	 a	
bluish	 light,	which	gathered	 into	a	 thin	 cloud	not	unlike	a	puff	of	 smoke	 from	a	
tobacco-pipe.	Some	of	the	meteors	were	so	bright	that	they	were	visible	for	some	









Rogers	 was	 an	 educated	man	 and	 knew	 about	meteor	 showers;	 yet	 the	 extraordinary	
intensity,	the	grandeur	and	beauty	of	what	he	saw	filled	him	with	wonder,	and	thus	his	
world	was	 in	a	way	enlarged	or	renewed	as	he	became	aware	that	 it	could	 indeed	hold	
such	 qualities.	 Indeed	 he	 acknowledges	 that	 his	 description	 may	 leave	 us	 with	 only	 a	
“faint	idea”	of	what	was	going	on	which	could	indicate	that	what	is	truly	wonder-filled	is	
beyond	words	to	describe	and	that	 in	order	to	obtain	a	richer	understanding	of	wonder	
one	 must	 experience	 it	 personally.	 However,	 the	 subjective	 nature	 of	 this	 experience	
does	not	make	it	solipsistic:	Rogers’	account	speaks	clearly	of	the	potential	communality	




rare,	 unexpected	and	extraordinary,	 the	 second	example	 concerns	philosopher	 Juan	de	




presence	but	 simultaneously	 felt	 I	was	 going	 to	 faint.	 I	went	 into	 the	bathroom	
and	began	to	 furiously	splash	water	on	my	 face,	not	so	much	to	wash	away	 the	











a	 person	 is,	 all	 that	 she	 knows	 and	 cares	 about	will	 at	 some	point	 disappear.	 Realising	
one’s	mortality	 leads	 to	a	 series	of	 imposing	existential	questions:	What	 should	one	do	
with	the	time	one	has	been	given?	How	should	one	live?	Is	there	something	one	must	do	
before	the	end?	Is	there	a	goal	or	purpose	to	human	existence	and	who	or	what	would	
and	 indeed	 could	 operate	 as	 guarantor	 for	 any	 answer	 to	 such	questions?	As	 no	quick	
answer	capable	of	withstanding	critical	scrutiny	is	easily	obtainable	facing	such	existential	
queries	may	well	provoke	wonderment,	although	 this	will	 to	an	extent	depend	on	how	
our	 individual	mindsets	and	circumstances	 influence	our	experiences	and	perception.	 In	
this,	 as	 in	 all	 the	 examples	 I	 will	 discuss,	my	 aim	 is	 not	 to	 claim	 essential	 or	 universal	








of	 Shakespeare’s	 tragedy	 Hamlet,	 where	 we	 find	 Horatio,	 the	 learned	 friend	 of	 Prince	
Hamlet,	joining	the	night	watchmen	Marcellus	and	Bernardo	on	their	late	and	bitter	cold	
watch	at	Elsinore	Castle.	On	the	previous	night	the	watchmen	sighted	what	appeared	to	

















Horatio	 declares	 that	 his	 response	 embraces	 both	 fear	 and	 wonder,	 due	 to	 the	
unexpected	 and	 extraordinary	 encounter,	 which	 in	 this	 particular	 case	 involves	 the	
paranormal.	 The	 ghost	 is	 an	 anomaly.	 It	 is	 thing	 that	 should	 not	 be	 there	 and	 its	 very	
presence	 displaces	 Horatio	 because	 the	 world	 he	 inhabits	 has	 suddenly	 become	 a	
stranger	to	him.	We	might	even	say	that	seeing	the	ghost	diminishes	his	self	because	not	
only	does	 it	 challenge	what	he	 thought	 to	be	 real	or	otherwise	a	 reasonable	picture	of	
how	the	world	works;	it	also	gives	rise	to	a	identity-crises	involving	questions	about	what	
and	who	he	is.	What	he	thought	to	be	real	or	otherwise	a	reasonable	picture	of	how	the	
world	works	 now	 stands	 challenged,	 and	 so	 does	 indeed	 his	 identity.	 Furthermore	 the	
scene	indicates	that	experiencing	wonder	at	least	to	some	degree	can	be	an	arresting	or	
astonishing	affair	that	may	last	only	temporarily.	The	example	informs	us	that	wonder	is	
an	 experience,	 which	 starts	 with	 an	 intense	 moment	 of	 surprise	 and	 dislocation	 but	
swiftly	leads	in	to	a	strong	desire	to	know	more	and	indeed	to	act.	
	
Literature	 offers	 vivid	 examples	 of	 wonder	 arising	 from	 unexpected	 encounters,	 and	 I	
turn	in	my	fourth	example	to	German	author	Thomas	Mann’s	novel	The	Magic	Mountain.	




















lifted	his	 huge	hand	 again	 from	his	 thigh	 and	pointed	with	 his	 forefinger	 at	 the	
pulsating	 shadow.	 Good	 God,	 it	 was	 the	 heart,	 it	 was	 Joachim’s	 honour-loving	
heart,	 that	 Hans	 Castorp	 saw!	 “I	 am	 looking	 at	 your	 heart.”	 He	 said	 in	 a	
suppressed	 voice.	 “Go	 ahead.”	 Answered	 Joachim	 again;	 probably	 he	 smiled	
politely	 up	 there	 in	 the	 darkness.	 But	 the	 Hofrat	 told	 him	 to	 be	 quiet	 and	 not	
betray	any	sensibility.	Behrens	studied	the	spots	and	the	lines,	the	black	festoon	in	
the	 intercostal	 space;	 while	 Hans	 Castorp	 gazed	 without	 wearying	 at	 Joachim’s	




The	 scene	 is	 wonder-filled	 for	 a	 number	 of	 reasons.	 First	 of	 all	 the	 protagonist	 is	
experiencing	wonder	when	 he	 via	 the	 X-ray	 apparatus	 beholds	 the	 insides	 of	 his	 living	
cousin	 including	 the	 pulsating	 heart	 and	 parts	 of	 his	 skeleton.	 The	 X-ray	machine	 is	 a	
technological	 wonder	 that	 gives	 Castorp	 a	 kind	 of	 augmented	 sight	 allowing	 him	
momentarily	to	see	something	that	normally	 lies	beyond	our	senses.	Secondly	Castorp’s	
new	found	‘ability’	sharpens	his	cognitive	focus	and	gives	rise	to	thoughts	about	life	and	
death.	 Thus	 the	 example	 is	 complementary	 to	 de	 Pasquale’s	 as	 it	 brings	 into	 view	 big	
questions	 about	 the	nature	of	 existence	which	 if	we	were	 to	 extrapolate	 is	 to	 say	 that	
although	we	may	 feel	 very	much	 alive	 and	well	 our	 existence	 is	 transient	 and	one	day	
things	 inevitably	will	 come	 to	an	end	without	us	 fully	 knowing	why	and	why	 it	was	we	
have	been	alive	in	the	first	place.	In	support	of	this	stands	Mann’s	use	of	the	Latin	phrase	






exclamation	 ‘My	God,	 I	 see!’	which	 is	 emotionally	 charged	 and	 brings	 to	 our	 attention	
that	 Castorp	 (and	 perhaps	 the	 reader	 as	 well)	 just	 ‘saw’	 or	 realised	 something	 of	 the	
utmost	 importance.	Thirdly	 it	gives	rise	to	awareness	of	 ignorance	or	 lack	of	knowledge	
because	 suddenly,	 courtesy	 of	 augmented	 sight,	 to	 perceive	 parts	 of	 the	 world	 that	
hitherto	have	remained	hidden	is	also	to	become	aware	that	our	knowledge	of	the	world	







make	 observations,	 informed	me,	 that	 one	 of	 the	 servants	 of	 the	 house,	 going	




capable	 of	 being	 made	 considerably	 dark,	 and	 then	 I	 plainly	 saw,	 both	 with	
wonder	and	delight,	 that	 the	 joint	of	meat	did,	 in	divers	places	shine	 like	 rotten	
wood	 or	 stinking	 fish;	 which	 was	 so	 uncommon	 a	 sight,	 that	 I	 had	 presently	
thoughts	of	inviting	you	to	be	a	sharer	in	the	pleasure	of	it.	
(Boyle,	1672,	vol	3,	p.	651)	
What	 is	 interesting	 from	 Boyle’s	 description	 is	 that	 his	 first	 reaction	 on	 seeing	 the	
luminous	meat	is	wonder	accompanied	with	delight.	This	is	in	other	words	an	emotional	
upheaval	but	unlike	in	the	example	focussing	on	Horatio	from	Shakespeare’s	Hamlet	it	is	
not	connected	 to	 fear	because	Boyle	 (but	not	his	 servant)	 is	not	 frightened	by	what	he	
witnesses	but	 takes	pleasure	 in	 the	mysterious	glow	and	quickly	 sets	out	 to	 investigate	













his	 youth,	 namely	 Sam	 Keen	 who	 writes	 of	 an	 ordinary	 day	 in	 the	 city	 of	 Maryville,	
Tennessee:	
	
When	 I	 was	 six	 years	 old	 I	 was	 walking	 by	 a	 courthouse	 in	 a	 small	 town	 in	
Tennessee.		A	man	came	out,	followed	by	a	large	crowd.		As	he	walked	past	me,	
he	pulled	a	knife	 from	his	belt	and	said,	“I	present	you	with	this	knife.”	Before	 I	
could	 see	 his	 face	 or	 overcome	 my	 shock	 and	 thank	 him,	 he	 turned	 and	
disappeared.	The	knife	was	a	strange	and	mysterious	gift.	The	handle	was	made	
out	 of	 the	 foot	 of	 a	 deer,	 and	 on	 the	 blade	 there	 was	 something	 written	 in	 a	
foreign	language	which	no	one	in	town	could	translate.	For	weeks	after	this	event	
I	 lived	with	a	pervasive	sense	of	gratitude	to	 the	stranger	and	with	a	wondering	
expectancy	 created	 by	 the	 realization	 that	 such	 a	 strange	 and	 wonderful	
happening	 could	occur	 in	 the	ordinary	world	 of	Maryville.	 If	 nameless	 strangers	
gave	such	gifts,	what	surprises	might	be	expected	in	the	world?	
(Keen,	1969,	p.	211)	
While	 it,	 too,	 emphasises	 the	 sudden	 and	 unexpected,	 Keen’s	 experience	 of	 wonder	
springs	 from	 something	 as	 ordinary	 as	 gift-giving	 and	 is	 characterised	 by	 a	 long-lasting	
‘wondrous	 afterglow’	 that	 involves	 a	 sense	 of	 gratitude	 and	 wondering	 expectancy.	
Keen’s	experience	of	wonder	contrasts	with	those	of	Rogers’	and	de	Pasquale’s	in	that	it	
emerges	 in	 a	much	 less	dramatic	or	 emotionally	 charged	environment.	 Keen’s	 example	
shows	 that	 wonder	 can	 emerge	 from	 a	 small	 abnormality	 in	 the	 ordinariness	 of	 the	
everyday	and	suggests	that	in	wonder	our	capacity	for	imagination	is	put	to	use	as	we	try	












image	 and	 after	 a	 few	 seconds	 I	 observed	 her	 eyes	 widening	 and	 her	 mouth	 opened	
slightly	 before	 she	 gently	 uttered	 ‘it’s	 a	 rabbit’.	 My	 daughter’s	 experience,	 the	
intensification	of	her	cognitive	focus	and	the	particular	expression	on	her	face7	during	her	
moment	 of	 aesthetic	 appreciation	 reveal	 this	 experience	 as	 one	 of	 wonder.	 The	
encounter	with	the	duck-rabbit	produced	a	small	rift	in	the	ordinary	understood	as	what	
she	 takes	 for	 granted	 including	 the	 idea	 that	 she	 has	 a	 one-to-one	 relation	 with	 the	
external	world	 and	 that	 this	world	 is	 reliable	 and	 consistently	predictable.	 Through	her	
experience	of	wonder	she	suddenly	‘saw’	new	patterns,	which	introduced	her	to	a	world	









the	 first	 time.	 From	 the	 paranormal	 goings	 on	 in	 Shakespeare’s	Hamlet	 we	 found	 that	



















might	 take	 pleasure	 in	 the	 experience	 of	 wonder	 to	 such	 a	 degree	 that	 it	 may	 fuel	 a	
sustained	inquiry	 into	the	object	of	wonder.	Keen’s	narrative	told	us	that	wonder	might	
arise	 from	 an	 ordinary	 event,	 that	 it	 intensifies	 the	 use	 of	 the	 imagination	 and	 can	 be	





comes	 to	 building	 a	 preliminary	 notion	 of	 wonder,	 as	 they	 provide	 insight	 into	 the	
constituents	 of	 wonder	 and	 invites	 further	 inquiry	 as	 they	 carry	 with	 them	 important	








knowledge	 and	 understanding	 (Plato,	 1926`).	 It	 also	 stipulates	 that	 obtaining	 the	 right	
understanding	of	a	particular	word	is	a	tricky	matter	and	that	etymology	as	a	teaching	is	
compromised	 by	 the	 crippling	 conflict	 between	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 Hermogenes	
(conventionalist)	and	on	the	other	Cratylus	(naturalist).8	The	conventionalist	would	argue	
that	 there	 is	 no	 correct	 usage	 of	 a	 particular	 name	besides	what	 is	 supported	 by	 local	
convention.	 For	 instance	 the	 aurora	 borealis	 is	 called	 ‘aurora	 borealis’	 only	 because	




it	 any	 name	 other	 than	 its	 natural	 name,	 one	 is	 completely	 failing	 to	 address	 it	 at	 all.	






be	used	alone	 to	pinpoint	 the	meaning	of	 a	word.	 It	 can	 also	be	 argued	 that	 it	 has	no	
purpose	 in	 a	 philosophical	 inquiry,	 as	 it	 does	 not	 provide	 any	 security	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
meaning	of	the	word.	Nevertheless	I	shall	argue	that	etymology	is	not	completely	useless	
to	 our	 current	 endeavour.	 Etymology	 can	 be	 used	 to	 indicate	 the	 root	 of	 wonder,	 its	
possible	 variation	 in	meaning	 over	 different	 languages	 and	 reveal	whether	 its	meaning	
changes	depending	on	how	one	uses	the	word.	On	that	note	let	us	have	a	closer	look	at	
what	etymology	can	tell	us	about	the	thing	called	‘wonder’.	
	 According	to	Chambers	Dictionary	of	Etymology	the	word	 ‘wonder’	derives	 from	
the	Old	English	word	‘wundor’	meaning	marvellous	thing.	The	word	has	 links	to	the	Old	
High	 German	 ‘wunter’	 which	 in	 modern	 German	 has	 become	 ‘wunder’.	 It	 can	 also	 be	
ventured	 that	 wonder	 has	 connections	 to	 the	 Old	 English	 ‘wundian’	 and	 the	 German	
‘wunde’	meaning	wound	or	cut	suggesting	that	to	be	wonderstruck	is	to	be	wounded	in	a	




or	 delight	 (Partridge,	 1966).	 This	 particular	 idea	 of	 wonder	 finds	 academic	 support.	
Literary	 scholar	Philip	 Fisher	 for	example	 connects	wonder	with	delight	 and	admiration	
and	points	out	that	the	Latin	root	of	admiration	is	‘mira’	which	also	is	the	Latin	name	for	
wonder	 and	 furthermore	 the	 root	 of	 the	word	miracle	 (Fisher,	 2003,	 p.	 11).	 Historians	





wonder	 (Quinn,	 2002,	 p.	 4;	 Theobald,	 1901,	 p.	 83).	 Furthermore	 Quinn	 suggests	 that	
‘admire’	 is	 a	 word	 of	 the	 senses,	 of	 passions,	 and	 of	 the	 intellect	 and	 relates	 to	 both	
seeing	 and	 knowing.	 This	 he	 relates	 to	 the	 Greek	 word	 ‘thau’	 which	 may	 connect	 to	
wonder	or	 to	 look	at	 something	 in	wonder.	Wonder	 in	Greek	 is	 ‘thauma’,	derived	 from	














Wonder	 also	 bears	 resemblance	 to	 the	 Old	 Icelandic	 word	 ‘undr’,	 which	 in	
Sweden,	Norway	and	Denmark	is	known	as	‘under’.	For	something	to	be	an	‘under’	 it	 is	
[attributed	 to]	 an	 extraordinary	 object,	 event	 or	 person	 of	 admirable	 composition	 or	
character.	For	example	it	can	be	well	said	that	the	Great	Pyramid	of	Giza	is	a	wonder	or	
extraordinary	 object	 because	 of	 its	 uniqueness.	 The	 same	 can	 be	 said	 about	Mahatma	
Gandhi’s	 Salt	March	 to	 Dandi	 in	 1930	 that	 alerted	 the	world	 to	 the	 burgeoning	 Indian	
independence	movement.	
In	 the	 Danish	 language	 one	 also	 finds	 the	 similar	 but	 more	 inquisitive	 word	
‘undre’.	This	is	equivalent	to	the	English	‘wonder’	understood	in	the	context	of	‘I	wonder	
what,	I	wonder	why,	I	wonder	if	and	I	wonder	how’	and	it	allows	us	to	say	that	‘wonder’	
can	be	used	both	as	a	noun	and	a	verb.	One	way	of	 illustrating	 this	 is	 to	 return	 to	 the	
paranormal	goings	on	at	Elsinore	Castle.	Seeing	the	ghost	of	the	late	king	is	to	the	learned	
Horatio	 a	wonder	 (noun)	 but	 seeing	 the	 king	 also	made	 him	wonder	 (inquisitive	 verb)	
about	the	nature	and	purpose	of	the	ghost.	In	addition	to	‘wonder’	as	a	noun	and	a	verb	
‘wonder’	 also	 presents	 itself	 as	 an	 adjective	 and	 an	 adverb.	 If	 ‘wonder’	 is	 used	 as	 an	
adjective	 it	 is	used	to	describe	a	property	of	something	meaning	that	 if	we	for	example	
say	 that	Horatio	 is	a	wondering	 (adjective)	man	we	are	giving	voice	 to	one	of	 the	parts	
that	make	up	 the	person	 called	Horatio.	Wonder	 can	also	be	used	as	 an	 adverb	 in	 the	
sense	 that	 we	 can	 do	 something	 wonderingly	 (adverb)	 indicating	 that	 the	 focus	 is	 no	
longer	 on	 the	 wonder-filled	 thing	 in	 itself	 (noun)	 or	 that	 we	 actively	 wonder	 about	
something	 (verb)	 or	 that	 we	 are	 describing	 a	 property	 of	 someone	 or	 something	
(adjective)	but	on	wonder	as	 in	 ‘we	are	doing	something	 in	a	particular	way’.	We	might	
say	 that	 after	 Horatio	 learned	 about	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 ghost	 he	 approached	 it	
wonderingly	or	in	a	wondering	fashion	(adverb).	
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wonder	 as	 it	 points	 out	 some	 of	 the	 various	 different	 meanings	 and	 connotations	
‘wonder’	as	a	word	may	have.	Wonder	can	be	seen	as	a	wound	but	also	something	that	
produces	 smiles,	 joy	 and	 delight.	 It	 may	 be	 that	 it	 is	 synonymous	 with	 marvel	 and	







For	 the	historical	account	of	wonder	 that	 I	 am	about	 to	give	 I	 shall	 lean	heavily	on	 the	
work	of	literary	scholar	and	historian	of	wonder	Dennis	Quinn	and	his	book	Iris	Exiled	–	A	
Synoptic	History	of	Wonder,	which	stands	as	one	of	the	more	comprehensive	histories	of	
wonder	 in	 the	 literature.	 Despite	 being	 synoptic	Quinn’s	 book	 stands	 alone	 as	 a	wide-
ranging	 and	 lengthy	 historical	 account	 of	 wonder.	 To	 support	 Quinn’s	 work	 I	 will	 also	
make	 references	 to	 a	 number	 of	 accounts	 targeting	 selected	 periods	 or	 themes	 in	 the	
history	of	wonder	such	as	philosopher	Sylvana	Chrysakopoulou’s	essay	‘Wonder	and	the	
Beginning	of	Philosophy	in	Plato’	 (Chrysakopoulou,	2012)	which	focuses	on	philosophy’s	
beginning	 in	 wonder	 and	 historian	 John	 Onians’	 essay	 ‘I	 wonder,	 A	 short	 history	 of	
amazement’	 (Onians,	 1994),	 highlighting	 how	 wonder	 reveals	 itself	 through	 art	 and	
engagement	with	natural	history.	Likewise	I	will	make	use	of	historians	Daston	and	Park’s	
Wonders	and	the	Order	of	Nature	(Daston	&	Park,	1998)	which	focuses	on	wonder	from	
the	medieval	 period	 through	 to	 the	enlightenment	 and	historian	 Frank	Nadis’s	Wonder	
Shows	 which	 begins	 where	 Daston	 and	 Park	 end	 their	 study	 namely	 with	 the	
‘vulgarization	 of	 wonder’	 (Nadis,	 2005,	 p.	 263).	 Now	 it	 is	 important	 for	 the	 reader	 to	
realise	 that	 the	 framework	of	 this	 thesis	does	not	allow	a	 full	history	of	wonder;	hence	
the	 headline	 ‘A	 History	 of	 Wonder	 and	 not	 ‘The	 History	 of	 Wonder’.	 This	 may	 be	
disappointing	 but	 given	 that	 we	 are	 merely	 seeking	 a	 preliminary	 understanding	 of	
wonder	 an	 incomplete	historical	 account	of	wonder	depicting	where	 the	 conception	of	
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wonder	 takes	 a	 significant	 turn	 will	 be	 excused.	 Bearing	 this	 in	 mind	 let	 us	 begin	 by	
addressing	what	may	be	called	early	cultivators	of	wonder,	the	ancient	Greeks.	





the	 sea	 god	 Thaumas	 (wonder)	married	 Electra	 and	 had	 three	 daughters	 including	 Iris	
(rainbow)	and	the	beautiful-haired	harpies	Aello	and	Ocypete	(Hesiod,	2006,	Th266).	Iris	
is	particularly	significant	for	our	purpose	here	because	she	functions	as	messenger	of	the	











epistemology.	 The	 dialogue’s	 youthful	 namesake	 exclaims	 upon	 the	 realisation	 that	 he	
does	not	know	what	knowledge	is	itself,	‘By	the	gods,	Socrates,	I	am	lost	in	wonder	when	



















beholding	 Iris	or	being	 in	 a	 state	of	wonder	 can	be	an	uncomfortable	and	destabilising	
experience	 inclined	 to	 make	 one’s	 head	 swim13.	 As	 daunting	 as	 this	 may	 sound	 it	 is	
nevertheless	 the	pathos	and	 trademark	of	a	philosopher	as	Socrates	clearly	 states.	This	








people	and	dedicated	 little	 time	 to	philosophy.	What	normally	 is	 referred	 to	as	Roman	
philosophy	 are	 the	 deliberations	 of	 the	moralists	 Cicero,	 Seneca,	Marcus	 Aurelius	 and	
Plutarch,	but	to	moralise	does	not	necessarily	evoke	wonderment	nor	does	it	necessarily	
mean	that	it	is	philosophy.	According	to	Quinn	moralising	demands	rather	the	application	
of	ethical	principles	 to	 the	act	of	 correct	 living	 (Quinn,	2002,	97).	 It	 can	be	argued	 that	























element	 in	Epicurean	ethics	 that	 flags	pleasure	and	encourages	 the	 individual	 to	satisfy	
























Middle	 Ages.	 This	was	 a	 troublesome	 period	 for	 the	 Roman	 Christians	 and	 culminated	
with	 the	 sacking	 of	 Rome	 by	 the	 Visigoths	 in	 410	 CE	 (Augustin,	 2002,	 p.	 14)	 and	 the	







work	 The	 City	 of	 God17	 aimed	 at	 aiding	 the	 doubtful	 by	 strengthening	 their	 belief	 in	
Christianity	 (Augustin,	 2002,	 p.	 15).	 However	 before	 attending	 to	 Augustine’s	magnum	
opus	let	us	take	a	look	at	his	earlier	autobiographical	work,	the	Confessions.	Augustine’s	







itself?	 Is	 it	without	 itself	 and	not	within?	How	 then	doth	 it	not	 contain	 itself?	A	
wonderful	 admiration	 surprises	 me,	 and	 an	 astonishment	 seizes	 me	 upon	 this.	
And	men	go	abroad	to	wonder	at	the	height	of	mountains,	the	lofty	billows	of	the	
sea,	 the	 long	 courses	 of	 rivers,	 the	 vast	 compass	 of	 the	 ocean,	 and	 the	 circular	
motions	of	the	stars,	and	yet	pass	themselves	by,	nor	wonder	that	while	I	spake	of	
all	these	things	I	did	not	see	them	with	mine	eyes;	yet	could	I	not	have	spoken	of	
them,	 unless	 those	 mountains,	 and	 billows,	 and	 rivers,	 and	 stars	 which	 I	 have	
seen,	and	that	ocean	I	believe	to	be,	I	saw	inwardly	in	my	memory,	yea,	with	such	
vast	 spaces	between,	as	 if	 I	 verily	 saw	them	abroad.	Yet	did	 I	not	swallow	them	




From	 reading	 Augustine	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 even	 though	 the	 height	 of	 mountains	 and	 the	
billows	of	the	sea	may	indeed	foster	a	sense	of	wonder	one	needs	not	travel	far	or	rely	
solely	on	natural	wonders	in	order	to	experience	wonder.	Reflection	upon	the	mystery	of	
how	 we	 remember	 or	 recall	 past	 experiences	 can	 prove	 quite	 a	 sufficient	 source	 of	











the	 City	 of	 Earth.	 The	 City	 of	 God	 refers	 to	 people	 of	 the	 Christian	 faith	 seeking	 the	
eternal	truths	of	God.	By	contrast	the	City	of	Earth	refers	to	pagan	people	who	made	the	
finite	 earthly	 life	 their	 business	 and	 pleasure.	 In	 time	 and	 if	 human	 kind	 embraces	
Christianity	the	idea	is	that	The	City	of	God	will	stand	triumphant.	For	our	purposes	Book	
XXI	 of	 The	 City	 of	 God	 is	 particularly	 interesting	 because	 here	 Augustine	 discusses	 a	





the	 spectator	 the	 impression	 that	 it	 floated	 in	 mid	 air	 (Augustin,	 2002,	 Book	 XXI,	 VI).	
Augustine	used	 the	 first	 two	examples	 in	his	argument	 for	 the	 idea	 that	not	everything	
that	 is	on	 fire	will	be	consumed.	This	played	an	 important	part	 in	his	outlook	on	divine	
punishment	 and	 the	 idea	 that	 sinners	 in	 the	 afterlife	 had	 to	 undergo	 purification	 by	
eternal	 fire	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 entrance	 to	 Heaven	 (Augustin,	 2002,	 XXI,	 II).	 The	 third	
example	helped	illustrate	the	existence	of	wonders	developed	from	human	ingenuity	and	
possibly	 with	 demonic	 aid,	 which	 could	 lead	 people	 away	 from	 the	 Christian	 path	
(Augustin,	2002,	XXI,	VI).	Additionally	Augustine	points	out	that	the	created	universe	is	a	
wonder	 designed	 for	 human	 pleasure	 and	 delight	 and	 that	 it	 in	 itself	 surpasses	 the	
wonder	of	the	things	it	contains	(Augustin,	2002,	Book	XXI,	VII).	By	this	notion	Augustine	
points	out	that	even	though	the	world	contains	many	objects	of	wonder	the	greatest	of	
wonders	 lies	 in	the	mystery	and	omnipotence	of	God	who	created	 it	all.	Additionally	as	




















By	 then	 the	 first	 universities	 had	 emerged	 and	 Christendom	 saw	 the	 reappearance	 of	
ancient	Greek	 texts	coming	 from	the	Arab	countries.	Among	these	 texts	 translated	 into	
Latin	 from	 both	 Greek	 originals	 and	 Arabic	 translations	 we	 find	 the	 nearly	 complete	
philosophical	corpus	of	Aristotle.	The	re-emergence	of	Aristotle	posed	a	new	“threat”	to	
Christianity	 as	 it	 offered	 a	 seemingly	 well	 thought-through	 pagan	 alternative	 to	
Christianity	claiming	that	the	world	was	eternal	and	no	such	thing	as	an	immortal	human	






wondering	 at	 what	 they	 saw,	 and	 not	 knowing	 its	 cause,	 men	 first	 began	 to	
philosophise,	and	when	they	had	discovered	the	cause	they	were	at	rest.’	Nor	do	
they	cease	inquiring	until	they	come	to	the	first	cause	[…]	Therefore	man	naturally	




The	 Thomistic	 idea	 of	 wonder	 being	 a	 desire	 for	 knowledge	 draws	 on	 Aristotle,	 which	
becomes	 clear	when	 reading	 the	opening	 sentence	of	Aristotle’s	Metaphysics:	 ‘All	men	
naturally	 desire	 knowledge’	 (Aristotle,	 1989,	 I).	 This	 is	 shortly	 followed	 by	 the	
confirmation	that	philosophy	begins	in	wonder:	
	
It	 is	 through	 wonder	 that	 men	 begin	 and	 originally	 began	 to	 philosophize;	














Whereas	 the	 highest	 form	 of	 knowledge	 for	 Aristotle	 was	 scientia22	 for	 Aquinas	 this	
comprised	 of	 knowledge	 that	 precedes	 faith.	 Aquinas	 introduced	 another	 kind	 of	
knowledge	that	acknowledges	the	mysterious	dimension	of	faith,	referring	to	the	kind	of	
knowledge	 that	will	not	be	 revealed	by	 reason	but	 in	principle	can	only	be	known	with	
the	 aid	 of	 divine	 revelation	 (Aquinas,	 2006,	 Part	 I,	 p.	 10).	 This	 allows	 us	 to	 say	 that	
although	 Aquinas	 evokes	 the	 notion	 that	 philosophy	 begins	 in	wonder	 and	 that	we	 all	
seek	knowledge	and	absence	of	ignorance	he	also	teaches	us	that	the	knowledge	of	God	
is	the	highest	form	of	knowledge	and	therein	lies	the	greatest	of	wonder.		
	 Aquinas	 completed	 his	 Summa	 Theologiae	 between	 1265-1274	 CE	 and	 one	 can	
argue	that	with	 its	publication	the	Middle	Ages	or	scholasticism	reached	a	 thriving	high	
point.	However	over	 the	next	 couple	of	 centuries	a	 series	of	major	 calamities	 spun	 the	
European	High	Middle	Age	 culture	 into	 an	 inevitable	 decline.	 The	Great	 Famine	 (1315-
1317)	is	one	of	these	calamities	as	it	ended	the	lives	of	millions	of	Europeans.	The	Black	
Death	 (1348-1350)	 also	 qualifies	 as	 it	 ravaged	 and	 robbed	 Europe	 of	 40-60%	 of	 its	




The	 Early	 Modern	 Era	 is	 a	 historical	 term	 that	 describes	 the	 period	 starting	 from	
approximately	the	year	1500	CE	and	ends	with	the	beginning	of	the	Enlightenment	in	18th	









Modern	Era	Neo-Platonism23	presented	a	 strong	 intellectual	 current	and	 influenced	 the	
philosopher	Nicholas	of	Cusa.	Nicholas’	main	inspiration	was	Plotinus	and	in	his	De	Docta	
Ignorantia	 (On	 learned	 ignorance)	 he	 stated	 that	 since	 the	 infinite	 God	 stands	 in	
contradiction	to	all	that	is	finite,	we	human	beings,	understood	as	finite	beings,	can	have	
no	 knowledge	of	God	 (Cusa,	 2001,	 p.	 46).	 To	 a	 degree	 this	 also	 extends	 to	 the	natural	
world,	 which	 for	 Nicolas	 was	 scarcely	 knowable	 due	 to	 its	 close	 connection	 with	 God	
(Quinn,	 2002,	 p.	 168).	 When	 it	 comes	 to	 wonderment	 the	 new	 idea	 is	 that	 wonder	
ultimately	prompts	us	 to	embrace	our	 ignorance	and	after	 that	simply	 rest	 in	 faith.	We	
cannot	know	God	and	so	we	are	left	to	wonder	(Quinn,	2002,	p.	168).	




‘wonderful’	 is	 synonymous	 with	 ‘estimable’	 or	 ‘exalted’	 and	 that	 the	 oration	 marks	 a	
crucial	 turning	 point	 in	 the	 history	 of	wonder.	 The	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	 here	we	 find	
literary	evidence	 for	an	early	hyperbolization	of	wonder	 (Quinn,	2002,	p.	170).	Another	






at	 the	 level	of	beasts	and	on	 the	other	elevate	 themselves	 to	become	something	more	
(Quinn,	 2002,	 p.	 171).	 Regardless	 it	 is	 important	 to	 realise	 that	 no	 matter	 what	 one	
chooses	to	be	one	fact	remains	and	that	 is	 that	one	 is	human.	The	thing	that	makes	us	












spiritual.	 One	 of	 the	 pioneers	 was	 the	 empirically	 minded	 Francis	 Bacon	 and	 to	 the	
student	of	wonder	he	signals	the	next	step	in	the	history	of	wonder.	According	to	Bacon’s	
The	Advancement	of	 Learning	 from	1605	CE	 the	new	philosophy	does	not	 ‘presume	by	
the	 contemplation	 of	 nature	 to	 attain	 to	 the	 mysteries	 of	 God’	 (Bacon,	 1971,	 I).	 The	
examination	 of	 nature	 does	 indeed	 produce	 knowledge	 but	 ‘having	 regard	 to	 God	 no	




in	relation	to	nature.	To	Bacon	wonder	 is	 the	 ‘seed	of	knowledge’	 (Bacon,	1971,	p.	17);	
however	 when	 one	 uses	 the	 contemplation	 of	 nature	 as	 a	 lever	 to	 obtain	 knowledge	
about	God,	wonder	no	longer	answers	to	that	description	and	comes	to	a	full	stop.	From	
this	moment	 on	 gaining	 knowledge	 becomes	 impossible	 and	we	 are	 once	 again	 left	 to	
wonder	(Quinn,	2002,	p.	197).	
Wonder	 as	 a	passion	 is	 also	 important	 to	 another	prominent	 figure	of	 the	Early	
Modern	 Age:	 Rene	 Descartes.	 Descartes	 was	 a	 reformer	 and	 his	 work	 Discourse	 on	
Method	 (Descartes,	 2008)	 aimed	 at	 arriving	 at	 clear	 and	 distinct	 ideas	 without	 for	
example	 appealing	 to	 authority,	 which	 was	 widely	 practised	 in	 scholasticism.	 In	 his	
treatise	 on	 the	 rainbow	 that	 accompanied	 the	 Discourse	 on	 Method	 Descartes’	
explanation	of	 the	enigmas	of	 the	 rainbow	completely	put	an	end	 to	 the	 supremacy	of	
the	Aristotelian	account,	which	is	to	be	found	in	Aristotle’s	Meteorology	(Aristotle,	1951,	
III,	 4-5).	 Descartes’	 work	 was	 so	 successful	 that	 today	 it	 remains	 a	 major	 source	 of	
knowledge	with	 regards	 to	explaining	 the	 features	of	 the	 rainbow	 (Fisher,	2003,	p.	42).	
Although	 scientific	work	 on	 the	 rainbow	 is	 interesting	 as	 it	 offers	 an	 alternative	 to	 the	










It	 is	clear	 that	 to	Descartes	wonder	 is	 the	 first	of	all	 the	passions.25	This	 rests	upon	the	





Descartes	 wonderment	 is	 situated	 between	 deficiency	 and	 excess.	 Never	 to	 wonder	
equals	stupidity	as	 it	 spells	out	a	mind	that	never	observes	or	 takes	notice	of	anything.	
Wonder	in	the	excess	is	the	reverse	of	stupidity	and	encompasses	being	astonished26	by	
literally	everything	one	experiences.	 In	Cartesian	optics	not	being	able	 to	marvel	at	 the	
aurora	borealis	the	first	time	one	encounters	 it	 is	 just	as	bad	as	when	one	 is	constantly	
astonished	by	cheap	parlour	tricks.	Cartesian	wonderment	acknowledges	ignorance	when	
something	 new	 is	 encountered	 but	 prompts	 investigation	 of	 the	 object	 of	 wonder.	
Furthermore	once	an	 investigation	has	 identified	the	object	of	wonder	or	woven	 it	 into	
the	 fabric	of	 the	 familiar,	perhaps	as	a	variation	of	a	particular	phenomenon	or	object,	







wonder	 at	 them,	 and	 to	 think	 that	 all	 those	 which	 may	 afterwards	 present	
themselves	 are	 common,	 still,	 when	 it	 is	 excessive,	 and	 causes	 us	 to	 arrest	 our	
attention	 solely	 on	 the	 first	 image	 of	 the	 objects	which	 are	 presented,	without	
acquiring	 any	 other	 knowledge	 of	 them,	 it	 leaves	 behind	 it	 a	 custom	 which	













not	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 really	 knowing	 them:	 for	 little	 by	 little	 they	 become	 so	











of	 what	 is	 known	 as	 the	 Age	 of	 Reason,	 The	 Age	 of	 Enlightenment	 or	 merely	 the	
Enlightenment.	 The	 Enlightenment	was	 a	 period	 that	 began	 roughly	 from	 the	mid	 17th	
century	 and	 lasted	 throughout	 the	 18th	 century.	 It	 was	 a	 period	 characterised	 by	 the	
application	of	reason	and	empirical	science	in	the	interest	of	advancing	knowledge.	It	was	
an	 intellectual	 revolution	 and	 as	 with	 all	 revolutions	 there	 were	 casualties.	 For	 the	
student	 of	 wonder	 the	 scientific	 revolution	 further	 diminished	 the	 importance	 of	
wonderment	 as	 wonders	 became	 quantifiable	 through	 the	 empirical	 lens.	 The	 singular	
quality	 of	 for	 example	 Theaetetus’	 wonderment	 became	 marginalised	 or	 of	 minor	
importance	to	contemporary	intelligentsia.	
	 One	of	the	interesting	intellectuals	who	engaged	with	wonder	directly	during	this	
period	 is	Adam	Smith.	At	 the	outset	of	his	History	of	Astronomy	 he	 cautiously	makes	a	
distinction	between	wonder,	surprise	and	admiration.	Smith	writes:	
	 	
	 What	 is	 new	 and	 singular,	 excites	 that	 sentiment	 which	 in	 strict	 propriety	 is	






distinct	 from	what	 is	unexpected	which	brings	 surprise	and	 from	 the	great	or	beautiful	
which	 calls	 for	 our	 admiration.	 Quinn	 notes	 that	 Smith’s	 distinctions	 became	 popular	
during	 the	 Enlightenment	 but	 that	 the	 identification	 of	 wonder	 with	 novelty	 would	
eventually	denigrate	wonder	and	admiration	would	gradually	lose	its	momentum	due	to	
it	being	separated	from	wonder	(Quinn,	2002,	p.	240).	What	Smith	means	by	sentiment	is	
unclear	 but	 given	 that	 he	 does	 not	 elaborate	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 he	 uses	 the	 word	
‘sentiment’	as	synonymous	with	‘passion’.	The	idea	that	wonder	is	a	passion	comes	under	
attack	when	we	look	to	the	work	of	German	philosopher	Immanuel	Kant.	In	his	Critique	of	
Judgement	 he	 reveals	 that	 Vervunderung,	 which	 translates	 into	 ‘astonishment’	 or	
‘wonder’	 is	 ‘the	 affection	 produced	 by	 the	 representation	 of	 novelty	 exceeding	 our	
expectations’	 (Kant,	 1987,	 p.	 133).	 For	 Kant	 wonder	 is	 not	 a	 passion	 but	 an	 affection	
contrasting	Bewunderung,	which	translates	into	‘admiration’	or	‘esteem’.	This	distinction	
is	 important	 because	 according	 to	 Kant	 we	 do	 not	 put	 an	 end	 to	 our	 ‘admiration’	 or	
‘esteem’	 of	 someone	 or	 something	 just	 because	 the	 novelty	 has	 worn	 off.	 To	 Kant	
admiration	 or	 esteem	 is	 more	 enduring	 than	 wonder	 and	 the	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	
admiration	or	esteem	is	free	from	any	contaminating	feelings	(Quinn,	2002,	p.	243).	





admire	 is	 all	 the	 art	 I	 know,	 To	make	men	happy,	 and	 to	 keep	 them	 so’	 (Pope,	 1885b,	
Epistle	VI,	 To	Mr	Murray,	 1-2,	 p.	 300).	 The	 expression	 ‘not	 to	 admire’	 is	 not	 coined	by	
Pope	himself	but	originates	in	the	expression	‘Nil	Admirari’	used	in	the	Epistles	written	by	
the	 Roman	 poet	 Horace.	 In	 here	 Horace	 links	 the	 notion	 of	 Nil	 Admirari	 to	 human	
happiness	 by	 writing:	 ‘Marvel	 at	 nothing	 –	 that	 is	 perhaps	 the	 one	 and	 only	 thing,	
Numicus,	that	can	make	a	man	happy	and	keep	him	so’	(Horace,	1955,	Epistle	VI).	It	can	















nothing’	all	are	synonymous	with	 the	notion	 ‘wonder	at	nothing’.	The	reason	 for	 this	 is	
that	Pope	uses	the	same	Latin	phrase	as	Horace	and	when	we	consider	Pope’s	support	of	
science	and	belief	that	wonder	is	for	fools	it	appears	likely	that	‘Nil	Admirari’	may	refer	to	
wonder	 at	 nothing.	 Upon	 considering	 why	 Horace	 should	 have	 less	 regard	 for	
wonderment	 one	 possible	 reason	 is	 that	 Horace	 finished	 his	 formal	 education	 at	 the	
Academy	in	Athens.	At	the	time	Stoic	and	Epicurean	philosophy	dominated	the	Academy	
and	 it	 is	 likely	 that	Horace’s	 aversion	 to	wonder	 springs	 from	a	deep	 involvement	with	
those	particular	philosophies	(Kierman,	1999,	p.	25).	On	a	different	note	one	could	point	
out	 that	Cicero	does	not	use	the	Latin	phrase	 ‘Nil	Admirari’	but	 ‘Nihil	Admirari’	 (Cicero,	




Despite	negative	exponents	of	wonder	 like	Pope	and	 the	 fact	 that	wonder	by	 the	early	
18th	 century	 was	 connected	 with	 the	 vulgar	 i.e.	 ‘the	 barbarous,	 the	 ignorant	 and	 the	
unruly’	 people	 who	 celebrated	 ‘enthusiasm,	 superstition,	 and	 imagination’	 (Daston	 &	
Park,	1998,	p.	343)	wonder	was	soon	to	enjoy	a	renaissance.	As	the	18th	century	matured	
a	countermovement	to	the	Enlightenment	known	as	Romanticism	arose	questioning	the	













poetry	 and	 dance	 to	 literature	 and	 paintings	 (Murray,	 2004,	 p.	 ix).	 The	 Romantics	
attacked	the	very	backbone	of	the	Enlightenment	which	according	to	philosopher	Isaiah	
Berlin	 comprises	 of	 the	 following	 three	 propositions:	 1)	 all	 genuine	 questions	 can	 be	
answered,	2)	The	answers	are	knowable	and	3)	the	answers	must	be	compatible	with	one	
another	 (Berlin,	 2001,	 21-22).	 The	 general	 notion	 of	 the	 Enlightenment	was	 that	what	
Newton	achieved	in	the	area	of	physics	could	likewise	be	applied	to	the	ethical,	political	
and	aesthetic	 domains.	 (Berlin,	 2001,	 p.	 22).	Questions	 like	what	one	 should	do	 in	 life,	
how	 the	 perfect	 society	 was	 to	 be	 structured	 and	 what	 counts	 as	 beautiful	 were	 in	
principle	answerable	by	applying	reason.	However	this	strict	rationalisation	of	human	life	
that	leaves	no	room	for	passions	and	wonderment	was	to	the	Romantics	questionable	if	















Keats’	 antagonistic	 attitude	 towards	 natural	 philosophy	 understood	 as	 science	 and	 in	
















































The	 Romantic	 Era	 as	 a	 whole	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 countermovement	 to	 Enlightenment	
thought.	 The	detachment	of	 the	 scientist	 and	her	disregard	of	 the	passions	was	 to	 the	
Romantics	 a	 fundamental	mistake.	 The	 ultimate	 outcome	of	 the	 romantic	 revolt	was	 a	
sharp	division	between	science	and	poetry.	Science	would	in	the	name	of	reason	continue	
its	exploration	of	 the	material	universe	and	poetry	would	 claim	 ruler-ship	of	 the	heart,	
beauty,	 imagination,	 spirit	and	wonder	 (Quinn,	2002,	p.	272).	 It	 can	be	argued	 that	 the	
tension	 between	 the	 divided	 was	 never	 harmonised	 and	 as	 Romanticism	 entered	 its	
autumn	 years	 a	 deep	 chasm	 had	 opened	 between	 the	 two	 poles.	 Nevertheless	 as	 the	





















	 Wonder,	 says	 Aristotle	 is	 the	 first	 cause	 of	 philosophy:	 but	 in	 the	 discovery	







an	 infant	world,	 subdues	 no	more	 the	mind	 of	 him	who	 comprehends	 the	 one	
mechanical	 law	which	 the	 planetary	 systems	move,	maintain	 their	motion,	 and	
even	originally	form	themselves.	He	no	longer	wonders	at	the	object,	infinite	as	it	
always	 is,	 but	 at	 the	 human	 intellect	 alone	 which	 in	 a	 Copernicus,	 Kepler,	




to	 succeed	 in	 displaying	 to	 us	 a	 mechanical	 system	 of	 the	 human	 mind	 as	






Mill	 later	 challenges	 Hamilton’s	 viewpoint	 and	 argues	 that	 Hamilton	 is	mistaken	 in	 his	
view	that	science	is	hostile	to	wonder.	Mill	writes:	
	
I	 do	 wonder	 at	 the	 barrenness	 of	 imagination	 of	 a	 man	 who	 can	 see	 nothing	
wonderful	 in	 the	 material	 universe,	 since	 Newton,	 in	 an	 evil	 hour,	 partially	
	 44	
unravelled	a	limited	portion	of	it.	If	ignorance	is	with	him	a	necessary	condition	of	
wonder,	 can	 he	 find	 nothing	 to	wonder	 at	 in	 the	origin	 of	 the	 system	of	which	
Newton	 discovered	 the	 laws?	 nothing	 in	 the	 probable	 former	 extension	 of	 the	
solar	 substance	 beyond	 the	 orbit	 of	 Neptune?	 nothing	 in	 the	 starry	 heavens,	
which,	with	a	full	knowledge	of	what	Newton	taught,	Kant,	in	the	famous	passage	
which	 Sir	 W.	 Hamilton	 is	 so	 fond	 of	 quoting	 (and	 quotes	 in	 this	 very	 lecture),	
placed	on	the	same	level	of	sublimity	with	the	moral	law?	If	ignorance	is	the	cause	
of	wonder,	 it	 is	downright	 impossible	 that	 scientific	explanation	can	ever	 take	 it	
away,	since	all	which	explanation	does,	in	the	final	resort,	is	to	refer	us	back	to	a	
prior	inexplicable.	Were	the	catastrophe	to	arrive	which	is	to	expel	Wonder	from	
the	 universe—were	 it	 conclusively	 shown	 that	 the	 mental	 operations	 are	
dependent	upon	organic	agency—would	wonder	be	at	an	end	because	the	fact,	at	
which	we	should	then	have	to	wonder,	would	be	that	an	arrangement	of	material	
particles	 could	 produce	 thought	 and	 feeling?	 Jacobi	 and	 Sir	W.	 Hamilton	might	




The	 19th	 century	 also	 saw	 a	 new	 batch	 of	 wonder	 advocates	 emerge,	 namely	 the	
American	 transcendentalists	who	according	 to	English	 literary	scholar	Tony	Tanner	held	
central	 the	 idea	 that	 by	 beholding	 the	 world	 with	 the	 wonder	 of	 a	 child	 one	 would	
recover	and	retain	a	sense	of	 its	actual	glory	(Tanner,	1965,	p.	22).	Tanner	explains	that	
wonder	 despite	 its	 fading	 status	 in	 Europe	 lived	 on	 in	 the	 American	 literature	 and	 in	
particular	 in	 the	 writings	 of	 Ralph	 Waldo	 Emerson,	 Henry	 David	 Thoreau	 and	 Walt	





experience	 of	 wonder.	 Boosted	 by	 a	 robust	 market	 economy,	 a	 wealth	 of	 printed	
materials	 on	 science	 together	 with	 a	 strong	 public	 interest	 in	 science	 as	 well	 as	
pseudoscience	 and	 religion	 (Nadis,	 2005,	 p.	 10),	 wonder	 showmen	 ‘worked	 at	 the	











Of	 notable	wonder	 showmen	Charles	 C.	 Came	who	 toured	New	York	 in	 the	 1840s	 and	
1850s	offering	patent	medicines,	scientific	lectures	and	electrical	healing	demonstrations	










	 As	the	19th	century	comes	to	an	end	 it	becomes	apparent	that	wonder	 is	on	the	
wane	when	it	comes	to	evoking	the	mysterious	and	the	realm	of	science	is	the	only	place	
where	 ‘real	 wonder’	 emerges.	Writer,	 journalist	 and	 educator	 Arthur	Mee	 emphasises	
this	 in	 his	 popular	 1908	 publication	Children’s	 Encyclopedia	 as	 it	 includes	 a	 section	 on	




















remnants	 of	 Romantic	 wonder	 in	 what	 Quinn	 calls	 ‘modernist	 phenomena’	 involving	






means	–	Gnostic,	 revelation,	magic,	or	art’	 (Quinn,	2002,	p.	294).	 It	 can	be	argued	 that	
here	wonder	finds	a	function	that	is	not	easily	challenged	by	science;	however	it	is	also	a	
function	 that	 academically	 speaking	 comes	 at	 a	 high	 price,	 as	 wonder	 conceptually	
becomes	increasingly	mystical	and	solipsistic.	Some	might	see	this	as	its	prime	strength;	
however	 to	 immunise	 wonderment	 from	 scrutiny	 does	 not	 academically	 speaking	
promote	understanding	and	merely	prompts	suspicion	and	scepticism.	
We	 are	 now	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 historical	 exploration	 of	 wonder,	 but	 before	we	
continue	let	us	briefly	summarise	it.	By	probing	the	history	of	wonder	particular	turning	
points	 have	 come	 to	 light.	We	 began	 by	 addressing	 the	 Greek	 myths	 as	 described	 by	
Hesiod	and	 learned	 that	wonder	 is	 connected	 to	 Iris,	 the	 rainbow,	who	delivers	 tidings	
from	the	gods.	From	Plato	it	became	clear	that	wonder	is	the	feeling	and	starting	point	(a	
point	 shared	 by	 Aristotle)	 of	 philosophy	 and	 is	 bound	 together	with	 an	 acute	 sense	 of	
ignorance,	which	altogether	can	be	quite	unpleasant.	In	the	Mediaeval	period	Augustine	
informs	us	that	 it	 is	quite	possible	to	marvel	at	 for	example	the	mountains	and	the	sea	
but	that	introspection	will	reveal	that	the	ignorance	we	harbour	about	ourselves	is	most	
worthy	 of	wonderment.	 Furthermore	we	 also	 pick	 up	 from	Augustine	 that	 the	 created	
universe	 is	 a	 source	 of	 wonder	 as	 it	 surpasses	 the	 wonder	 of	 the	 things	 it	 contains	
indicating	 that	 the	 creator	 is	 the	 greatest	 wonder	 of	 all.	 Thomas	 Aquinas	 fused	




know	 God.	 The	 first	 humanist	 Pico	 della	 Mirandola	 offers	 us	 a	 chance	 to	 marvel	 at	
ourselves	as	free	rational	beings	without	a	nature.	To	Francis	Bacon,	exponent	of	the	new	
philosophy,	wonder	 is	broken	knowledge.	This	means	that	when	it	comes	to	knowledge	
about	God	 the	 study	of	nature	provides	no	 clue	and	we	 therefore	 remain	 in	 a	 state	of	
wonderment	about	God.	For	Descartes	wonder	was	the	first	of	all	the	passions	situated	
between	 deficiency	 and	 excess	 and	 so	 making	 it	 a	 passion	 worthy	 of	 the	 enquiring	
scientific	mind.	Furthermore	we	learn	that	wonder	fades	as	our	experience	of	it	grows	in	
numbers.	 Moving	 on	 to	 the	 Enlightenment	 Adam	 Smith	 brings	 to	 our	 attention	 that	
wonder	is	distinct	from	surprise	and	admiration	and	arises	from	an	encounter	with	what	
is	new	and	singular.	Kant	described	wonder	not	as	a	passion	but	affection	produced	by	
the	 representation	 of	 novelty	 exceeding	 our	 expectations	 and	 that	 this	 affection	 is	
altogether	different	from	admiration	or	esteem.	Whether	it	is	correct	to	think	of	wonder	
as	 something	 completely	different	 from	a	passion	can	of	 course	be	debated	and	 I	 shall	
return	 to	 this	 in	 a	 later	 chapter	when	 I	 address	wonder	 as	 an	emotion.	 For	now	 it	will	
suffice	to	say	that	the	supremacy	of	reason	and	mechanical	thinking	over	passion	proved	
demeaning	for	wonder	in	the	time	after	the	Enlightenment.	However	the	view	of	wonder	
expressed	 by	 Enlightenment	 scholars	 was	 not	 unchallenged.	With	 its	 emphasis	 on	 the	
passions	 the	Romantics	offered	an	 influential	 countermovement	and	Byron	pointed	out	
that	not	to	wonder	was	problematic	because	without	wonder	inspiration	would	not	arise.	
However	as	science	continued	its	advancement	Romanticism,	which	was	a	largely	artistic	
movement,	 retreated.	Throughout	 the	nineteenth	century	wonder	continued	 to	decline	
despite	 sporadic	 upheavals	 of	 the	 Romantic	 kind.	 According	 to	 Quinn	 these	 upheavals	















religion,	 which	 he	 labelled	 ‘the	 numinous’.	 The	 numinous	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 the	
‘wholly	other’	or	‘that	which	is	quite	beyond	the	sphere	of	the	usual,	the	intelligible,	and	
the	familiar,	which	therefore	falls	quite	outside	the	limits	of	the	‘canny’,	and	is	contrasted	
with	 it,	 filling	 the	 mind	 with	 blank	 wonder	 and	 astonishment’	 (Otto,	 2010,	 p	 26).	
According	to	Otto	the	English	phrase	or	word	that	(to	a	degree)	encapsulates	the	above	is	
‘religious	 dread’	 or	 simply	 ‘awe’	 (Otto,	 2010,	 p.	 14).	 This	 particular	 take	 on	 awe	 is	
somewhat	 echoed	 in	 Hepburn’s	 work,	 who	 suggests	 that	 awe	 is	 ‘dread	 mingled	 with	




it	 could	 be	 ventured	 that	 as	 a	 sensation	 awe	 is	 seldom	 joyous	 unless	 the	 object	 in	






Trollslottet	 Mountain,	 Queen	 Maud	 Land,	 Antarctica	 may	 easily	 inspire	 awe	 in	
conjunction	with	fear	and	terror.	One	need	only	imagine	what	it	must	be	like	to	attempt	
to	climb	 its	640	m	almost	vertical	wall	amidst	 the	unforgiving	and	extremely	hostile	 icy	
landscape.	Likewise	it	can	be	argued	that	the	swift	American-led	2003	military	invasion	of	
Iraq	produced	awe	escorted	by	fear	and	terror.31	









Haidt	 point	 out	 and	may	 facilitate	 personal	 change	 or	 transformation	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	
radical	 alteration	 of	 a	 person’s	 outlook,	 attitude,	 and	 system	 of	 value	 or	 way	 of	 life	
(Keltner,	2003,	p.	297).	One	can	imagine	that	being	the	sole	survivor	of	a	serious	accident	
like	a	plain	crash	or	natural	catastrophe	like	a	tsunami	may	produce	a	sense	of	awe	and	
inspire	 for	 example	 a	 change	 in	 attitude	 in	 terms	of	 how	one	 lives.	 The	 same	 goes	 for	
people	 who	 have	 survived	 a	 heart	 attack,	 cancer	 or	 some	 other	 serious	 ailment.	 Life	
altering	 experiences	 based	 on	 awe	 are	 as	 indicated	 also	 represented	 in	 the	 field	 of	
religion	 and	 a	 prime	 example	 of	 such	 is	 the	 awesome	 circumstances	 that	 led	 to	 the	
conversion	of	the	biblical	character	St.	Paul	(Keltner,	2003,	p.	298).	 Initially	St.	Paul	also	














majestic	 display	 of	 power	 God	 delivers.	 First	 God	 produces	 a	 sudden	 heavenly	 flash,	
which	 causes	 Paul	 to	 fall	 to	 the	 ground	 and	 blinds	 him.	 Hereafter	 God	 without	 any	
introduction	and	 in	a	 voice	without	a	 clear	point	of	origin	 starts	 to	 interrogate	St.	Paul	
asking	him	why	he	prosecutes.	This	is	followed	by	the	curious	comment:	‘It	is	hard	for	you	
to	kick	against	the	pricks’.	Now	what	the	latter	means	is	uncertain	but	one	interpretation	
could	be	 that	 it	 is	equivalent	 to	 ‘it	 is	useless	 to	 fight	against	my	will’	or	 ‘it	 is	useless	 to	
fight	against	 the	power	of	God’.	 In	any	case	 this	display	of	awesome	power	has	a	huge	
effect	 on	 Paul	 who	 offers	 his	 compliance.	 Subsequently	 he	 was	 ordered	 to	 go	 to	





may	 be	 found32	 one	 of	 the	 major	 differences	 it	 would	 seem	 is	 the	 notion	 that	 while	




trembles	 and	 experiences	 astonishment.	 Furthermore	 one	 could	 venture	 that	 what	 is	
meant	by	 ‘astonished’	 could	be	 ‘surprise’	or	even	 ‘sudden	wonder’	which	 if	 true	would	
casts	 a	 different	 light	 on	 Paul’s	 experience.	 However	 since	 it	 is	 conceivable	 that	
astonishment	 is	but	a	 component	of	both	 the	experience	of	wonder	and	awe	 it	 can	be	
ventured	that	labelling	Paul’s	experience,	as	one	of	astonishment	is	insufficient	and	that	
there	must	be	more	 to	his	experience	 than	 ‘astonishment’	 can	cover.	 In	 this	 light	 I	will	
hold	that	there	is	good	indication	that	what	is	afoot	in	the	case	of	St.	Paul	is	awe.	This	is	
mainly	because	his	experience	involves	submission	to	an	overwhelming	power	and	is	one	
totally	 devoid	 of	 delight	 and	 joy.	God	 seeks	 to	 dominate	 and	 succeeds	 via	 a	 display	 of	
power,	will	 and	 terror	 in	 the	 form	of	 taking	 away	 Paul’s	 ability	 to	 see.	 This	 leaves	 him	
quite	 vulnerable	 and	 completely	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 his	 comrades	 and	 it	 enables	 us	 to	
understand	what	philosopher	Martha	Nussbaum	has	 in	mind	when	she	writes:	 ‘Wonder	





the	 literature	 on	wonder	 indicating	 that	 the	 two	 are	 related	 or	 similar	 in	 composition.	
Verhoeven	 for	 example	 writes	 that	 ‘wonder	 can	 shade	 from	 slight,	 by	 being	 way	 of	
surprise,	 astonishment	 and	 amazement	 right	 up	 to	 way	 of	 dismay	 and	 horror’	



















the	 actual	 experience	 of	 horror	 springs	 from	 the	 possibility	 that	 this	 given	 universe	 of	
meaning	 is	under	 threat	of	being	dismantled	 (Miller,	1992,	p.	130).	 In	 this	 sense	horror	
comes	as	a	direct	result	of	losing	the	centre	around	which	a	given	life	revolves	and	which	
makes	 it	a	coherent	whole	 (Miller,	1992,	p.	126).	For	most	of	us	 losing	the	centre	 from	
which	we	gravitate	 is	a	rarity,	however	this	does	not	mean	that	we	are	totally	bereft	of	
the	experience	of	horror.	We	might	have	experienced	what	Miller	 calls	 ‘intimations’	or	
hints	 of	 horror,	 which	 can	 take	 the	 form	 of	 the	 most	 insignificant	 interruptions	 in	 a	



























us	 from	a	 condition	of	 ignorance	 towards	 knowledge	horror	 has	 a	 tendency	 to	 lead	us	
from	 the	 familiar	 world	 of	 the	 known	 towards	 an	 unknown.	 While	 wonder	 tempts	 a	
person	to	run	towards	its	object	horror	makes	one	run	away.	It	can	also	be	argued	that	
while	 horror	 threatens	 to	 destroy	 our	 universe	 of	 meaning	 wonder	 seems	 bent	 on	
expanding	it.	To	exemplify	this	one	could	look	to	the	works	of	20th	century	weird	fiction	
writer	H.	P.	 Lovecraft	who	 is	perhaps	most	 famous	 for	his	horror/science	 fiction	stories	
but	 also	 wrote	 stories	 of	 wonder	 similar	 in	 style	 to	 those	 of	 Lord	 Dunsany33.	 Now	




stories	and	visions	of	 their	youth;	 for	when	as	children	we	 listen	and	dream,	we	
think	but	 half-formed	 thoughts,	 and	when	 as	men	we	 try	 to	 remember,	we	 are	
dulled	and	prosaic	with	the	poison	of	life.	But	some	of	us	awake	in	the	night	with	








Quite	 different	 is	 the	 theme	of	 Lovecraft’s	 horror	 story	Dagon	 (Lovecraft,	 2008)	where	
the	protagonist	after	drifting	aimlessly	for	days	on	a	small	 lifeboat	south	of	the	equator	
encounters	a	huge	polyphemus-like	creature	that	‘should	not	exist’	on	a	vast	upheaval	of	
the	 ocean	 floor.	 The	 story	 ends	 with	 the	 protagonist	 committing	 suicide	 by	 throwing	










The	 next	 altered	 state	 similar	 to	 wonder	 I	 am	 going	 to	 address	 is	 the	 sublime.34	 The	
sublime	has	 in	many	ways	suffered	the	same	fate	as	wonder	because	what	 is	meant	by	
the	 sublime	 in	 everyday	 speech	 is	 quite	 distinct	 from	 the	 meaning	 attached	 to	 the	
sublime	 within	 academia.	 According	 to	 Holmqvist	 and	 Pluciennik	 the	 sublime	 in	 its	
ordinary	 usage	 frequently	 addresses	 what	 is	 noble	 and	 morally	 positive	 (Holmqvist	 &	
Pluciennik,	2002,	p.	718)	but	within	academia	 it	 remains	a	disputed	technical	 term	that	
due	to	its	complicated	history	and	relationship	with	the	Roman	oratory	of	Longinus,	18th	





In	 broad	 terms,	 whenever	 experiences	 slip	 out	 of	 conventional	 understanding,	








the	 Sea	 of	 Fog	 and	 the	 state	 of	 mind	 we	 experience	 when	 beholding	 images	 of	 the	















this	 particular	 piece	 of	 work	 takes	 the	 form	 of	 an	 orator’s	 guide	 to	 how	 one	 might	
manipulate	an	audience	most	effectively.	 From	Longinus’	 text	we	 foremost	 learn	about	
the	 effects	 of	 the	 sublime	 but	 also	 that	 the	 sublime	 stands	 in	 relation	 to	wonder	 and	
astonishment.	Longinus	writes:	
	
For	 grandeur	 produces	 ecstasy	 rather	 than	 persuasion	 in	 the	 hearer;	 and	 the	
combination	of	wonder	 and	astonishment	always	proves	 superior	 to	 the	merely	
persuasive	and	pleasant.	This	is	because	persuasion	is	on	the	whole	something	we	
can	 control,	 whereas	 amazement	 and	wonder	 exert	 invincible	 power	 and	 force	
and	 get	 the	 better	 of	 every	 hearer.	 Experience	 in	 invention	 and	 ability	 to	 order	
and	 arrange	 material	 cannot	 be	 detected	 in	 single	 passages;	 we	 begin	 to	
appreciate	them	only	when	we	see	whole	context.	Sublimity,	on	the	other	hand,	




If	 one	 seeks	 to	 dominate	 an	 audience	 one	 must	 in	 Longinus’	 view	 break	 away	 from	
traditional	 oratory	 and	 make	 the	 audience	 experience	 a	 sense	 of	 wonder	 and	
astonishment.	 The	 rationale	 behind	 this	 is	 that	 in	 comparison,	 oration	 based	 on	
controllable	persuasion	is	simply	not	as	effective.	To	Longinus	the	effect	of	the	sublime	is	
like	a	tsunami	or	avalanche.	It	is	an	uncompromising,	forceful	natural	event	that	sweeps	
everything	 along	 with	 it	 defying	 the	 will	 of	 any	 that	 might	 oppose	 it.	 Important	 to	
Longinus’	 view	of	 the	 sublime	 is	 that	wonder	and	astonishment	are	 subordinate	 to	 the	
sublime	 as	 they	 both	 qualify	 as	 what	 tears	 everything	 up	 and	 get	 the	 better	 of	 every	
hearer.	 Now	 it	might	 be	 true	 that	 astonishment	 contributes	 to	 this	 effect	 but	 it	 is	 not	
necessarily	the	case	that	wonder	does.	Admittedly	wonder	instigates	a	certain	instability	
which	in	combination	with	astonishment	may	leave	us	overwhelmed	or	wonderstruck	but	
the	 hearer	 needs	 not	 be	 a	 passive	 recipient	 completely	 ‘defenceless’	 against	 Longinus’	
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whirlwind	as	we	can	envision	 the	hearer	 to	be	an	active	 listener	who	can	evaluate	and	
moderate	her	wonderment.	
	 In	1757	Edmund	Burke	anonymously	published	his	A	Philosophical	Enquiry	into	the	
Origin	of	Our	 Ideas	of	 the	Sublime	and	Beautiful,	which	 like	 Longinus’	work	 stands	as	a	
landmark	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 inquiries	 into	 the	 sublime.	 For	 Burke	 the	 source	 of	 the	
sublime	is	the	terrible.	He	writes:	
	
	 Whatever	 is	 fitted	 in	 any	 sort	 to	 excite	 the	 ideas	 of	 pain	 and	 danger,	 that	 is	 to	
	 say,	 whatever	 is	 in	 any	 sort	 terrible,	 or	 is	 conversant	 about	 terrible	 objects,	 or	
	 operates	in	a	manner	analogous	to	terror,	is	a	source	of	the	sublime.	
(Burke,	1990,	p.	36)	
On	the	outset	 it	appears	as	 if	 the	Burkean	sublime	 is	rooted	 in	terrifying	natural	events	
like	the	1755	Lisbon	earthquake.	The	rationale	behind	this	is	the	fact	that	the	earthquake	
was	 caused	 by	 something	 outside	 human	 control	 and	 brought	 about	 pain	 and	 danger.	
Nevertheless	 Burke’s	 contribution	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 sublime	 comes	 with	 a	 certain	
amount	of	ambiguity	and	this	is	due	to	its	focus	on	cognition	and	the	psychological	effect	






our	 understanding	 of	 the	 topic	 to	 an	 entirely	 new	 level.	 Kant	 refers	 to	 the	 sublime	 as	
what	 is	 	 ‘absolutely	 large’	 or	 that	 ‘in	 comparison	 with	 which	 everything	 else	 is	 small’	
(Kant,	1987,	§25,).	This	may	not	sound	revolutionary	but	 important	 to	Kant’s	outlook	 is	
that	the	largeness	is	something	that	is	formed	in	our	heads	so	to	speak.	Kant	writes:	
	
	 For	 what	 is	 sublime,	 in	 the	 proper	 meaning	 of	 the	 term,	 cannot	 be	 contained	
	 in	 any	 sensible	 form	 but	 concerns	 only	 ideas	 of	 reason,	 which	 though	 they	







product	of	the	mind	that	 judges	the	object	as	sublime	and	it	 is	 in	this	respect	that	Kant	
places	the	sublime	within	our	heads.		
	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 above	 it	 is	 important	 to	 point	 out	 that	 Kant	 distinguishes	
between	 two	 forms	 of	 the	 sublime:	 the	 mathematically	 and	 the	 dynamically	 sublime	









we	 consider	 nature	 as	 a	 might	 that	 has	 no	 dominance	 over	 us,	 then	 it	 is	 dynamically	
sublime’	 (Kant,	 1987,	 §28).	 To	 spell	 out	 what	 Kant	 has	 in	mind	 consider	 this	 example.	
When	I	was	a	child	my	family	and	I	would	spend	every	summer	in	my	grandparents’	beach	
house,	 which	 was	 located	 on	 a	 small	 hill	 on	 the	 west	 coast	 of	 Northern	 Jutland	 in	
Denmark.	 This	 meant	 that	 from	 time	 to	 time	 we	 had	 to	 endure	 powerful	 seasonal	




once	we	were	 all	 seated	 in	 the	 car	 the	 fear	 and	 terror	 of	 the	 storm	we	 all	 harboured	
vanished.	My	experience	here	corresponds	 to	Kant’s	dynamically	 sublime	because	 from	
our	 safe	 haven	 we	 could	 watch	 the	 magnificence	 of	 the	 storm	 knowing	 full	 well	 that	






out	 that	 the	 Kantian	 sublime	 is	 neither	 entirely	materialistic	 nor	wholly	 idealistic	 in	 its	
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nature	but	 is	born	out	of	 a	 structural	necessity	or	 ‘	 a	 supplement	not	belonging	 to	 the	











2006,	 p.	 380;	 Keen,	 1969,	 p.	 29;	 Matravers,	 2012,	 p.	 166).	 However	 we	 have	 also	
acknowledged	 that	 wonder	 can	 be	 accompanied	 by	 fear	 as	 we	 saw	 in	 the	 example	
involving	 Shakespeare’s	 Horatio	 and	 that	 wonder	 can	 be	 associated	 with	 a	 wound,	




	 The	difference	between	wonder	and	the	sublime	may	also	 lie	 in	 their	 respective	
relationship	 with	 knowledge.	 Typically	 a	 sense	 of	 wonder	 entails	 awareness	 of	 one’s	
ignorance	(lack	of	knowledge)	and	a	desire	to	know	about	the	object	or	indeed	subject	at	
hand.	We	 find	 this	 exemplified	 in	Mann’s	 character	 Castorp	who	 does	 not	 quite	 know	










end	 to	 our	 quest	 for	 knowledge,	 as	 we	 are	 overwhelmed	 with	 terror.	 The	 Lisbon	
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earthquake,	which	we	may	call	sublime	in	a	Burkean	sense,	took	the	lives	of	thousands	of	
God-fearing	people	and	 left	 survivors	and	 intellectuals	pondering	why	God	would	allow	
such	 an	 event	 to	 happen.	 Philosopher	 Daniel	 Speak	 writes	 that	 the	 Catholic	 Church	
explained	that	the	earthquake	and	the	subsequent	fires	and	tsunami	were	God’s	way	of	
punishing	 the	 sinful	 citizens	 but	 while	 the	 earthquake	 took	 place	 most	 people	 were	
gathered	 in	 their	 churches	 and	 the	 red	 light	 district	which	 one	may	 reasonably	 expect	
would	be	categorised	as	a	place	of	sin	by	the	church	emerged	largely	unharmed	from	the	
event	(Speak,	2014,	p.	94).	In	a	Burkean	sense	the	Lisbon	earthquake	is	sublime	first	and	
foremost	because	of	 the	 terrible	destruction	 it	 brought	upon	 the	 citizens	of	 Lisbon	but	
also	 because	 it	 was	 a	 dramatic	 blow	 to	 Christianity.	 It	 raised	 terrifying	 questions	 that	
needed	an	answer	such	as	why	would	God	punish	good	God-fearing	people	while	leaving	
the	 sinful	 area	 of	 the	 city	 largely	 untouched;	 was	 God	 nothing	 like	what	 he	 had	 been	
construed	to	be	and	did	the	destruction	of	Lisbon	happen	for	no	particular	 reason	thus	
signalling	 that	human	beings	are	 situated	 in	a	world	bereft	of	a	benevolent	 intervening	
divine	caretaker?	
	 If	 we	 focus	 on	 the	 Kantian	 mathematically	 sublime	 the	 difference	 between	
wonder	and	the	sublime	also	becomes	visible.	While	 the	sublime	 is	concerned	with	 the	
absolutely	 large	 and	 boundless,	 wonder	 (although	 it	 might	 be	 associated	 with	 the	
vastness	 of	 space)	 facilitates	 a	 sense	 of	 boundness	 and	 connectedness	 without	 the	
wonderer	really	knowing	why.	This	 is	exemplified	by	Keen’s	experience	as	he	for	weeks	
after	 his	 experience	 of	 wonder	 found	 himself	 haunted	 by	 a	 wondering	 expectancy	
signalling	that	he	is	connected	to	the	world	anew.	Had	he	not	been	able	to	acknowledge	
this	connection	or	enlargement	of	his	world	it	is	doubtful	that	he	would	have	entertained	
his	 ‘post	 taumatic	expectancy’	and	might	have	 felt	alienated	or	otherwise	disassociated	
instead.	 Continuing	 with	 Kant’s	 mathematically	 sublime	 there	 seems	 also	 to	 be	 a	












over	 the	 self	 that	 is	 acknowledging	 it,	 the	 idea	of	 having	 a	 ‘solid	 self’	 is	 not	 present	 in	
wonder	because	wonder	gives	way	to	at	 least	a	temporary	displacement/diminishing	of	
the	self.	Thus	we	might	say	that	in	wonder	we	are	not	in	a	‘safe	place’	where	the	intellect	
may	 appreciate	 ‘the	 boundless	 ocean	 heaved	 up’	 (Kant,	 1987,	 §28)	 or	 a	 violent	
thunderstorm.	 In	wonder	we	are	at	 least	momentarily	 thrown	or	unhinged	because	we	
find	ourselves	connected	to	a	larger	world,	which	we	do	not	fully	understand.	The	case	of	










something	 quite	 distinct	 from	 curiosity	 (Daston	 &	 Park,	 1998,	 p.	 15).	 To	 the	medieval	
philosopher	 wonder	 was	 awed	 reverence	 in	 conjunction	 with	 the	 uncomfortable	






























According	 to	 Aristotle	 what	 makes	 us	 different	 from	 other	 animals	 is	 our	 capacity	 for	
rational	 thought	 (Aristotle,	 1989,	 A	 980b	 25-28).	 With	 Hobbes	 this	 notion	 gets	
supplemented	 with	 curiosity,	 as	 rationality	 cannot	 alone	 account	 for	 what	 moves	 the	
mind	and	body	of	human	beings.	One	noticeable	feature	about	curiosity	is	that	it	is	never	
quenched.	Associated	with	greed	and	 independent	 from	need	and	satisfaction	curiosity	
never	 rests	 and	 constantly	 yearns	 for	what	 is	 novel	 and	 new	 (Daston	&	 Park,	 1998,	 p.	
307).	According	 to	philosopher	 Jianhong	Chen	Hobbes	adopted	an	approach	 to	wonder	
similar	to	that	of	Aristotle	but	at	the	same	time	he	made	sure	that	it	was	not	at	odds	with	
the	Christian	outlook	on	wonder	emphasising	that	‘nothing	can	be	called	wonders	except	
divinely	wrought	miracles’	 (Chen,	 2011,	 p.	 130-132).	 In	 the	 eighteenth	 century	wonder	
had	 lost	much	of	 its	 status	and	affiliation	with	 the	academic	mindset	and	 curiosity	had	
become	the	prime	motivator	for	the	scientific	endeavour	(Daston	&	Park,	1998,	p.	305).	In	
his	 1937-38	 lectures	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Freiburg	 Martin	 Heidegger	 addresses	 this	




It	 has	 long	 been	 known	 that	 the	 Greeks	 recognised	 [thaumazein]	 as	 the	
”beginning”	 of	 philosophy.	 But	 it	 is	 just	 as	 certain	 that	 we	 have	 taken	 this	
[thaumazein]	 to	 be	 obvious	 and	 ordinary,	 something	 that	 can	 be	 accomplished	
without	 difficulty	 and	 can	 even	 be	 clarified	without	 further	 reflection.	 For	most	
part,	the	usual	presentations	of	the	origin	of	philosophy	out	of	[thaumazein]	result	
in	 the	 opinion	 that	 philosophy	 arises	 from	 curiosity.	 This	 is	 a	 weak	 and	 pitiful	
determination	of	origin,	possibly	only	where	there	has	never	been	any	reflection	
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on	 what	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	 determined	 here	 in	 its	 origin.	 Indeed	 we	 consider	







§37	 [156-57]).	 According	 to	 Heidegger	 to	 be	 amazed	 is	 to	 ‘	 find	 oneself	 in	 face	 of	 the	
inexplicable’	 (Heidegger,	 1994,	 §37	 [162-63])	 understood	 as	 how	 when	 something	 or	
someone	amazes	us	we	face	an	inability	to	explain	the	object	of	amazement.	However	if	
we	find	out	what	makes	the	object	amazing	the	amazement	disappears.	To	explain	this	
we	might	 turn	to	philosopher	Brad	Elliot	Stone	who	gives	 the	example	of	a	magic	 trick.	
Every	magic	 trick	 is	 explainable	 and	with	 training	 one	 can	 learn	 to	 imitate	 it.	 However	
when	 the	magic	 trick	 is	 explained	 it	 is	 no	 longer	 amazing	 (Stone,	 2006,	 p.	 209-210).	 In	
addition	Heidegger	 claims	 that	once	we	get	used	 to	 the	new	and	amazing	we	begin	 to	
crave	more	(Heidegger,	1994,	§37	[157-58]).	Seeing	the	same	magic	trick	over	and	over	
becomes	at	length	boring	and	we	begin	to	seek	new	vistas	in	order	to	feel	amazed.	
Quinn	 has	 pointed	 out	 that	 in	 the	 English	 language	 the	 word	 ‘admiration’	 is	
sometimes	 used	 as	 a	 synonym	 for	 wonder	 (Quinn,	 2002,	 p.	 4),	 however	 to	 Heidegger	
admiration	is	not	the	same	as	wonder.	According	to	Heidegger	anyone	who	let	herself	be	
admired	puts	herself	down	or	is	of	a	lower	rank	(Heidegger,	1994,	§37).	We	might	admire	




Everyone	 who	 allows	 himself	 to	 be	 admired,	 and	 precisely	 if	 the	 admiration	 is	





idea	of	what	 is	 admirable	but	 in	doing	 so	 I	 become	dependent	upon	her	 admiration	 in	
order	to	be	admirable.	Furthermore	this	does	not	make	me	a	wonder	or	wonderful	but	
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merely	 admirable	 following	 the	 measure	 of	 a	 particular	 person.	 In	 other	 words	 the	
standard	 of	 admiration,	 which	 is	 put	 to	 use,	 is	 not	 my	 own,	 which	 means	 I	 will	 be	
subordinate	 to	 the	 standard	 of	 the	 admirer	 and	 in	 this	 sense	 as	 Heidegger	 writes	
admiration	 ‘embodies	 a	 kind	 of	 self-affirmation’	 (Heidegger,	 1994,	 §38	 [163-64]).	
Furthermore	as	Stone	points	out	if	one	was	to	desire	a	continuation	of	being	admired	it	
would	demand	hard	work	because	there	are	many	admirable	people	in	history	and	so	the	










from	 what	 exists	 in	 the	 awesome’	 (Heidegger,	 1994,	 §38	 [163-64]).	 However	 because	
astonishment	 is	 in	 need	 of	 the	 extraordinary	 Heidegger	 categorises	 it	 differently	 from	
wonder.	Astonishment	 fades	 away	as	 repetition	 sets	 in	 and	 the	extraordinary	becomes	
the	everyday.	Skiing	through	powdery	snow	may	seem	special	and	extraordinary	at	first	
but	 if	 you	do	 it	 everyday	 for	 a	whole	winter	 the	 extraordinary	 about	 it	 diminishes	 and	
becomes	an	everyday	thing	bereft	of	excitement.	
	 In	Heidegger’s	 view	 amazement,	 admiration	 and	 astonishment	 are	more	 closely	
linked	to	curiosity	than	wonder.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	like	curiosity	they	are	in	league	
with	 the	 extraordinary,	 the	 strange	 and	 peculiar.	 Heideggerian	 wonder	 is	 entirely	
different	 because	 ‘in	 wonder	 what	 is	 most	 usual	 itself	 becomes	 the	 most	 unusual’	
(Heidegger,	1994,	§38	 [165-66]).	 In	other	words	 in	wonder	we	 see	 the	extraordinary	 in	










no	 longer	 knows	 the	 way	 out	 but	 knows	 itself	 solely	 as	 being	 relegated	 to	 the	 most	
unusual	of	the	usual	 in	everything	and	anything:	being	as	beings’	 (Heidegger,	1994,	§38	






differs	 from	 wonder	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 is	 usually	 accompanied	 by	 fear	 and	 terror	
whereas	wonder	 brings	 joy	 and	 delight.	 The	 second	 altered	 state	we	 focussed	 on	was	














thinking.	 It	 is	 the	 feeling	 that	 is	 visited	 upon	 us	 when	 we	 realise	 the	 transcendental	
dimensions	of	experience.	Moving	on	to	curiosity	Daston	and	Park	inform	us	that	curiosity	
is	different	from	wonder	in	the	sense	that	as	a	motivator	for	inquiry	it	is	never	quenched	
and	 in	 the	 Heideggerian	 sense	 it	 is	 therefore	 more	 fitting	 for	 modern	 inquiries	 than	
wonder.	Amazement	differs	 from	wonder	 in	 the	sense	 that	 it	 relies	on	 the	unknown	or	
uncovered	 properties	 of	 the	 object.	 Thus	 amazement	 is	 different	 from	 wonderment	
because	what	we	 find	wonder-filled	 does	 not	 necessarily	 stop	 being	wonder-filled	 just	
because	we	know	how	it	functions.	Admiration	is	likewise	different	from	wonder	because	





In	astonishment	we	 lose	our	ability	 to	 take	up	a	position	with	regards	 to	 the	thing	that	
causes	 us	 to	 be	 astonished;	 however	 in	 wonderment	 this	 does	 not	 happen	 because	
regardless	 of	 our	 wondrous	 state	 we	 are	 mindful	 of	 being	 excluded	 from	 what	 the	
marvellous	thing	contains.	Unlike	in	astonishment	we	find	in	wonder	the	most	usual	and	












and	 pain,	 sadness	 and	 despair	 not	 forgetting	 bereavement,	 sense	 of	 rejection	 and	 the	
fear	of	being	the	cause	of	harm	to	others	are	all	natural	enemies	of	wonder.	In	addition	
what	 he	 labels	 ‘entire	 conditions	 of	 life’	 understood	 as	 prison	 camps,	 war,	 poverty	
including	 also	 the	 human	 tendency	 of	 taking	 on	 the	 responsibility	 for	 the	 welfare	 of	
others	are	also	to	be	considered	natural	enemies.	Factors	such	as	these	simply	render	it	
impossible	 for	 most	 people	 to	 entertain	 a	 sense	 of	 wonder	 because	 doing	 otherwise	
would	result	in	the	neglect	of	an	immediate	and	pressing	unforgiving	reality	(Tallis,	2012,	
p.	6-7).	
	 Tallis	 also	 talks	 about	 something	 entirely	 different	 from	 natural	 enemies	 of	
wonder,	which	he	calls	‘elective	enemies	of	wonder.’	The	elective	enemies	of	wonder	are	
attached	 to	our	modern	way	of	 life	 including	 its	habit	of	 rush	and	busyness.	A	modern	






modern	 living	 that	we	 replicate	 the	 business	 of	working	 life	 in	 our	 free	 time.	 In	 other	




p.	 8).	 Furthermore	 the	 fact	 that	we	 are	 social	 creatures	 poses	 a	 great	 problem	 for	 the	
occurrences	 of	 wonderment.	 Because	 wondering	 is	 essentially	 a	 lonely	 business,	
whenever	 someone	 is	 wondering	 she	 is	 viewed	 as	 asocial	 or	 not	 committed	 to	
corporation	and	serious	engagement	with	a	given	project	or	situation.	Imagine	sitting	in	a	
pub	with	a	friend	you	have	not	seen	for	a	while.	Imagine	further	that	the	person	you	are	
meeting	 with	 now	 and	 then	 disappears	 into	 a	 state	 of	 wonder	 and	 that	 she	 does	 not	
enlighten	 you	 as	 to	 what	 makes	 her	 wonder.	 Classifying	 the	 meeting	 as	 outright	
successful	would	 probably	 be	 an	 overstatement	 and	most	 people	would	 be	 inclined	 to	
think	of	the	meeting	as	irritating	and	not	worth	repeating.	Wonder	signals	a	momentary	
departure	 from	 the	 life	 we	 share	 with	 other	 people	 and	 ‘is	 more	 often	 part	 of	 our	
solitude’	(Tallis,	2012,	p.	9).	
	 I	 am	 sympathetic	 to	 Tallis’	 account	 of	 both	 natural	 and	 elective	 enemies	 of	
wonder;	 however	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 latter	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 wonderment	 to	 a	
certain	degree	can	be	a	mutual	experience,	which	to	an	extent	would	both	counter	the	
notion	that	wonderment	is	a	solitary	experience	and	that	our	urge	to	socialise	makes	us	
less	 likely	 to	 experience	 wonder.	 Now	 Tallis	 does	 not	 deny	 the	 existence	 of	 shared	
experiences	of	wonder	and	points	out	that	we	may	want	to	communicate	our	wonder	for	
the	 purpose	 of	 validation	 (Tallis,	 2012,	 p.	 9).	 In	 addition	 it	 seems	 plausible	 that	 two	
people	may	 be	 inspired	 by	 the	 same	 source	 of	wonder	 and	 experience	wonder	 at	 the	
same	time.	Some	years	ago	my	wife	and	I	climbed	Mt.	Fuji	 in	Japan.	As	we	watched	the	
sunrise	together	from	the	summit	we	both	noted	that	time	somehow	seemed	different.	
We	 both	 became	 aware	 of	 an	 intense	 yet	 calm	 focus	 on	 the	 rising	 sun	 together	 with	
openness	 towards	 the	world	and	a	 readiness	 for	 change.	We	both	noted	 in	 silence	 the	
array	of	colours	filling	the	sky,	and	with	it	came	a	feeling	of	delight	and	joy	together	with	
certain	bafflement	about	what	the	world	is.	Now	I	am	not	claiming	that	our	experiences	





before	 we	 entered	 a	 discussion	 we	 sat	 with	 an	 individual	 experience,	 which	 found	
resonance	 in	 the	other	during	our	conversation.	This	perhaps	 indicates	 that	 the	sunrise	
on	Mt	 Fuji	was	 of	 a	 particular	 kind	 and	 given	 that	 our	 respective	 experiences	 seem	 to	
overlap	with	regards	to	some	basic	elements	of	wonder	such	as	displacement,	openness	
and	joy	I	think	this	sufficiently	proves	that	it	is	at	least	not	unthinkable	that	an	experience	
of	 wonder	 can	 be	 shared.	 Based	 on	 this	 I	 claim	 that	 wonderment	 needs	 not	 be	 an	




favoured	 indirectly	 by	 the	 scientifically	minded	Adam	Smith	who	 claims	 that	wonder	 is	
merely	anxious	curiosity	from	which	we	seek	to	rid	ourselves	by	extending	our	knowledge	
(A.	 Smith,	 1980b,	 II,5).	 In	 this	 sense	 wonder	 is	 not	 an	 experience	 to	 be	 savoured	 or	
treasured	but	 an	experience	we	 should	 root	out	by	engaging	 in	 scientific	 inquiry.	Once	
knowledge	of	the	object	of	wonder	is	obtained	the	anxiety	of	not	knowing	will	disappear	




being	 and	 the	 very	 existence	 of	 the	 universe	 that	 seem	 to	 defy	 such	 an	 attitude	 and	




Freiburg	 in	 which	 he	 claims	 that	 wonder	 is	 no	 longer	 a	 viable	 starting	 point	 for	
philosophy.	Heidegger	explains	that	we	have	moved	on	since	philosophy	was	conducted	
in	 ancient	Greece	 and	we	 have	 now	 committed	 ourselves	 to	 curiosity	 to	 the	 extent	 of	
being	obsessed.	
I	would	like	to	finish	this	section	by	addressing	what	may	be	labelled	as	‘the	urge	




in	 such	a	way	 that	 it	no	 longer	 interferes	 in	an	uncomfortable	way.	 	Alternatively	a	 far	
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more	 irrational	 and	 psychologically	 loaded	 reaction	may	 take	 place	where	we	 shun	 or	
refuse	 to	 have	 anything	 to	 do	 with	 what	 makes	 us	 wonder	 because	 it	 makes	 us	
uncomfortable.	 In	 such	 circumstances	 one	 might	 seek	 to	 deem	 wonder	 irrelevant,	
unimportant,	uninteresting	or	otherwise	downgrade	 in	order	to	 justify	 the	neglect	of	 it.	
This	 is	 a	 notion	 explored	 by	 philosopher	 Trevor	 Norris	 who	 is	 engaged	 in	 education.	





In	 a	 lesson	 on	 consumerism	 in	 a	 Business	 Ethics	 course	 I	 recently	 taught,	 we	
researched	the	third	world	labour	practices	of	the	students’	favourite	shoemaker.	
At	 one	 point	many	 students	 were	 fuming	 and	 attacked	me	with	 ‘what’s	 wrong	
with	 my	 Nikes?’	 Others	 in	 the	 class	 suggested	 that	 people	 like	 working	 in	
sweatshops.	This	encounter	with	the	new	and	difficult	knowledge	did	not	provoke	
wonder,	but	aggressive	and	often	personal	attacks,	creating	a	palpable	classroom	




In	 Plato’s	Theaetetus	 the	 namesake	 of	 the	 dialogue	 declares	 himself	 lost	 in	wonder	 as	
Socrates’	 ‘torpedo	 fish’	 strikes	him.	Violence	and	aggression	 is	 very	much	missing	 from	
the	 scene.	 However	 according	 to	 Norris	 because	 human	 beings	 are	 political	 creatures	
situations	 may	 arise	 where	 too	 much	 personal	 investment	 is	 at	 play	 for	 a	 person	 to	
become	wonderstruck.	In	such	a	case	a	person	may	display	a	refusal	to	wonder	and	turn	
aggressive	 (Norris,	 2001,	 p.	 222-223).	 In	 the	 example	 above	we	 find	 the	 students	 in	 a	
defiant	and	aggressive	position	submitting	Norris	to	personal	attacks.	Norris	clarifies	that	
the	students	do	not	feel	the	need	for	change	despite	their	ability	to	see	that	their	support	
of	 Nike	 is	 generating	 sweatshops	 in	 third	 world	 countries	 (Norris,	 2001,	 p.	 223).	
Furthermore	he	claims	that	what	we	have	here	is	a	perfect	case	of	what	is	called	‘Calvin’s	
refusal’	which	 is	 a	 term	 coined	 by	 philosopher	Megan	 Boler	 after	Watterson’s	 cartoon	
character	Calvin	who	returns	a	 library	book	 loaned	by	his	mother	with	 the	comment	 ‘It	
complicates	my	life.	Don’t	get	me	any	more’	(Megan,	1997).	In	the	light	of	the	example	I	
think	 it	 is	 safe	 to	 say	 that	due	 to	 the	destabilising	 impact	of	wonder	 it	 is	plausible	 that	
	 68	
some	 politically	 engaged	 people	 of	 whom	 it	 can	 be	 said	 they	 live	 to	 defend	 particular	
interests	could	display	a	downright	refusal	to	wonder.	Furthermore	we	might	say	that	it	is	
important	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 a	 sudden	 expansion	 of	 one’s	 perspective	 following	 an	
experience	of	wonder	can	as	chemist	and	philosopher	Catherine	Hurt	Middlecamp	argues	
induce	pain	 (Middlecamp,	2009,	p.	 134)	which	most	people	would	 seek	a	quick	escape	
from.	Middelcamp	 illustrates	 her	 point	 by	 referring	 to	 an	 old	 Sufi	 tale,	which	 goes	 like	
this:	













with	here	 is	 largely	 a	matter	 of	 psychology	 and	ultimately	 it	 boils	 down	 to	 an	urge	 for	
contentment	and	stability	that	override	perfectly	logical	and	empirically	sound	arguments	





by	 considering	 the	 outlooks	 on	 wonder	 by	 a	 selection	 of	 contemporary	 writers	 on	
wonderment.		
	 Let	me	open	by	again	bringing	the	philosopher	Raymond	Tallis	to	attention.	Tallis	




human	 beings	 exist	 is	 quite	 a	 wonder.	 That	 we	 are	 fleshly	 creatures	 endowed	 with	
conscious	 thought	 which	 can	 be	 used	 to	 ponder	 our	 existence,	 formulate	 ideas	 and	
contemplate	 whether	 a	 balanced	 sense	 of	 wonder	 is	 a	 major	 contributor	 to	 our	




sense	 (I	would	 imagine)	 that	 it	will	not	achieve	much	support	 from	scientists	and	other	
‘unweavers	 of	 the	 rainbow.’	 Likewise	 a	 notion	 of	 wonder	 synonymous	 with	 curiosity	
would	prove	unsatisfactory	for	the	artist,	poet	and	the	philosopher.	Just	because	we	can	
explain	 the	 appearance	 of	 the	 rainbow	 scientifically	 does	 not	 take	 away	 the	 impact	 a	
rainbow	has	on	the	aesthetically,	poetically	and	philosophically	inclined.	A	rainbow	in	the	
sky	can	render	us	wonderstruck	and	 indeed	make	hearts	 leap	up	to	put	 it	poetically.	 In	
this	light	it	would	seem	that	a	preliminary	understanding	of	wonder	would	have	to	take	
into	account	the	achievements	of	both	science	and	the	arts.	From	the	literature	that	has	
come	 to	 my	 attention	 Robert	 C.	 Fuller’s	 understanding	 of	 wonder	 might	 suit	 these	
‘demands.’	 In	 Fuller’s	 view	 ‘wonder	 excites	 our	 ontological	 imaginings	 in	 ways	 that	
enhance	our	capacity	 to	seek	deeper	patterns	 in	 the	universe’	 (R.	C.	Fuller,	2006,	p.	2).	
Furthermore	 he	 thinks	 that	 experiences	 of	wonder	 can	 dramatically	 change	 perception	
and	are	morally	helpful	in	the	sense	that	they	provide	us	with	a	second	chance	to	choose	
what	kind	of	people	we	want	 to	be	and	can	 inspire	us	 to	become	 true	 individuals,	 and	




from	 the	 ethical.	 In	 fact	 it	 seems	 quite	 in	 tune	 with	 the	 writings	 of	 ethicist	 and	
philosopher	Philo	H.	Hove	who	writes:	
	
Wonder	 lies	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 what	 it	 is	 to	 be	 human:	 it	 places	 us	 directly	 and	
transparently	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	 world	 in	 which	 we	 live	 with	 others.	 Wonder	
reveals	things	in	a	new	light	and	tends	to	promote	mindful	and	gentle	regard	for	
their	 inherent	worth	 […]	Wonder	 is	associated	with	a	wide	range	of	experiences	
and	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 it	 may	 arise	 in	 regard	 to	 anything;	 but	 a	 deep	 level	 of	
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makes	 us	 sensible	 to	 an	 unseen	 order	 of	 life	 but	 also	 develops	 in	 us	 an	 enduring	
reverence	for	 it	 (R.	C.	Fuller,	2006,	p.	158).	Like	Tallis,	Fuller	 is	 for	a	 life	 in	wonderment	
although	 he	 acknowledges	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 live	 a	 life	 without	 a	 sense	 of	 wonder.	
Fuller	 also	 points	 out	 that	 ‘a	 life	 shaped	 by	 wonder	 is	 attuned	 to	 the	 widest	 possible	
world	of	personal	fulfilment’	(R.	Fuller,	2006,	p.	158)	and	here	he	opens	up	to	the	notion	
that	wonder	may	have	a	significant	impact	on	our	lives	as	flourishing	human	beings.	Hove	
seems	 to	 suggest	 something	 along	 the	 same	 lines	 as	 he	 emphasises	 the	 possibility	 of	
entertaining	a	deep	sense	of	wonder	that	may	reveal	fundamental	features	of	our	human	
life	such	as	our	vulnerability.	
	 Seneca	points	out	 that	 it	 is	 by	 the	 toils	 of	others	 that	we	are	being	 let	 into	 the	
presence	of	 things	and	here	at	 the	end	of	 the	 introduction	we	have	 reached	a	plateau	
where	we	have	some	overview	of	wonder	and	may	to	some	extent	appreciate	why	it	is	an	
alluring	 phenomenon	 and	 subject.	 Iris	 the	 rainbow	and	daughter	 of	 Thaumas	 (wonder)	
displays	 seven	 colours	 and	 by	 opening	 the	 chapter	 with	 seven	 colourful	 examples	
gathered	from	real	life	experiences	and	fiction	we	have	honoured	her	by	suggesting	that	






can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 noun,	 verb,	 adjective	 and	 an	 adverb.	 Engaging	 with	 the	 history	 of	




admiration	 and	 amazement.	 Furthermore	 we	 considered	 some	 possible	 enemies	 of	
wonder	 in	 order	 to	 find	 out	why	we	 sometimes	 forget	 or	 opt	 not	 to	wonder.	 Through	
these	investigations	the	connection	between	wonder,	emotion	and	imagination	has	again	
emerged	 and	 this	 connection	 is	 reinforced	 in	 the	 philosophy	 of	 wonder	 advocated	 by	
contemporary	 philosophers	 Robert	 C.	 Fuller	 and	 Philo	 Hove.	 However	 their	
complementary	 accounts	 leave	 certain	 questions	 unanswered	 including	 whether	 it	 is	
possible	 to	 view	 wonder	 exclusively	 as	 an	 emotion	 and	 what	 is	 the	 exact	 role	 of	
imagination	in	wonder?	Furthermore,	what	are	we	to	make	of	the	notion	of	deep	wonder	
that	 Hove	 speaks	 of	 and	 in	 what	 sense	 wonder	 contributes	 to	 fulfilment	 or	 human	
flourishing?	 I	 seek	 to	 answer	 these	 questions	 in	 the	 chapters	 to	 come	 alongside	 my	
efforts	 to	 continue	 to	 explore	 the	 components	 and	 effects	 of	 wonder	 and	 mount	
























by	 philosopher	 Adam	Morton	 depicting	 wonder	 as	 an	 epistemic	 emotion.	 The	 section	
closes	 with	 applying	 Ben-Ze’ev’s	 cognitive	 approach	 and	 Adam	 Morton’s	 notion	 of	
wonder	 as	 an	 epistemic	 emotion	 to	 some	 of	 the	 examples	 depicting	 wonder	 as	 an	
emotion	 provided	 in	 the	 first	 section	 in	 order	 to	 show	 in	 what	 respect	 the	 examples	
reflect	wonder	as	an	emotion.	
	 Thirdly	I	shall	explore	what	we	may	call	other	faces	of	wonder	and	argue	that	as	














	 Likewise	 Keen’s	 recollection	 of	 being	 given	 a	 knife	 by	 a	 mysterious	 stranger	 in	
Maryville,	 Tennessee	 evokes	 the	 idea	 of	 wonder	 being	 an	 emotion.	 It	 is	 entirely	
reasonable	to	think	that	the	pervasive	sense	of	gratitude	and	wondering	expectancy	he	
experienced	 in	 the	 weeks	 following	 the	 event	 was	 prompted	 by	 an	 initial	 emotion	 of	
wonder	 produced	 by	 the	 extraordinary	 handover	 of	 the	 knife.	 When	 we	 read	 his	
description	one	certainly	gets	the	sense	that	there	is	a	particular	emotional	quality	to	his	
experience,	which	should	not	be	underestimated.	
	 The	 wonder	 Boyle	 experienced	 upon	 witnessing	 the	 luminous	meat	 brought	 to	
him	 from	 the	 larder	 by	 his	 servant	 again	 qualifies	 as	 an	 emotion.	What	 points	 to	 this	
notion	is	that	as	we	may	recall	 from	the	introduction	wonder	 in	general	 is	 joyful	and	to	
think	of	joy	as	an	emotion	seems	reasonable.	In	further	support	of	Boyle’s	wonder	being	
an	 emotional	 response	 stands	 the	 fact	 that	 he	 finds	 within	 him	 an	 urge	 to	 share	 his	
experience,	which	 leaves	one	with	the	 impression	that	he	 is	being	moved	by	something	















makes	 our	 hearts	 leap	 up	 (W.	 Wordsworth,	 1850,	 p.	 33)	 and	 because	 of	 this	 feature	
displays	 of	 wonder	 such	 as	 18th	 century	 Prussian	 showman	 Gustave	 Katterfelto’s38	
Wonder	of	Wonders	Show39	which	took	place	at	Spring	Gardens	in	London	in	1780	(Nadis,	
2005,	 p.	 3)	 were	 popular.	 The	 same	 feature	 is	 behind	 the	 popularity	 of	modern	 IMAX	
films	depicting	 for	example	 the	wonders	of	climbing	Mount	Everest	or	what	 it	 is	 like	 to	





the	wonder-provoking	activity	of	 stargazing	or	 to	be	precise	meteor	 spotting	which	we	
have	touched	on	earlier	 in	connection	with	Rogers’	experience	of	wonder	brought	forth	








































most	 incredible	 vision	 I	 have	 ever	 witnessed.	 It	 was	 as	 if	 every	 star	 was	 falling	












Mission,	 Kansas.	 	 That's	 eastern	 Kansas.	 	 I	 got	 up	 in	 the	middle	 of	 the	 night	 to	
make	 my	 scheduled	 trip	 to	 the	 bathroom	 and	 as	 I	 glanced	 out	 the	 bathroom	
window,	streaks	of	 light	from	the	moonless	dark	sky	caught	my	eye.	 	 I	moved	to	
the	south	facing	bathroom	window,	and	what	I	saw	as	I	approached	that	window	








rain	 stars.	 	 It	 truly	was	 a	 constant	 shower	 of	 stars.	 	 At	 first,	 I	 was	 frightened.	 I	
didn't	understand	what	was	happening.		Then,	the	beauty	of	it	took	over.		I	must	
have	stood	there	30	minutes	or	more	waiting	for	the	rain	to	stop.		It	never	did.		I	
finally	 went	 back	 to	 bed	 feeling	 as	 if	 I	 had	 witnessed	 something	 that	 no	 other	





All	 of	 the	 above	 descriptions	 seem	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 implicated	 “stargazers”	






Further	 support	 for	 depicting	wonder	 as	 an	 emotion	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 literature	 on	
wonder.	 Towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	 introductory	 chapter	 I	 highlighted	 the	 work	 of	
contemporary	wonder-theorist	Robert	C.	Fuller	who	thinks	of	wonder	as	an	emotion	that	
may	give	rise	to	personal	transformation	and	makes	us	sensible	to	what	he	refers	to	as	an	






















because	 it	 synthesises	 and	 widens	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 wonder	
through	an	evolutionary-adaptive	perspective43	yet	at	the	same	time	it	paves	the	way	for	
thinking	of	the	emotion	of	wonder	as	‘one	principal	source	of	adult	spirituality’	(R.	Fuller,	
2006,	p.	365)	and	as	Fuller	writes	 the	 idea	 that	 ‘a	 life	 shaped	by	wonder	evidences	 the	
very	existential	 and	cognitive	 sensibilities	 that	would	 seem	 indispensable	 to	humanity’s	
search	for	religious	meaning’	(R.	Fuller,	2006,	p.	384).	
	 The	 idea	 that	 wonder	 is	 an	 emotion	 is	 not	 unique	 to	 Fuller.	 In	 fact	 the	 first	
significant	hint	of	wonder	being	an	emotion	comes	from	Plato	who	views	wonder	as	the	





hailing	 from	a	 variety	of	disciplines	we	might	begin	by	 turning	our	 attention	 to	 literary	









Cunningham	 clearly	 states	 that	 wonder	 is	 an	 emotion,	 yet	 an	 emotion	 that	 is	 rarely	
discussed	in	comparison	to	the	emotion	of	fear	and	sorrow	when	it	comes	to	tragedy,	and	
particularly	so	in	1964	compared	to	the	renaissance	period.		
	 Contemporary	philosopher	 Jesse	Prinz	 also	 thinks	of	wonder	 as	 an	emotion	and	
argues	that	it	is	perhaps	our	most	important	emotion	because	it	has	inspired	humanity’s	










wonder)	 at	 places	 of	 worship	 such	 as	 temples	 and	 cathedrals,	 as	 they	 have	 a	 way	 of	
making	 us	 feel	 small	 yet	 elevated	 (Prinz,	 2013).	 We	 wonder	 at	 art	 because	 art	 often	
depicts	 religious	 outlooks	 and	 so	 it	 is	 that	 we	 can	 wonder	 at	 everything	 from	 the	
limestone	 idol	 Venus	 of	Willendorf	 to	 the	 depiction	 of	 animals	 in	 the	 Chauvet	 cave	 in	
France	thought	to	have	been	utilised	in	shamanistic	rites	(Prinz,	2013).	
	 Quinn	 acknowledges	 that	 ‘wonder	 is	 a	 human	 emotion	 and	 not	 an	 idea	 or	











and	 understand,	 its	 presence	 in	 other	 practices	 as	 in	 spiritual	 or	 aesthetic	
contexts—if	 indeed	we	may	draw	these	boundaries	with	sufficient	distinctness—




Vasalou	 clearly	 points	 out	 that	 wonder	 is	 an	 emotion	 connected	 with	 inquiry	 and	 the	





	 Philosopher	 Marguerite	 La	 Caze	 is	 another	 patron	 of	 the	 idea	 that	 wonder	
qualifies	as	an	emotion	and	she	argues	 in	her	Wonder	and	Generosity	 that	wonder	and	
indeed	generosity	plays	 important	roles	 in	both	ethics	and	politics	and	that	wonder	 is	a	
passion	 that	 enables	 a	particular	 response	 to	others	 that	 ‘accepts	 their	 differences’	 (La	
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Caze,	2013,	p.	1).	Furthermore	she	puts	forward	that	wonder	‘involves	recognising	others	
as	 different	 from	 ourselves	 in	 that	 it	 is	 a	 response	 to	what	 is	 unfamiliar	 and	 a	way	 of	
finding	the	unfamiliar	in	the	familiar	(La	Caze,	2013,	p.	1).	
	 That	wonder	can	be	classified	as	an	emotion	is	likewise	advocated	by	philosopher	
Martha	Nussbaum	and	 in	 her	 opus	 on	 emotions	Upheavals	 of	 Thought	 she	writes	 that	
wonder	is	the	emotion	that	responds:	
	
To	 the	 pull	 of	 the	 object,	 and	 one	might	 say	 that	 in	 it	 the	 subject	 is	maximally	
aware	 of	 the	 value	 of	 the	 object,	 and	 only	 minimally	 aware,	 if	 at	 all,	 of	 its	




Additionally	 she	 writes	 that	 wonder	 is	 the	 emotion	 that	 makes	 it	 possible	 for	 human	
beings	 to	 transcend	 selfishness	 and	 respond	 to	 and	 recognise	 the	 inherent	 worth	 of	
others	because	as	she	writes	it	‘helps	move	distant	objects	within	the	circle	of	a	person’s	
scheme	of	ends’	 (Nussbaum,	2008,	p.	55).	 In	 this	 sense	wonder	 is	an	 inclusive	emotion	
that	as	Fuller	would	argue	encourages	‘empathy	and	compassion	[and]	redraws	our	world	
of	 concern,	 establishing	 true	mutuality	 with	 a	 wider	 sphere	 of	 life’	 (R.	 Fuller,	 2006,	 p.	
















of	 the	whole	 that	 enlightens	 rather	 than	 fragments	 knowledge	 from	disparate	 sources’	
(Deane-Drummond,	2006,	p.	152).	
	 Additionally	wonder	understood	as	an	emotion	to	an	extent	finds	support	 in	the	
work	 of	 psychiatrist	 Pauls	 R.	 Fleischman	who	 in	 his	 book	Wonder	 argues	 that	 wonder	
might	qualify	as	an	emotion	but	that	wonder	can	also	be	thought	of	as	a	thought-pattern	
or	 the	 absence	 of	 such	 (Fleischman,	 2013,	 p.	 109).	 Additionally	 Fleischman	writes	 that	
when	 we	 wonder	 ‘something	 about	 the	 world	 itself	 awakens	 in	 us’	 and	 in	 this	 sense	











Of	 all	 the	 theorists	 Fleishman	 deserves	 special	 attention	 because	 as	much	 as	 he	 is	 an	



















upheavals”	 a	 traveller	might	 discover	 in	 a	 landscape	 where	 recently	 only	 a	 flat	










	 Nussbaum’s	contribution	to	the	understanding	of	emotions	 is	 important	and	the	
idea	 that	 emotions	 can	 be	 cultivated	 links	 up	 to	 her	 work	 in	 political	 philosophy	 and	
ethics.	Nevertheless	her	 approach	 is	 but	one	among	many	and	 the	nature	of	 emotions	
and	indeed	the	nature	of	their	expression	is	a	complicated	and	controversial	matter.	To	
begin	 to	appreciate	 this	complexity	one	could	begin	by	pointing	out	 that	 there	are	 two	
distinct	 ideas,	which	 I	shall	 label	the	 ‘cultural	approach’	and	the	 ‘natural	approach’	that	
have	long	troubled	and	divided	scholars	working	on	the	subject.		
	 The	 cultural	 approach	 signifies	 that	 human	 emotions	 are	 social	 constructs	
understood	 as	 philosopher	 Ian	 Hacking	 puts	 it	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 ‘emotions	 and	 their	
expressions	are	quite	specific	 to	a	social	and	 linguistic	group’	 (Hacking,	2001,	p.	18).	To	
elaborate	Fuller	explains	that	this	line	of	thinking	holds	that	‘human	behaviour	and	even	
“inner	experiences”	(including	our	emotions	or	even	mystical	experiences)’	 (R.	C.	Fuller,	





cultural	 background	and	 the	environment	but	on	 the	way	people	 talk	 and	 think	
about	 emotions.	 In	 our	 society,	 conversations	 often	 tend	 to	 focus	 on	 outrage,	
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resentment,	and,	in	a	very	different	mood	romantic	love.	We	talk	very	little	about	
grief,	 very	 little	 about	 gratitude,	 although	 these	 two	 emotions	 form	 the	
foundation	of	a	great	many	extended	conversations	and	so	are	“basic”	emotions	
in	other	cultures.	Among	the	Kululi	of	Papua,	New	Guinea,	for	example,	grief	and	




Solomon	clearly	points	out	 that	 there	are	vast	differences	 in	 the	way	emotions	such	as	
grief	 and	gratitude	are	 thought	and	 talked	about	across	 cultures	which	 speaks	 towards	
the	importance	of	culture	and	subculture	in	the	making	of	emotions.	
	 For	 further	 clarification	of	what	 it	means	 that	emotions	are	 linked	 to	 social	 and	
linguistic	 groups	 one	 can	 also	 turn	 to	 psychologist	 Vivian	 Burr	 who	 in	 her	 book	 Social	
Constructionism	gives	voice	to	the	social	constructionist	view	of	emotions.	She	writes:	
	




A	 social	 constructionist	 view,	 by	 contrast,	 would	 say	 that,	 in	 English-speaking	
cultures,	 the	words	 ‘anger,	 ‘hatred’	 and	 ‘envy’	 and	 the	 concepts	 to	which	 they	
refer	 pre-date	 any	 one	 person’s	 entry	 into	 the	 world	 as	 an	 infant,	 and	 in	 the	
process	 of	 learning	 to	 talk	 we	 have	 no	 choices	 but	 to	 come	 to	 understand	
ourselves	in	terms	of	these	concepts.	This	view	would	suggest	that	our	experience	
of	the	world,	and	perhaps	especially	of	our	own	internal	states,	is	undifferentiated	
and	 intangible	 without	 the	 framework	 of	 language	 to	 give	 it	 structure	 and	









	 	To	 exemplify	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 culture	we	 are	 situated	 in	 determines	 how	 our	
emotions	 develop	 we	 might	 turn	 to	 anthropologist	 Catherine	 Lutz	 who	 in	 her	 book	
Unnatural	 Emotions	 reveals	 her	 study	 of	 the	 people	 inhabiting	 the	 island	 Ifaluk	 in	 the	
South	 Pacific	 and	 their	 particular	 emotion	 ‘fago’	 which	 she	 translates	 into	
compassion/love/sorrow	(C.	Lutz,	1988,	p.	12).	Lutz	writes	that	to	really	understand	what	







and	 that	 ‘amae’	 which	 we	 may	 translate	 into	 ‘indulgent	 interdependence’	 (Solomon,	
2007,	 p.	 258)	 or	 ‘sweet	 dependence’	 (Hare,	 1988,	 p.	 10)	 in	 reality	 is	 completely	
untranslatable	 because	 it	 has	 many	 meanings	 in	 Japanese	 and	 is	 an	 emotion	 that	
‘intrinsically	avoids	verbalisation’	(Morsbach	&	Tyler,	1998,	p.	290).	If	for	argument’s	sake	
this	is	true	those	outside	Japanese	society	will	have	no	clue	as	to	what	amae	refers	to	in	
full	 and	 if	 one	 were	 to	 acquire	 such	 understanding	 it	 would	 depend	 entirely	 on	 one’s	
ability	 to	 submerge	oneself	 into	 Japanese	 culture	and	only	 through	being	a	part	of	 the	
Japanese	culture	could	we	understand	the	true	meaning	of	‘amae’.		
	
As	mentioned	earlier	 there	 is	another	 idea	that	 influences	thinkers	on	emotion,	which	 I	
have	labelled	the	natural	approach.	Now	in	the	earlier	quotation	from	Burr	it	was	pointed	
out	 that	 psychoanalysis	 builds	 on	 the	 idea	 of	 innate	 human	 emotions	 and	 thus	 the	
practice	of	psychoanalysis	represents	an	outlook	on	human	emotions	quite	different	from	
that	 of	 the	 social	 constructionist.	 The	 idea	 is	 that	 emotions	 are	 a	 part	 of	 our	 human	
makeup	and	that	no	matter	what	culture,	 social	group	or	 language	group	we	belong	to	













Our	 concept	 of	 emotions	 are	 organized	 hierarchically,	 with	 the	 non-basic	
emotions	 falling	 under	 one	 or	 more	 of	 the	 basic	 emotions.	 So,	 for	 example,	 if	
anger	 is	 a	 basic	 emotion,	 then	 less	 basic	 species	 of	 anger	might	 be	 annoyance,	
fury,	 rage,	 indignation	 and	 so	 forth.	 Other	 non-basic	 emotions	 could	 then	 be	
comprised	 of	 a	 cocktail	 of	 basic	 emotions:	 jealousy,	 for	 example,	might	 include	




That	 there	 might	 be	 such	 a	 thing	 called	 universal	 emotions	 is	 an	 interesting	 notion	
because	if	true	it	effectively	points	out	a	human	communality.	However	it	has	to	be	said	
that	what	qualifies	as	basic	emotions	is	not	quite	as	fixed	as	some	perhaps	would	like	to	
think	 and	 that	 the	 ‘list	 of	 basic	 emotions’	 has	 virtually	 changed	over	 time	 and	 is	 still	 a	
matter	of	controversy.	To	substantiate,	 the	 Indian	treatise	Natyashastra,	a	Sanskrit	 text	
dating	 back	 to	 the	 3rd	 century	 BCE	 committed	 to	 investigations	 into	 the	 nature	 of	
consciousness,	distils	nine	principal	emotions:	sexual	passion,	amusement,	sorrow,	anger,	
fear,	 perseverance,	 disgust,	 wonder	 and	 serenity	 (Shweder	 &	 Haidt,	 2000,	 p.	 399).	 A	
different	 list	 can	be	 found	 in	 the	Li	 Chi,	 a	Chinese	encyclopaedia	dating	back	 to	 the	1st	
century	BCE	which	describes	the	seven	feelings	of	men	as:	joy,	anger,	sadness,	fear,	love,	
disliking,	and	liking’	(J.	Russell,	1991,	p.	426).	In	contrast	Cicero’s	work	highlights	only	four	
emotions	 namely	 lust/desire,	 delight,	 fear	 and	 distress	 (Cicero,	 2001,	 IV,	 13-15)	 and	
Descartes	names	six	simple	and	primitive	passions	namely	wonder,	 love,	hatred,	desire,	
joy	 and	 sadness	 (Descartes,	 1986,	 p.	 362).	 The	 philosopher	 Spinoza	 found	 there	 to	 be	
three	primary	emotions	which	are	pleasure,	pain	and	desire	(Spinoza,	1989,	III,	prob.	59)	








emotional	 expressions	 including	 low	 spirits	 (anxiety,	 grief,	 dejection	 and	 despair),	 high	
spirits	 (joy,	 love,	 tender	 feelings	 and	 devotion),	 reflection	 (meditation,	 ill-temper,	
sulkiness	 and	 determination),	 hatred	 (anger),	 disdain	 (contempt,	 disgust,	 guilt,	 pride,	
helplessness,	patience,	affirmation	and	negation)	surprise	(astonishment,	fear	and	horror)	
and	self-attention	(shame,	shyness,	modesty,	blushing)	(Darwin,	1999,	VII-XIII).	Now	this	
montage	 of	 discrepancy	 over	 basic	 emotions	 clearly	 is	 brought	 together	 from	 older	
sources	and	thus	one	might	be	inclined	to	think	that	contemporary	psychology	can	offer	a	
conclusive	vision	of	what	counts	as	 innate	human	emotions.	Alas	this	 is	 in	a	strict	sense	
not	the	case,	which	becomes	obvious	when	we	consult	the	work	of	psychologist	Robert	




natural	 approach	 to	 emotions.	 Having	 said	 that,	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	 cultural	
approach	 prevails.	 The	 natural	 approach	 endures	 within	 the	 philosophy	 of	 emotions	
because	 although	 theorists	 cannot	 completely	 agree	 on	 a	 list	 of	 basic	 emotions	 most	





to	 keep	 both	 ideas	 in	 mind	 because	 both	 may	 help	 us	 understand	 wonder	 better.	 To	
elaborate	 one	 might	 say	 that	 the	 cultural	 approach	 is	 merited	 because	 to	 say	 that	
emotions	are	 socially	 constructed	can	help	cast	 light	on	why	 the	conception	of	wonder	
has	changed	over	time	and	why	it	is	that	for	example	the	feeling	of	wonder	celebrated	in	
Plato’s	 Theaetetus	 as	 the	 beginning	 of	 philosophy	 is	 so	 readily	 dismissed	 by	 the	 18th	
century	English	poet	Alexander	Pope	who	we	recall	voiced	that	fools	admire,	but	men	of	
sense	 approve.	 One	 possible	 explanation	 is	 that	 changes	 in	 the	 social	 climate	 and	 the	
general	conception	of	the	order	of	things	discredited	wonder	and	from	being	the	feeling	
of	the	philosopher	it	became	the	feeling	associated	with	naivety.	In	other	words	we	can	
say	 that	 given	 the	 seemingly	 wonder-friendly	 culture	 of	 ancient	 Athens	 an	 upstart	
philosopher	 would	 have	 been	 encouraged	 to	 see	 wonder	 in	 a	 positive	 light	 whilst	 a	
student	 during	 the	 less	 wonder-friendly	 Enlightenment	 period	 with	 its	 emphasis	 on	
reason	 in	 all	 likelihood	would	 have	 been	 cultivated	 to	 think	 and	 speak	 of	wonder	 in	 a	
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much	more	reserved	and	negative	way.	A	further	merit	of	the	cultural	approach	is	that	it	
will	 help	 us	 remain	 critical	 towards	 whatever	 conclusions	 about	 wonder	 the	 natural	
approach	might	provide	us	and	not	to	be	let	astray	by	what	could	be	nothing	but	social	
trends	 in	 the	 current	 research	 climate	 on	 emotions,	 attempting	 to	 pigeonhole	wonder	
merely	 as	 a	 complex	 emotion	 too	 muddled	 for	 serious	 attention	 or	 explain	 away	 its	
significance	by	describing	it	as	synonymous	with	for	example	surprise	or	fear.	
	 Now	keeping	this	 in	mind	together	with	the	uncertainties	surrounding	the	 list	of	
basic	emotions	it	has	to	be	said	that	the	approach	to	emotions	and	indeed	wonder	(which	
I	 shall	 elaborate	on	 later	 in	 this	 chapter)	drawing	on	 the	natural	 approach	 to	emotions	
does	 offer	 a	 fruitful	way	 forward	when	 it	 comes	 to	 understanding	what	 emotions	 are.	
This	is	because	the	‘war’	between	social	science	and	natural	science	is	not	as	prominent	
as	it	was	in	the	20th	century	and	that	since	the	1980s	genetics	have	established	the	strong	
influence	 of	 biology	 on	 human	 behaviour.	 Likewise	 the	 disciplines	 of	 evolutionary	
psychology	 aiming	 at	 explaining	 why	 ‘natural	 selection	 favours	 the	 kinds	 of	 mental	
activity	 that	 we	 discern	 in	 organism	 today’	 (R.	 C.	 Fuller,	 2006,	 p.	 21)	 and	 sociobiology	
which	 is	 concerned	 with	 ‘why	 humans	 and	 other	 social	 organisms	 evolved	 particular	
behaviour	 patterns’	 (R.	 C.	 Fuller,	 2006,	 p.	 21)	 have	 emerged	 and	 advanced	 our	
understanding	of	what	human	emotions	are	(R.	C.	Fuller,	2006,	p.	21).	The	advancement	
of	 our	 understanding	 of	 emotions	 that	 these	 new	movements	 have	 brought	 forth	 can	
partly	be	found	in	the	insistence	of	researchers	advocating	the	natural	approach	to	‘get	to	
the	 “bottom	 of	 things”,	 to	 identify	 the	 basic	 building	 blocks	 of	 emotions,	 the	 basic	
emotions’	 (Solomon,	2002a,	p.	115).	To	an	extent	 these	new	 fields	and	disciplines	have	





This	section	breaks	away	from	the	big	 lines	 in	the	philosophy	of	emotions	drawn	out	 in	
the	 previous	 section	 and	 focuses	 on	 the	 cognitive	 approach	 to	 emotions	 which	 is	 a	
particular	view	of	emotions	that	gained	momentum	after	the	publication	of	psychologist	
Ulric	Neisser’s	 1967	book	Cognitive	 Psychology	 (Neisser,	 2014).	 The	 cognitive	 approach	
advocates	the	notion	that	emotions	are	intentional	states	of	mind	meaning	that	they	are	
‘directed	 at	 or	 toward	 some	 object’	 (Deigh,	 2010,	 p.	 17)	 and	 this	 approach	 is	 quite	
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suitable	 for	 an	 investigation	 into	wonder	 because	when	we	wonder,	we	wonder	 about	
something	meaning	that	our	wonderment	is	directed	toward	a	particular	object	or	event.	
The	 cognitive	 approach	 has	 in	 this	 respect	 a	 certain	 explanatory	 power	 as	 it	 allows	
emotions	 to	become	part	 of	 a	 larger	 affective	 realm	and	emotions	 to	be	broken	down	
into	smaller	subcategories,	which	consequently	will	increase	the	level	of	detail,	and	thus	
we	 stand	 a	 better	 chance	 of	 advancing	 our	 understanding	 of	wonder	 if	 indeed	 it	 is	 an	
emotion.	Now	before	I	say	more	about	the	cognitive	approach	it	has	to	be	said	that	it	is	
not	 unrivalled	 or	 immune	 to	 criticism.	 The	 cognitive	 approach	 is	 an	 alternative	 to	 the	
approach	 to	 emotions	 pioneered	 by	 psychologist	William	 James	 arguing	 that	 emotions	
equals	feelings	and	are	connected	with	bodily	states.	James	writes:	
	
	 Without	 the	 bodily	 states	 following	 on	 the	 perception,	 the	 latter	 would	 be	
	 purely	 cognitive	 in	 form,	 pale,	 colourless,	 destitute	 of	 emotional	 warmth.	 We	




James’	 idea	 is	 that	without	bodily	 feelings	 there	 is	 no	 such	 thing	 as	 emotions	 and	 that	
bodily	 changes	 are	 responsible	 for	 emotions.	 Rooted	 in	 ancient	 Greek	 thought	 the	
cognitive	approach	 treats	emotions	as	 cognitive,	 thought-centred	and	directed	 towards	
the	world	(Deigh,	2010,	p.	17,26);	(Goldie,	2010,	p.	4).	This	challenges	James’s	view	and	
insists	that	his	approach	places	too	much	emphasis	on	bodily	states	and	too	little	on	the	
cognitive	 aspect	 of	 emotions	 (Ratcliffe,	 2005,	 p.	 179).	 For	 this	 reason	 the	 cognitive	
approach	 is	 popular	 but	 in	 our	 endeavour	 to	 understand	 in	 what	 sense	 wonder	 is	 an	
emotion	 we	 must	 exercise	 caution	 because	 as	 philosopher	 Simon	 Blackburn	 argues	
emotions	are	not	as	cognitive	as	some	might	think	and	the	cognitive	approach	is	far	too	
Apollonian45	and	far	less	Dionysian46,	leaving	out	as	Nussbaum	has	stated	‘what	is	messy	





























ceases	 to	 excite	 us	 (Ben-Ze'ev,	 2010,	 p.	 43).	 Emotions	 exist	 to	 protect	 our	 personal	
concerns	 and	 in	 the	 event	 of	 an	 emotional	 change	 its	 importance	 or	 meaning	 is	
comparative	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 is	 against	 a	 personal	 referential	 framework	 or	
background	that	the	importance	or	meaning	of	the	change	can	be	evaluated	and	assessed	
(Ben-Ze'ev,	 2010,	 p.	 44).	 In	 addition	 he	 explains	 that	 a	 typical	 emotion	 has	 four	
characteristics:	 Instability,	 great	 intensity,	 partiality,	 and	 brief	 duration	 and	 four	 basic	
components:	Cognition,	evaluation,	motivation	and	feelings	(Ben-Ze'ev,	2010,	p.	42).	The	
first	characteristic,	instability,	relates	to	the	notion	that	emotions	are	unstable	states	and	
indicators	 of	 change	 or	 transition.	 Born	 out	 of	 a	 changing	 context	 ‘they	 signify	 some	










similar	 to	 heat-seeking	missiles	 since	 their	 only	 concern	 is	 to	 find	 the	 heat-generating	
target	(Ben-Ze'ev,	2010,	p.	45).	The	fourth	characteristic	of	emotion	is	brevity.	Ben-Ze’ev	
states	 that	 typical	emotions	are	 relatively	 short-lived	since	a	person	cannot	mobilise	all	
her	resources	to	remain	focussed	on	a	particular	event	for	a	prolonged	period.	If	so	she	




person	mirrors	 this	 particular	 quality.	 Ben-Ze’ev	 finds	 that	 ‘a	 brief	 emotional	 state	 can	
have	profound	and	long-lasting	behavioural	implications’	(Ben-Ze'ev,	2010,	p.	46).	
	 As	 mentioned	 Ben-Ze’ev	 also	 informs	 us	 that	 emotions	 contain	 four	 basic	
components	 which	 ‘express	 a	 conceptual	 division	 of	 the	 elements	 of	 this	 experience'	




we	may	 form	 for	 example	 a	meaningful	 relationship	 to	 another	 person.	 The	 final	 basic	
component	 is	 feeling,	which	Ben-Ze'ev	ascribes	to	what	he	calls	 'the	feeling	dimension'.	
Feelings	 are	 hard	 to	 describe	 and	 people	 often	 turn	 to	 the	 use	 of	 metaphors	 in	 the	
attempt	 to	convey	a	particular	 feeling.	He	 furthermore	explains	 that	 feelings	 reveal	 the	







and	 (c)	 increasing	memory	 (Ben-Ze'ev,	2010,	p.	48).	On	 the	negative	side	 it	 can	be	said	
that	 if	 one	 harbours	 intense	 feelings	 the	 intellectual	 faculties	 of	 a	 person	 might	 be	
compromised,	 meaning	 that	 sound	 cognitive	 assessment	 in	 a	 given	 situation	 is	
impossible.	(Ben-Ze'ev,	2010,	p.48).	
Returning	 to	 the	 intentional	 dimension	 and	 the	 component	 of	 emotion	 called	











cause	distortion	because	when	one	harbours	 such	 feelings	our	 intellectual	 faculties	 are	
compromised	‘and	no	longer	functions	normally’	(Ben-Ze'ev,	2010,	p.	48).	
With	 regards	 to	 the	 evaluative	 component	 of	 emotion	Ben-Ze’ev	 considers	 it	 of	









	The	 final	 component	 in	 the	 intentional	 dimension	 is	 according	 to	 Ben-Ze'ev	
motivation.	Motivation	 is	 concerned	with	 a	 person’s	 eagerness	 to	 “maintain	 or	 change	
present,	past	or	future	circumstances”	(Ben-Ze'ev,	2010,	p.	48).	A	motivated	person	might	
defy	a	considerable	amount	of	obstacles	 in	order	to	change	her	circumstances.	 Imagine	
an	upcoming	ballet	dancer	bent	on	being	hired	by	a	major	ballet	 company.	 	 She	might	
defy	the	advice	of	her	parents,	the	pangs	of	poverty	or	anxiety	provoked	by	the	intense	
competition	in	order	to	fulfil	her	dream.	
	 So	 far	 we	 have	 engaged	 with	 the	 notion	 of	 changes	 and	 we	 have	 found	 that	
emotions	 are	 personal	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 emotional	 change	 is	measured	 against	 a	
personal	 background.	 Furthermore	 we	 have	 explored	 the	 major	 characteristics	 of	
emotion	 together	 with	 the	 basic	 components.	 However,	 Ben-Ze’ev’s	 description	 of	





suffered	because	of	 the	event.	An	event’s	 reality	 refers	 to	what	degree	we	believe	 the	
event	to	be	real	which	 is	to	say	that	the	more	we	believe	an	event	to	be	real	the	more	
intense	our	emotions	will	be.	The	relevance	of	an	event	is	likewise	important	because	the	
greater	 the	relevance	an	event	has	 the	more	 important	and	 intense	 it	will	be.	A	deadly	
tornado	hitting	us	right	here,	right	now	is	more	relevant	to	us	than	a	tornado	hitting	an	
uninhabited	 area	 in	 Oklahoma	 because	 our	 lives	 are	 in	 danger	 and	 thus	 our	 emotions	
would	be	more	intense.	
	 Our	 accountability,	 readiness	 and	 deservingness	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 event	 also	
influence	 the	 way	 emotions	 work	 because	 they	 form	 the	 ‘constituting	 background	
circumstances	 of	 the	 emotional	 event’	 (Ben-Ze'ev,	 2010,	 p.	 52).	 By	 accountability	 Ben-
Ze’ev	 highlights	 responsibility	 and	 agency,	 which	 is	 to	 say	 that	 a	 higher	 degree	 of	
accountability	results	in	greater	emotional	intensity.	By	readiness	Ben-Ze’ev	points	to	the	
cognitive	 change	 that	 takes	 place	 in	 our	minds	 during	 an	 event.	 If	 something	 happens	
unexpectedly	it	generates	intensity	because	as	he	writes:	‘we	are	angrier	if	we	happen	to	





	 Furthermore,	contextual	and	personality	variables	are	 influential	as	well	when	 it	
comes	 to	 emotional	 intensity	 (Ben-Ze'ev,	 2010,	 p.54).	 What	 is	 at	 play	 here	 is	 that	
‘personal	 traits,	 world	 views,	 cultural	 background,	 and	 current	 personal	 situation’	 are	
factors	that	may	fuel	the	intensity	of	an	emotion.	
	 As	a	last	entry	Ben-Ze’ev	claims	that	emotions	belong	to	a	greater	affective	realm,	
which	 includes	 sentiments,	 moods,	 affective	 traits	 and	 affective	 disorders	 (Ben-Ze'ev,	




Earlier	we	encountered	 the	notion	of	basic	emotions	and	 the	predicate	 ‘basic’	 suggests	
there	are	other	kinds	of	emotions	to	consider	which	we	for	the	sake	of	argument	could	
term	 ‘non-basic	 emotions’.	 Given	 that	 we	 do	 not	 have	 a	 complete	 list	 of	 the	 basic	
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focus	 on	 a	 particular	 subgroup	 of	 non-basic	 emotion	 labelled	 ‘epistemic	 emotions’	 by	
following	 philosopher	 Adam	 Morton	 who	 classifies	 wonder	 as	 an	 epistemic	 emotion	
(Morton,	2010,	p.	385,	389).	
To	 begin	 we	 might	 say	 that	 Morton	 is	 interested	 in	 how	 we	 acquire	 beliefs	
correctly	and	in	this	respect	he	identifies	epistemic	emotions	that	are	directed	especially	
towards	 knowledge	 or	 epistemic	 ends	 (Morton,	 2010,	 p.	 386).	 In	 this	 respect	 he	 has	
devised	 a	 list	 of	 possible	 candidates	 for	 epistemic	 emotions:	 ‘Curiosity,	 intellectual	
courage,	love	of	truth,	wonder,	meticulousness,	excitement	and	humility’	(Morton,	2010,	








of	 an	 incompetent	 co-worker	 slows	 down	 a	 research	 project.	 This	 person	 harbours	
generosity	as	a	character	trait	but	she	cannot	be	viewed	as	virtuous	since	her	generosity	
is	excessive	(Morton,	2010,	p.	386).	Emotion	contrasts	with	both	virtue	and	character.	It	is	
quite	possible	 to	 imagine	a	person	who	after	exhibiting	great	generosity	may	say,	 ‘I	did	
not	 feel	 generous’	 but	 this	 does	 not	 nullify	 her	 generosity	 (Morton,	 2010,	 p.	 387).	 The	
opposite	 is	 also	 possible	 as	 one	 can	 imagine	 a	 person	 post	 displaying	 no	 generosity	
whatsoever	 claims	 that	 she	 feels	 enormously	 generous.	 In	 either	 case,	 feelings	 do	 not	
define	whether	an	act	is	generous	nor	do	they	define	whether	it	is	virtuous.	
Morton	 also	 offers	 an	 alternative	 argument	 to	 distinguish	 virtue,	 character	 and	
emotion	 through	 the	 concept	 of	 longevity.	 Virtues	 are	 normative	 concepts	 since	 they	
‘pick	out	dispositions	 to	profitable,	 correct,	or	admirable	patterns	of	action	or	 thought’	
(Morton,	2010,	p.	388).	Furthermore	 it	can	be	said	of	virtues	 that	 just	 like	one	swallow	
does	not	a	make	a	spring	one	virtuous	act	does	not	make	one	a	virtuous	person.	Virtue,	it	
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seems,	appeals	 to	 longevity.	Concerning	 the	notion	of	character	 it	 can	be	said	 that	 just	
because	a	person	loses	her	temper	momentarily	during	a	discussion	it	does	not	make	her	
an	 angry	 character.	 Likewise,	 just	 because	 a	 cowardly	 character	 experiences	 a	 brief	
moment	of	courage	it	does	not	follow	that	she	is	no	longer	a	coward.	In	this	light	the	idea	
of	character	 like	the	notion	of	virtue	demands	certain	durability.	Emotions	on	the	other	
hand	 are,	 according	 to	 Morton,	 different	 since	 they	 are	 occurrent	 and	 ‘happen	 at	
particular	moments	and	through	determinate	stretches	of	time,	during	which	they	have	
causal	 influence	 on	 the	 person’	 (Morton,	 2010,	 p.	 388).	 Furthermore	Morton	 explains	
that	emotions	can	be	associated	with	conscious	affect,	meaning	we	can	have	a	feeling	of	
being	 generous	 just	 as	 we	 can	 have	 conscious	 awareness	 about	 a	 particular	 thought	
formation	 or	 pressing	 desire	 (Morton,	 2010,	 p.	 388).	 In	 addition	 emotions	 can	 also	 be	
motives	since	they	can	‘cause	behaviour	by	making	particular	desires	and	beliefs	salient’	
(Morton,	2010,	p.	388).	
With	 regards	 to	 how	 we	 human	 beings	 acquire	 beliefs	 it	 is	 nevertheless	 still	
possible	for	the	sceptic	to	deny	the	existence	of	epistemic	emotions.	First	of	all	it	is	quite	




because	 feeling	 curious	 at	 a	 key	 moment	 in	 time	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	 emotion	
functions	 epistemically	 (Morton,	 2010,	 p.	 388).	 Nevertheless	Morton	 argues	 that	 there	
are	occasions	where	virtues	are	not	enough	and	where	emotions	play	a	key	role	when	it	
comes	to	acquiring	knowledge.	He	claims	that	an	enquiry	based	on	emotion-less	virtues	





precisely	 that.	According	 to	Morton	 it	 is	quite	possible	 that	 the	scientist	will	 succeed	 in	
producing	excellent	scientific	work;	however	 it	 is	unlikely	that	she	will	 revolutionise	her	
field	or	take	a	chance	and	dedicate	her	working	life	to	a	line	of	inquiry	that	for	her	seems	
important	 (Morton,	 2010,	 p.	 386).	 In	 order	 to	 be	 a	 scientist	 par	 excellence	 one	 has	 to	
harbour	certain	motivating	epistemic	emotions	and	in	this	respect	he	mentions	wonder,	
curiosity	 and	 scepticism	 (Morton,	 2010,	 p.	 389).	 Without	 wonder	 the	 scientist	 would	
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never	wonder	at	 an	emerging	pattern	 in	her	pool	of	data.	Without	 curiosity	 she	would	
never	ponder	how	scientists	view	her	field	centuries	into	the	future.	Without	scepticism	
she	would	 never	 stop	 at	 think	whether	 her	 enquiry	would	 benefit	 from	 an	 alternative	
perhaps	less	supported	method	(Morton,	2010,	p.	389).		
Secondly	 Morton	 argues	 that	 the	 epistemic	 emotions	 answering	 to	 curiosity,	
worry,	 concern	 and	 interest	 are	 linked	 to	 obtaining	 knowledge	 and	 how	 we	 consider	
relevant	alternatives	 to	a	given	belief.	 If	one	 is	curious	about	a	particular	matter	one	 is	
interested	in	knowing	the	truth	and	would	not	just	settle	with	a	belief	(Morton,	2010,	p.	
391).	Knowledge	is	what	satisfies	curiosity	and	obtaining	knowledge	‘requires	exploration	
of	 a	 maze	 of	 possibilities,	 some	 consistent	 with	 the	 fact	 that	 is	 known	 and	 some	










food	 acidity	 or	 with	 digestive	 enzymes	 things	 are	 no	 longer	 certain.	 The	 scientist	may	








I	 shall	 now	 attempt	 to	 cast	 light	 on	 the	 stargazers’	 peculiar	 arresting	 experiences	 by	
making	use	of	 the	 insights	 into	emotion	 from	a	 cognitive	perspective	provided	by	Ben-
Ze’ev	and	Morton.	It	may	be	prudent	to	start	by	asking	if	it	is	reasonable	to	think	that	the	
stargazers	are	experiencing	an	emotion	in	the	arresting	moment.	According	to	Ben-Ze’ev	
and	 his	 take	 on	 emotions	 it	 seems	 the	 answer	 is	 yes.	 All	 the	 stargazers	 are	 facing	
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something	extraordinary,	unexpected	and	very	real	and	their	reaction	fits	very	well	with	
Ben-Ze’ev’s	 description	 of	 an	 emotion.	 Ben-Ze’ev	 lists	 that	 an	 emotion	 contains	 four	
characteristics	and	four	components.	The	first	characteristic	is	instability.	In	this	respect	it	
can	be	said	that	 the	arresting	moment	 is	a	moment	of	 transition	or	 transfiguring	 for	all	
the	 implicated	 stargazers.	 All	 the	 implicated	 parties	 have	 to	 face	 and	 cope	 with	 the	
extraordinary	and	unexpected	as	 the	normal	appearance	of	 the	night	sky	 is	 suspended.	
The	second	characteristic	is	great	intensity.	In	relation	to	the	stargazers	it	can	be	argued	




shower	as	the	most	 incredible	vision	he	has	ever	witnessed	speaks	of	great	 intensity.	 In	
the	third	example	Pam	describes	herself	as	 frightened	and	 ignorant	of	what	 is	going	on	
when	 she	 first	 encounters	 the	meteor	 shower.	 This	 speaks	of	 great	 intensity.	 The	 third	
characteristic,	partiality,	 is	also	called	for	 in	the	three	examples.	All	 the	 involved	people	
focus	in	the	situation	on	a	specific	target	namely	the	meteor	shower.	Nothing	else	seems	
to	matter.	The	fourth	characteristic	is	brief	duration	and	I	shall	argue	this	is	also	honoured	




	 According	 to	 Ben-Ze’ev	 emotions	 also	 have	 four	 components	 that	 we	 need	 to	
consider	 before	 we	 can	 say	 that	 the	 stargazers	 are	 dealing	 with	 an	 emotion.	 The	 first	




them.	 Robert’s	 statement	 “I	 had	 no	 idea	 that	 what	 I	 was	 about	 to	 see	 would	 burn	 a	
picture	 in	 my	 mind	 that	 would	 be	 with	 me	 to	 this	 day”	 speaks	 of	 a	 person	 who	 was	
oblivious	 as	 to	 what	 was	 coming	 and	 was	 swept	 away	 by	 what	 he	 encountered.	 Pam	
reports	 that	 when	 she	 first	 saw	 the	 unusual	 streaks	 of	 light	 in	 the	 sky	 she	 set	 out	 to	




the	 involved	 evaluate	 the	 situation	 as	 not	 dangerous.	 The	 students	 gaze	 at	 the	






an	arresting	 feeling.	The	students	 just	gaze	at	 the	meteors	not	doing	anything	else	and	
Robert	 and	Pam	 report	 that	 they	had	 their	mouths	open	 for	 30-45	minutes	while	 they	
were	 watching	 the	 sky.	 In	 addition	 judging	 from	 Robert	 and	 Pam’s	 reports	 it	 can	 be	





emotion	 during	 the	 peak	 of	 the	 shower	 but	 does	 this	 emotion	 correspond	 to	wonder?	
Morton	 says	 little	about	 the	epistemic	emotion	of	wonder	 in	particular;	however,	 from	






that	 they	 had	 to	 give	 up	 their	 endeavours	 when	 the	 rate	 of	 meteors	 increased	
dramatically.	 It	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 students	 at	 this	 point	 became	 stunned	 or	
flabbergasted	by	the	intensity	of	the	meteor	shower,	which	effectively	ended	their	initial	
epistemic	 pursuits.	 Alternatively	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 students	 experienced	 a	
transition	 in	 their	 epistemic	 focus.	 It	 is	 thinkable	 that	 the	 students	 initially	 were	




with	 reflections	 on	 for	 example	 the	 beauty	 of	 the	 event	 to	 thoughts	 of	 their	 own	
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existence	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 vastness	 of	 space	 or	 why	 there	 is	 something	 rather	 than	
nothing.	 Taking	 this	 into	 account	 I	 think	 it	 is	 quite	 plausible	 that	 the	 students	 are	
experiencing	the	epistemic	emotion	of	wonder.	
Considering	Gleaves’	and	Glemmer’s	witness	reports	it	seems	they	also	could	have	
experienced	 an	 epistemic	 shift.	 From	 the	 time	 Gleaves’s	 mother	 woke	 him	 up	 and	
ushered	him	to	follow	her	outside	he	must	have	been	curious	about	what	was	afoot.	The	







epistemic	 emotion.	 However	 this	 does	 not	 necessarily	 imply	 that	 wonder	 is	 only	 an	
emotion	and	in	the	following	I	shall	briefly	depict	three	different	aspects	of	wonder	based	














the	 starting	 point	 of	 a	 new	promising	 philosophy,	which	 the	 student	 has	 the	 option	of	
exploring	further.	I	shall	venture	that	it	is	quite	possible	that	the	student	experiences	the	
epistemic	 emotion	 of	 wonder	 at	 the	 moment	 her	 philosophy	 is	 refuted.	 Given	 her	
particular	status	as	a	philosophy	student	it	is	also	possible	that	her	newfound	emotion	of	
wonder	 can	 evolve	 into	 a	 long-lasting	mood	 that	 fuels	 her	 future	 inquiries	 into	 a	 new	
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promising	 philosophy.	 To	 exemplify	 we	 might	 draw	 attention	 to	 de	 Pasquale	 who	
experienced	 an	 episode	 of	 wonder	 following	 the	 funeral	 of	 his	 good	 friend.	 It	 is	 quite	
possible	 that	 the	 episodic	 wonder	 that	 revealed	 to	 him	 the	 fragility	 of	 human	 life	








line	a	citizen	of	 the	cosmos	 (Parsons,	1969,	p.	84).	He	argues	 that	when	thinking	about	
wonder	 one	 cannot	 avoid	 taking	 into	 account	 our	 relationship	 with	 the	 universe.	 He	
furthermore	claims	that	wonder:	
	





Parsons	explains	 that	 to	be	wonderstruck	 is	 to	be	wounded	by	 the	 sword	of	 a	peculiar	
event	in	such	a	way	that	it	renders	one	open	to	a	reformation	of	one’s	current	outlook.	
Furthermore	Parsons	writes	that:	“The	excitation	of	wonder	ranges	from	the	sudden	and	
intense	 to	 the	 gradual	 and	 moderate,	 until	 it	 shades	 into	 ordinary	 emotion”(Parsons,	
1969,	p.	85,	86).	Parsons	seems	to	advocate	a	notion	of	wonder	that	has	many	features.	
Towards	 the	 end	 of	 ‘A	 Philosophy	 of	 Wonder’	 he	 laments	 the	 separation	 of	 science,	
aesthetic	 and	 humanistic	 values.	 Furthermore	 he	 believes	 that	 all	 three	 cultures	 are	
fuelled	by	wonder	yet	the	humanistic	side	is	being	neglected	(Parsons,	1969,	p.	100).	He	






The	will	 to	wonder	which	 comes	easily	 for	 the	well	 fed	and	well	 loved	and	well	
taught	child,	 is	a	readiness	to	explore	and	hold	one’s	mind	open.	[...]	Philosophy	
begins	in	wonder	but	wonder	begins	in	the	child.	And	while	philosophy	in	the	full	
sense	 cannot	 be	 taught	 to	 the	 child,	 the	 philosopher	 who	 sets	 not	 just	 a	
professional	but	also	a	human	value	on	wonder	will	be	concerned	about	a	society	










To	 continue	 our	 exploration	 of	wonder	 being	 something	 other	 than	 an	 emotion	 let	 us	




(Evans,	 2012,	 P.	 4).	 If	 one	 were	 to	 apply	 this	 notion	 to	 the	 three	 examples	 with	 the	
stargazers	it	can	be	said	that	their	wonderment	grew	out	of	quite	ordinary	circumstances.	
The	night	sky	is	not	unfamiliar	to	them	nor	I	imagine	are	shooting	stars	or	meteors.	In	the	
case	of	 the	 students	 it	 is	plausible	 to	presume	 that	 this	 is	 in	part	 the	 reason	why	 their	
night	out	under	the	stars	until	5AM	was	fairly	mundane.	After	5AM	things	changed	and	
with	 the	 sudden	 rise	 in	 the	 frequency	of	 incoming	meteors	 the	extraordinary	 found	 its	
way	on	to	the	scene.	Ultimately	 it	overwhelmed	the	students	and	 it	can	be	argued	that	
wonder	 as	 a	 special	 attitude	 arose.	 Evans	 explains	 further	 that	 wonder	 is	 of	 a	 curious	
intensified	 nature.	 What	 induces	 it	 can	 be	 unexpected,	 hard	 to	 comprehend	 but	
nevertheless	we	 attach	 significance	 to	 it	 and	 seek	 to	 understand	 it	 (Evans,	 2012,	 P.	 4).	
Mirrored	against	the	case	of	the	meteor-seeking	students	this	highlights	the	significance	
of	the	sentence:	‘the	students	simply	stood	and	gazed	in	wonder’.	The	same	goes	for	the	








existence,	 and	 that	we	 human	 beings	 are,	 to	 use	 a	 biblical	 term,	 looking	 at	 the	world	
through	 a	 glass	 darkly.	 From	 such	 an	 attitude	 a	 disposition	 to	 wonder	 may	 spring	
understood	 as	 a	 willingness	 to	 be	 open	 to	 it	 and	 not	 to	 shun,	 dismiss,	 downgrade	 or	





This	 chapter	 has	 been	 centred	 on	 the	 question	 ‘is	wonder	 an	 emotion’?	 Based	 on	 the	




wonder	 in	 addition	 to	being	 an	epistemic	 emotion	 could	be	 looked	upon	as	 a	mood,	 a	
value	and	an	attitude	and	even	though	these	candidates	were	only	explored	briefly	I	find	
that	 they	 sufficiently	 flag	 the	 importance	 of	 keeping	 an	 open	mind	 when	 it	 comes	 to	
depicting	wonder.	In	all	likelihood	wonder	is	more	than	one	thing.	


































filled	 feature	 of	 our	 nature.	 The	 connection	 between	 wonder	 and	 imagination	 is	 also	





world	 fundamentally	 is.	 Furthermore	he	 thinks	 that	 experiences	 of	wonder	 can	 change	
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perception,	are	morally	helpful	and	may	 inspire	us	 to	become	true	 individuals	and	 true	






what	capacity	 it	 is	possible	to	say	that	a	person	who	entertains	a	vivid	 imagination	also	
harbours	a	deep	sense	of	wonder	it	is	important	to	cast	some	light	on	what	imagining	or	
imagination	means.	
	 An	 investigation	 into	 how	 imagination	 is	 a	 part	 of	 the	wonder-filled	 experience	
can	also	be	grounded	in	the	notion	that	 it	 follows	naturally	from	how	wonder	has	been	
presented	 in	 this	dissertation	so	 far.	 In	 the	 introduction	 I	defined	 ‘wonder’	as	a	sudden	
experience	that	intensifies	the	cognitive	focus	and	awareness	of	ignorance	about	a	given	





all	 qualities	 of	 the	 wonder-filled	 experience	 that	 are	 supported	 by	 other	 scholars	 of	
wonder	 such	 as	 philosopher	 Sophia	 Vasalou,	 who	 speaks	 of	 wonder	 as	 ‘attention	
arresting’	(Vasalou	2012,	p.	4);	it	links	to	Fisher’s	work	as	he	defines	wonder	as	‘a	sudden	
experience	of	an	extraordinary	object	that	produces	delight’	(Fisher	2003,	p.	55);	and	the	
definition	 pays	 homage	 to	Miller’s	 emphasis	 on	 the	 notion	 that	 ‘were	 there	 no	 given,	
wonder	could	never	spring	on	us	its	unpredictable	surprise,	would	never	be	able	to	sneak	
up	and	startle	us	 into	 realizing	 that	we	do	not	know	what	 lies	 right	here	 in	 front	of	us’	
(Miller	 1992,	 p.	 40).	My	 definition	 of	wonder	 claims	 no	 originality	 but	 it	 is	 useful	 as	 it	
allows	 further	 investigation	 into	wonder	and	 in	particular	 in	 relation	 to	 imagination.	To	
elaborate	one	might	start	with	pointing	out	that	just	because	one	is	experiencing	wonder	
as	 something	 sudden,	 arresting,	 attention	 gathering	 and	 as	 something	 that	 produces	
awareness	of	one’s	 ignorance	about	a	given	object,	does	not	mean	that	one’s	mind	has	
come	to	a	complete	standstill.	 If	 this	were	 indeed	so,	 the	state	of	 the	mind	 in	question	
would	be	more	attuned	to	that	of	astonishment	perhaps.	It	is	true	that	an	experience	of	
wonder	 can	 be	 astonishing	 but	 in	 the	 pure	 or	 distilled	 case	 it	 is	 perfectly	 possible	 to	
	 103	
depict	wonder	as	an	experience	that	springs	solely	from	the	initial	inability	of	the	mind	to	
produce	 satisfying	 cognitive	 schemata	 i.e.	 to	 come	up	with	depictions	of	 the	perceived	
object	 of	 wonder	 that	 would	 make	 sense	 to	 the	 wonderer	 and	 integrate	 with	 her	
knowledge	and	understanding	about	the	order	of	things	without	introducing	problems	or	
dissonance.	 The	 idea	 is	 that	 when	 a	 person	 is	 wonderstruck,	 she	 actively	 seeks	 to	
understand	 and	 attach	 meaning	 to	 what	 is	 perceived	 but	 does	 so	 without	 completely	
succeeding.	I	think	such	a	process	is	highly	imaginative	but	for	this	notion	to	be	worth	its	





‘image’	 entered	 the	 European	 vocabulary	 via	 Augustine	 in	 the	 5th	 century	 CE	 (Brann,	
1991,	p.	18,	20)	and	derives,	as	philosopher	Ernan	McMullen	informs	us,	from	the	use	of	
the	 Latin	 term	 ‘imaginatio’	 (McMullen,	 1996,	 p.	 231)	 or	 as	 Brann	 states	 ‘imaginem’	 or	




philosophers	 Warnock	 and	 McGinn	 rests	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 covers	 a	 vast	 territory	





	 Furthermore	 the	 topic	 of	 imagination	 cannot	 be	 allocated	 exclusively	 to	 a	
particular	field	or	discipline.	Imagination	is	important	to	philosophy	where	it	plays	a	part	
in	 ideas	 about	 perception.	 This	 is	 noticeable	 in	 the	 works	 of	 philosopher	 David	 Hume	
where	 the	 imagination	 is	 considered	 the	power	 that	enables	our	minds	 to	 repeat	 ideas	
before	 itself	 (Hume,	 1985,	 p.	 56).	 Imagination	 also	 plays	 a	 role	 in	 philosophical	 ideas	






	 Imagination	 is	 also	 important	 in	 the	 field	 of	 psychology	where	 it	 plays	 a	 part	 in	
relation	 to	 having	 imagery.	 This	 becomes	 clear	 if	 we	 look	 to	 the	 phenomenon	 of	
hypnagogic	imagery,	which	refers	to	the	images	acknowledged	by	a	person	transitioning	
between	 being	 asleep	 and	 being	 awake	 (Brann,	 1991,	 p.	 333).	 Imagination	 is	 likewise	
important	with	regards	to	dreams	where	McGinn	argues	that	dreams	are	made	of	images	
(McGinn,	2006,	p.	4).	Within	psychology	pretend	play	also	 involves	the	 imagination	and	




century	 illustrator	Gustave	Dore	 to	 depict	 the	 scenes	 from	Dante’s	The	Divine	 Comedy	
because	 the	 surroundings	 in	which	we	 find	Dante	 have	 an	 air	 of	 otherworldliness	 that	
have	very	little	resemblance	if	any	to	our	ordinary	world	(Dore,	1976).	
	 Furthermore	 imagination	 is	 important	 to	 the	 field	 of	 religion.	 In	 this	 regard	
McMullen	 points	 out	 that	 the	 idea	 of	 image	 is	 significant	 to	 all	 of	 the	 monotheistic	
religions	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 supreme	deity	 cannot	 be	 imagined	 (McMullen,	 1996,	 p.	
253).	 Philosopher	 Aaron	 Hughes	 suggests	 that	 ‘the	 imagination	 is	 responsible	 for	
translating	the	incorporeal	divine	world	into	corporeal,	material	images’	(Hughes,	2002,	p.	
33).	 In	 this	 sense	 the	 imagination	 plays	 a	 part	 in	 what	 we	 might	 call	 the	 mystical	
experience	of	the	divine.	
	 To	complicate	matters	there	is	a	trend	in	the	literature	to	qualify	imagination	with	




religion,	 politics	 and	 films	 which	 we	 may	 group	 as	 ‘hidden	 players’	 that	 generate	
explanatory	 systems	 which	 in	 turn	 motivate	 individual	 as	 well	 as	 group	 behaviour	
(Muchembled,	 2003,	 p.	 2).	 In	 this	 sense	 our	 conception	 of	 the	 devil	 is	 contextual	 or	









This	 becomes	 apparent	 when	 we	 consider	 the	 devil-sightings	 of	 medieval	 monk	 Raoul	
Glauber	who	describes	him	as	a	 small,	 scrawny	manikin	 in	dirty	clothing	 (Muchembled,	
2003,	p.	14)	and	the	depiction	of	the	archfiend	given	in	Dante’s	The	Divine	Comedy	where	
he	 is	 presented	 as	 a	 three-faced,	 sinner-devouring	 giant	 with	 batwings	 (Dante,	 1995,	
XXXIV).	By	contrast	we	may	acknowledge	the	depiction	of	the	devil	by	English	poet	John	
Milton	where	he	is	not	so	much	described	as	beastly	and	inhuman,	but	takes	the	form	of	
a	 beautiful	 fallen	 angel	 with	 a	 rebellious	 streak	 not	 far	 removed	 from	 the	 heroic	 and	
iconoclastic	 intellectual.	 Likewise	 we	 would	 perhaps	more	 readily	 accept	 variations	 on	
Milton’s	Satan	 like	 the	one	we	 find	 in	Taylor	Hackford’s	1997	 film	The	Devil’s	Advocate	
where	the	devil	takes	the	form	of	a	shrewd	and	exploitive	male	manager	of	a	New	York	
law	 firm	 (‘curiously’	 named	Milton)	 (Hackford,	 1997).	Now	we	might	 agree	 or	 disagree	
with	 Muchembled’s	 view	 of	 the	 devil	 as	 a	 product	 of	 our	 collective	 imagination	 but	




and	 connects	 with	 a	 multitude	 of	 different	 fields	 of	 inquiry	 such	 as	 philosophy,	
psychology,	art	and	religion.	Imagination	comes	across	as	an	individual	cognitive	capacity	
or	quality	that	is	involved	in	matters	such	as	perception,	personal	identity	and	the	ability	
to	 transcend	 conventional	 thinking.	 Likewise	 it	 plays	 a	 part	 in	 generating	 images	 and	
enables	for	example	pretend	play	and	the	production	and	apprehension	of	works	of	art.	
The	subject	of	 imagination	 is	 further	complicated	by	 the	 fact	 that	one	might	encounter	
‘imagination’	combined	with	another	word	indicating	a	particular	kind	of	imagination.	In	
this	 respect	 we	 looked	 at	 Muchembled’s	 ‘collected	 imagination’	 which	 enriches	 our	
conception	 of	 imagination	 by	 pointing	 out	 that	 imagination	 is	 not	merely	 an	 individual	
capacity	 or	 quality	 but	 can	 also	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 mass	 phenomenon	 that	 can	 give	 life	 to	
particular	ideas	or	imaginings	such	as	the	devil.	
	 Our	engagement	with	imagination	so	far	has	provided	us	with	a	somewhat	broad	
understanding	 of	 the	 subject	 but	 to	 take	 this	 further	 and	 build	 a	 richer	 conception	 of	






Warnock’s	 Romantic	 approach	 to	 imagination	 including	 her	 views	 on	 imagination	 in	
relation	 to	 education	has	been	developed	over	 the	 course	of	 three	books:	 Imagination	






without	attempting	to	understand	the	romantic	version	of	this	concept,	even	 if	 it	 is	not	
the	only	possible	version’	(Warnock,	1976,	p.	201).	
To	 begin	 to	 articulate	 Warnock’s	 approach	 in	 more	 detail	 let	 us	 look	 at	 the	
concluding	remarks	of	her	book	Imagination	where	she	states	that	imagination	is:	
	
















having	 emotions.	 This	 makes	 sense	 because	 our	 ability	 to	 put	 before	 the	 mind’s	 eye	
visions	of	 absent	 relatives	 and	 friends	might	 also	encompass	or	 even	be	 fuelled	by	 the	
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to	do	 so.	 That	 they	are	able	 to	use	 language	 is	 sufficient	proof	of	 this,	 since,	 to	








































very	 important	 for	 Schelling,	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 world	 lies	 below	 the	 level	 of	








	 The	 notion	 of	 the	 imagination	 as	 ‘world-creating’	 is	 important	 to	 the	 further	
development	 of	 the	 Romantic	 conception	 of	 imagination	 advocated	 especially	 by	
Coleridge.	According	to	Warnock	Coleridge’s	travels	in	Germany	made	him	aware	of	the	
thoughts	 of	 imagination	 expressed	 above	 and	 he	 sought	 to	 include	 them	 in	 his	 own	
approach	to	imagination	(Warnock,	1976,	p.	73).	The	influence	of	German	philosophy	on	
Coleridge	becomes	clear	by	reading	his	1802	poem	Dejection:	an	Ode.	The	poem	speaks	
of	 the	 loss	 of	 the	 shaping	 spirit	 of	 imagination	 and	 the	 joy	 that	 comes	with	 using	 the	
imagination.	Without	the	joy	Warnock	writes	‘we	merely	see;	and	we	may	even	see	that	
things	are	beautiful,	but	we	cannot	feel	that	they	are	so’	(Warnock,	1976,	p.	78).	Warnock	
explains	 that	 joy	 according	 to	 Coleridge	 is	 synonymous	 with	 the	 soul	 or	 to	 put	 it	
differently	 the	 inner	 power	 that	 animates	 us	 –	 which	 gives	 us	 life.	 Additionally	 she	
explains	that	‘it	is	joy	which	converts	a	perception	to	a	feeling,	and	it	is	this	that	is	lost	in	
the	loss	of	the	shaping	power	of	imagination’	(Warnock,	1976,	p.	78).	From	this	Warnock	
distils	 that	 the	 Romantic	 position	 on	 imagination	 initially	 has	 two	 functions	 which	








my	 infant	 seen	 by	 me	 in	 the	 dream,	 yet	 so	 that	 it	 might	 be	 Sara,	 Derwent	 or	
Berkeley,	and	still	 it	was	an	individual	babe	and	mine.	Of	love	in	sleep—a	sort	of	
universal-in-particularness	 of	 Form	 seems	 necessary—vide	 the	 note	 preceding,	
and	my	lines	“All	look	or	Likeness	caught	from	Earth,	All	accident	of	Kind	or	Birth,	
























Warnock	 condenses	 her	 interpretation	 into	 three	 elements,	which	makes	 up	what	 she	









the	more	 ‘systematic’	 writings	 on	 imagination	 from	 Coleridge’s	Biographia	 Literaria.	 In	
this	work	Coleridge	divides	 imagination	 into	 two	kinds:	 The	primary	 and	 the	 secondary	
imagination.	Coleridge	writes:	
	
The	 primary	 imagination	 I	 hold	 to	 be	 the	 living	 power	 and	 prime	 agent	 of	 all	
human	 perception	 and	 as	 a	 repetition	 on	 the	 finite	 mind	 of	 the	 eternal	 act	 of	
creation	 in	the	 infinite	 I	AM.	The	secondary	 I	consider	as	an	echo	of	the	former,	
coexisting	with	the	conscious	will,	yet	still	as	identical	with	the	primary	in	the	kind	
of	 its	 agency,	 and	 differing	 only	 in	 degree	 and	 in	 the	mode	 of	 its	 operation.	 It	
dissolves,	 diffuses,	 dissipates,	 in	 order	 to	 recreate;	 or	 where	 this	 process	 is	





of	 both	 Kant	 and	 Schelling.	 When	 it	 comes	 to	 speaking	 about	 the	 imagination	 as	 a	
function	 and	 its	 role	 in	 perception	 and	 knowledge	 of	 the	 world	 we	 are	 clearly	 in	 the	
territory	of	Kant	because	this	 theme	 is	central	 to	his	Critique	of	Pure	Reason	 (Warnock,	
1976,	p.	91).	Things	begin	 to	deviate	 from	Kant’s	outlook	and	 towards	 that	of	Schelling	
when	 Coleridge	 begins	 to	 address	 creativity	 but	 according	 to	Warnock	 it	 is	 unclear	 to	
what	extent	Coleridge	embraces	the	outlook	of	Schelling.	She	writes:	
	
It	may	be	 said	 that	 he	 is	 not	 completely	 committed,	 at	 least	 in	 this	 passage,	 to	
idealism;	for	the	work	of	actual	creation	is	ascribed	to	the	deity,	while	the	human	
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the	writings	of	 Schelling	and	his	notion	of	 the	poetic	 faculty	 (Warnock,	1976,	p.	91).	 In	























ennui	 is	also	promoted	 in	 the	chapter	entitled	 ‘Educating	 for	Pleasure’	 in	her	book	The	
Uses	 of	 Philosophy.	 Here	 Warnock	 argues	 that	 using	 the	 imagination	 is	 pleasurable	




faculty	 that	enables	us	 to	plan	 for	 the	 future	–	 it	 is	 the	 faculty	 that	 ‘makes	us	 feel	 that	














sense	 of	 past,	 present	 and	 future	 is	 essential	 to	 sporting	 a	 personal	 identity	 or	
entertaining	a	sense	of	continuity	in	one’s	life.	If	one	did	not	have	the	ability	to	put	before	
the	mind’s	eye	these	temporal	aspects	of	life	it	might	well	be	said	that	one	would	never	
rise	 above	 the	 level	 of	 the	 wanton	 who	 unconsciously	 and	 without	 her	 say	 is	 pushed	







to	 apply	 thought	 and	 concepts	 to	 things	 and	 ‘see	 into	 the	 life	 of	 things’	meaning,	 that	
when	we	use	 it,	we	participate	 in	creating	the	world	we	partake	 in;	5)	has	a	combining	
power	 that	 enables	 us	 to	 put	 before	 our	 mind’s	 eye	 an	 image,	 see	 it	 as	 universally	
significant	and	entertain	deep	feelings	in	the	presence	of	it;	6)	must	be	educated	and	not	
merely	 for	 the	 intelligence	but	also	 feelings;	and	7)	 is	pleasurable	because	 it	deals	with	
the	possible	as	well	as	the	actual	meaning	that	 it	enables	us	to	grasp	past,	present	and	
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the	 notion	 of	 wonderment?	 I	 think	 the	 answer	 is	 yes	 because	 it	 is	 the	 activity	 of	 the	
imagination	 in	 wonder	 that	 enables	 us	 to	 perceive,	 communicate	 and	 behold	 what	 is	
significant	 about	 a	 concrete	 object	 of	 wonder.	 To	 exemplify	 we	 might	 recall	 Boyle’s	
experience	of	wonder	prompted	by	his	encounter	with	a	piece	of	luminous	meat	brought	
to	him	from	the	larder.	First	it	is	reasonable	to	suggest	that	Boyle	through	the	use	of	his	
imagination	 perceived	 the	 object	 of	 wonder	 for	 what	 it	 was,	 i.e.,	 a	 piece	 of	 luminous	
meat.	Second	it	 is	reasonable	to	say	that	it	was	due	to	his	active	use	of	the	imagination	
that	 he	 realised	 the	 uncommon	 quality	 of	 the	 object	 of	 wonder	 and	 thus	 attached	
significance	to	it.	Thirdly	we	might	say	that	because	he	had	no	prior	experience	of	meat	
that	glows	in	the	dark	it	would	be	natural	for	him	to	give	thoughts	to	its	nature	and	put	
before	 his	mind’s	 eye	 a	 variety	 of	 possible	 explanations	 or	 theories	 and	 perhaps	 even	
thoughts	on	the	consequences	of	there	being	such	a	thing	as	luminous	meat	in	the	world.	
In	 this	 sense	 it	 is	 the	 activity	 of	 imagination	 in	 wonder	 that	 makes	 our	 experience	 of	
wonder	 comes	 alive.	 In	 wonder	 we	 actively	 use	 our	 imagination	 to	 seek	 a	 satisfying	
cognitive	 schema	 of	 what	 we	 experience	 but	 fail	 to	 obtain,	 such	 that	 the	 object	 of	
concern	is	never	fully	beheld	or	understood.	This	explains	why	an	experience	of	wonder	is	
‘life-giving’,	 invigorating	 or	 otherwise	 intensely	moving	 because	 in	 wonder	 we	 are	 not	
only	 animated	 by	 the	 activity	 of	 the	 imagination	 but	 we	 are	 also	 animated	 by	 the	
realisation	that	despite	our	imaginative	efforts	a	complete	and	satisfactory	picture	of	the	








compels	us	 to	 continue	 to	broaden	our	 knowledge	or	 gain	better	understanding	of	 the	
object	in	question.	
	 The	next	aspect	of	Warnock’s	approach	to	 imagination	 I	would	 like	to	address	 is	
concerned	with	what	can	be	viewed	as	‘the	universality	of	imagination’	and	its	relation	to	
wonder.	 Warnock	 holds	 that	 we	 must	 recognise	 the	 universality	 of	 imagination	 as	 a	
function	 i.e.,	 that	 imagination	 is	 connected	 to	 our	 rational	 as	 well	 as	 our	 emotional	
capacities;	 is	 exercised	 by	 everyone;	 a	 part	 of	 everyone’s	 experience	 and	 should	 be	
educated.	 I	 support	 Warnock’s	 position	 but	 one	 might	 have	 reservations	 as	 to	 what	
extent	 the	 imagination	 can	 be	 educated.	 Recall	 that	Opdal	 is	 of	 the	 view	 that	 children	






of	perspective	 in	one’s	 thinking	 to	emerge	 something	has	 to	generate	 it	 and	a	 suitable	
candidate	could	very	well	be	the	 imagination.	This	supposition	 is	 in	 line	with	Warnock’s	
view	 of	 education	 and	 supports	 the	 view	 that	 educating	 the	 imagination	 may	 lead	 to	




merely	 a	 question	 of	 input/output	 and	 thus	 just	 because	 one	 is	 educated	 does	 not	
guarantee	an	elaborate	ability	to	wonder	and	imagine.	This	signifies	a	crucial	point	in	the	
philosophy	 of	 education	 where	 attitudes	 towards	 how	 we	 start	 out	 as	 human	 beings	
differ,	 but	 it	 is	 not	my	 business	 to	 defend	 any	 of	 these	 attitudes	 here.	 However	 I	 am	
inclined	 to	 think	 that	although	 it	 cannot	be	guaranteed	 that	education	brings	about	an	
elaborate	ability	to	wonder	and	imagine	it	is	nevertheless	safe	to	say	that	certain	forms	of	




not	 only	 the	 development	 of	 particular	 skills	 but	 could	 potentially	 also	 allow	 for	 the	
cultivation	of	the	student	in	a	way	that	heightens	her	imaginary	power	and	deepens	her	
sense	of	wonder.	
	 Moving	 on	 let	 us	 now	 consider	 ‘wonder	 as	 conveyer	 of	 the	 universal’.	 In	
Warnock’s	 view	 a	 core	 feature	 of	 the	 Romantic	 account	 of	 imagination	 is	 that	 it	 has	 a	
combining	power	that	enables	us	 to	call	up	an	 image,	attach	universal	significance	to	 it	
while	 entertaining	 certain	 feelings	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 it.	 Warnock	 elaborates	 on	 the	
connection	between	 imagination	and	 the	affective	 realm	by	highlighting	Coleridge	who	
claims	 that	 there	 are	 only	 two	 universalising	 emotions,	 namely	 fear	 and	 love	 which	
‘makes	us	feel,	that	is,	that	the	image	before	us	has	a	general	significance	beyond	itself,	
though	still	retaining	its	particular	character’	(Warnock,	1976,	p.	82).	Now	given	that	the	
imagination	 is	 active	during	an	experience	of	wonder	and	 that	 in	wonder	we	deal	with	
emotional	upheaval	mostly	 in	the	form	of	 joy	but	 in	some	cases	perhaps	 in	the	form	of	
something	closer	to	fear51	we	might	be	inclined	to	think	that	wonder	can	give	rise	to	the	
idea	 that	 the	 object	 of	 wonder	 has	 a	 general	 significance	 beyond	 itself	 —	 that	 it	 is	





generally	significant	beyond	 itself	 let	us	return	to	Rogers	and	Glemmer’s	wonder	at	 the	
















This	 ends	my	 dealings	with	Warnock	 and	 her	 approach	 to	 imagination,	which	 helps	 us	
understand	 something	 about	 the	 role	 of	 imagination	 in	 wonder.	 To	 recapitulate	 the	
activity	of	the	imagination	in	wonder	which	is	both	rational	and	emotional	enables	us	to	
perceive,	communicate	and	behold	what	is	significant	about	a	concrete	object	of	wonder.	
Furthermore	 imagination	 makes	 our	 experience	 of	 wonder	 come	 alive	 and	 during	




speak	 about	 the	 universality	 of	 wonder.	 As	 much	 as	 the	 use	 of	 the	 imagination	 is	 a	
characteristic	of	being	human	so	is	wonder.	By	addressing	‘wonder	as	a	conveyer	of	the	
universal	 or	 general’	 we	 also	 uncovered	 that	 because	 of	 the	 activity	 of	 imagination	 in	
wonderment	 one	might	 through	 an	 experience	 of	wonder	 suddenly	 recognise	 that	 the	
object	of	wonder	has	significance	beyond	itself.	To	exemplify	this	we	looked	at	the	case	of	











	 Hepburn	 opens	 his	 article	 by	 posing	 the	 question	 ‘what	 is	 it	 to	 appreciate	 a	
landscape	aesthetically?’	(Hepburn,	1996,	p.	191)	He	then	proposes	three	different	levels	
of	 aesthetic	 landscape	 appreciation,	 of	which	 the	 first	 is	 concerned	with	what	 he	 calls	
‘purely	 sensory	 components’	 such	 as	 ‘colours,	 shapes,	 sounds,	 tactile	 sensations	 [and]	










	 A	 second	 layer	 reveals	 ‘expressive	 properties,	 and	 the	 thought	 of	 changes	 over	
time	–	even	of	drama’	 (Hepburn,	1996,	p.	191).	A	 thin	cascade	of	glittering	white	snow	
and	 ice	coming	down	the	mountainside	could	be	 thought	of	as	a	harbinger,	warning	us	
that	 an	avalanche	 is	 imminent,	 and	 this	 endangers	what	otherwise	would	be	a	pristine	
and	tranquil	appreciation	of	a	mountainous	landscape.	
	 A	third	and	final	 layer	may	convey	how	the	world	fundamentally	or	ultimately	 is	
(Hepburn,	1996,	p.	191).	Flying	over	the	icy	wastes	of	Svalbard,	Norway	might	suggest	to	
us	 that	 the	 world	 is	 fundamentally	 harsh	 and	 inhospitable,	 in	 contrast	 to	 our	 viewing	
more	 temperate	 and	 cultivated	 landscapes	 from	above	 such	as	Oxfordshire	 in	 England.	
Alternatively,	 as	 Hepburn	 points	 out,	 a	 particular	 landscape	 may	 bring	 about	 an	
experience	of	nature	as	loaded	with	‘poignant	beauty	[that]	on	some	occasion	seems	to	
speak	of	a	 transcendent	Source	 for	which	we	 lack	words	and	clear	concepts’	 (Hepburn,	
1996,	p.	191).	Hepburn’s	view	 in	 these	 last	 two	 instances	 is	 illustrative	of	what	he	calls	



















To	 Hepburn	 there	 are	 clearly	 different	 dimensions	 to	 appreciating	 a	 landscape	
aesthetically,	 and	 the	metaphysical	 one	 allows	 for	 the	 apprehension	 of	 the	world	 as	 a	
whole	or	 the	development	of	a	 conception	of	how	 the	world	 is	 structured.	 In	addition,	
Hepburn	 acknowledges	 that	 the	metaphysical	 imagination	 is	 not	merely	 a	 lofty	 add-on	
signalling	a	hierarchical	structure	to	the	aesthetic	appreciation	of	a	given	landscape.	The	
metaphysical	 imagination	 is	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 an	 integrated	 part	 in	 the	 total	
appreciation	of	a	landscape,	drawing	on	both	metaphysical	theorising	about	the	ultimate	
structure	 of	 the	 world	 and	 the	 sensory	 components	 that	 landscape-experiences	 also	
consist	of.52	
	 Although	 Hepburn	 appreciates	 the	 metaphysical	 imagination	 he	 makes	 it	 clear	
that	 there	 is	a	danger	of	over-valuing	 it	or	yielding	 to	 its	authority	without	question.	 In	
this	 respect	 he	 positions	 himself	 as	 a	 critic	 of	 Warnock’s	 conception	 of	 imagination.	
Hepburn	writes:	
	
While	 not	 unaware	 of	 its	 limitations,	 she	 [Warnock]	 accepts	 an	 essentially	
Romantic	 conception	 of	 imagination	 and	 its	 products	 as	 ‘in	 some	 sense’	 true.	
Imagination	is	‘that	by	which,	as	far	as	we	can,	we	see	into	the	life	of	things’;	or,	it	
is	 ‘ability	 to	 see	 through	 objects…	 to	 what	 lies	 behind	 them’.	 It	 is	 through	 the	
power	 of	 imagination	 that	 we	 have	 ‘intuition	 of	 the	 infinite	 and	 inexpressible	
significance	 of	 the	 ordinary	 world’.	 These	 remarks,	 intriguing	 though	 they	 are,	



















the	 astrophysicist,	 her	 metaphysical	 imagination	 informs	 her	 that	 the	 beauty	 of	 the	
sunrise	is	the	handiwork	of	God	and	that	her	ability	to	recognise	this	very	beauty	confirms	
that	she	as	a	human	being	is	created	in	the	image	of	God.	Now	both	claims	are	valid,	vivid	




engaging	 in	metaphysical	 imaginings	 concerning	 the	 “true”	 structure	 of	 the	 universe	 is	




would	 as	 a	 minimum	 have	 to	 rely	 on	 ’a	 background	 of	 sound	 theistic	 metaphysical	
argument	and	theory’	(Hepburn,	1996,	p.	195).	Bypassing	such	would,	as	Hepburn	argues,	
render	 us	 incapable	 of	 making	 the	 leap	 from	 the	 noetic	 quality	 of	 our	 metaphysical	
imaginings	 to	 ‘noesis	 in	 the	 full	 sense	 –	 a	 knowledge-claim	 about	 how	 the	 world	
ultimately	is’	(Hepburn,	1996,	p.	195).	Now	to	fully	comprehend	what	Hepburn	is	talking	
about	 we	 have	 to	 understand	 what	 is	 meant	 by	 the	 word	 ‘noetic’.	 According	 to	 the	
Institute	of	Noetic	Sciences	(IONS)	noetic	derives	from	the	Greek	word	noēsis/	noētikos,	





states	of	 insight	 into	depths	of	truth	unplumbed	by	the	discursive	 intellect.	They	
are	 illuminations,	 revelations,	 full	 of	 significance	and	 importance,	 all	 inarticulate	









the	 theologian	 I	 focussed	on	 the	 theologian	 and	her	 claim	 that	 the	 sunrise	 is	 a	 sign	 of	




is	 undermined	 and	 the	 expressed	 view	 as	 it	were	 is	 nothing	more	 than	 a	 questionable	
personal	belief.	
	
To	 continue	 our	 exploration	 of	 Hepburn’s	 approach	 to	 imagination	 let	 us	 now	 take	 a	




say	 that	 the	 wondering	 or	 wonder-filled	 experience	 likewise	 is	 layered.	 Suppose	 we	
witness	 something	wonderful	 like	 the	 Leonid	meteor	 shower	 that	 Elder	 Samuel	 Rogers	
was	so	 lucky	to	see	 in	1833.	 It	could	be	argued	that	during	what	we	may	call	 first	 layer	
wonderment	 the	 imagination	 is	 providing	 us	 sensory	 data,	 which	 enables	 us	 to	 begin	
appreciating	the	wonder	before	us	or	in	this	case	above.	The	second	layer	of	wonderment	
is	concerned	with	revealing	expressive	properties	of	the	object	of	wonder	and	in	this	case	
I	 think	 it	 is	 fair	 to	say	 that	 it	 reveals	 to	us	 that	 the	meteor	shower	 is	extraordinary	and	
significant	 in	 light	of	 its	magnitude,	rarity	and	beauty.	The	third	 layer	of	wonderment	 is	
concerned	 with	 the	 metaphysical	 and	 so	 we	 may	 ask	 what	 could	 experiencing	 a	
wonderful	 event	 like	 the	 1833	 Leonid	 meteor	 shower	 possibly	 have	 on	 our	 current	
metaphysical	outlook?	One	possibility	 is	 that	 the	natural	or	materialistic	world	 is	 grand	
and	beautiful.	 Rogers	 knew	about	 the	natural	 phenomenon	of	meteor	 showers	 and	he	
links	his	wonder	to	the	grandeur	and	beauty	of	the	event,	which	he	struggles	to	describe.	
Another	possibility	 is	 to	 link	 the	event	 to	a	 religious	view.	Rogers’s	biography	mentions	
that	some	religious	people	saw	the	meteor	shower	as	a	sign	that	judgment	day	was	near	
and	that	they	dropped	to	their	knees	confessing	their	sins	and	prayed	for	mercy.	Likewise	
Rogers	 reports	 that	some	people	conjectured	 that	 the	event	was	 the	 first	 in	a	series	of	
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fearful	 calamities	 that	 God	would	 bestow	 upon	 them	 because	 he	 was	 displeased	with	
them	 (Rogers,	 1880,	 p.	 134).	 The	 layered	 approach	 to	 imagination	 advances	 our	
understanding	of	wonder	because	it	helps	us	get	closer	to	what	we	can	agree	upon	when	
it	comes	to	a	shared	experience	of	wonder.	Whereas	we	might	agree	on	for	example	the	
first	 two	 layers	 we	 might	 not	 agree	 on	 the	 third	 layer	 and	 thus	 we	 can	 say	 that	 the	
layered	approach	may	help	us	flesh	out	individual	interpretations	of	the	wonderful,	which	
I	should	think	qualifies	as	advancement.	Likewise	it	complicates	Warnock’s	position	in	the	
sense	 that	 Hepburn’s	 view	 prompts	 us	 to	 be	mindful	 about	 what	 we,	 courtesy	 of	 the	




going	 to	 address	 is	 concerned	 with	 ‘imagination	 as	 conveyer	 of	 truth’.	 Given	 that	
imagination	has	a	role	in	wonderment	is	it	plausible	to	think	that	wonder	gives	us	access	
to	the	truth	of	things?	On	the	one	hand	one	could	argue	yes	because	there	is	a	revelatory	
and	noetic	quality	 to	wonder	 in	 the	sense	that	 it	does	make	us	aware	of	our	 ignorance	





Warnock’s	Romantic	view	of	 imagination	by	highlighting	 the	dangers	 involved	with	 that	
position.	For	Hepburn,	the	key	problem	with	Warnock’s	approach	to	imagination	is	that	it	
might	 lead	us	to	think	that	the	use	of	 imagination	alone	can	 lead	to	truth.	According	to	
Hepburn	 this	 is	 to	 venture	 too	 far	 because	 it	 seems	 to	 grant	 too	 much	 independent	
authority	to	the	imagination	and	especially	imagination	of	the	metaphysical-religious	kind	




















hands	and	 loudly	praising	God	 for	writing	 to	 them.	To	make	sense	of	 the	view	that	 the	
contrails	 were	 in	 fact	 the	 handwriting	 of	 God	would	 demand	 a	 fair	 amount	 of	 theistic	
metaphysical	 argumentation	 evoking	 the	 idea	 that	 human	 beings	 are	 created	 in	 God’s	
image	 and	 that,	 for	 instance,	 technological	 advancement	 is	 the	manifestation	 of	 divine	
power	or	creativity.	So	Hepburn’s	suggestion	about	having	noetic	insight	‘cleared’	up	by	
further	 metaphysical	 argumentation	 seems	 good	 advice	 also	 when	 it	 comes	 to	
experiences	 of	wonder.	 It	 prevents	 us	 from	 being	 let	 astray	 by	wonderment	 and	 from	
becoming	victims	of	un-reflected	interpretations.	
	
Moving	 on	 let	 us	 now	 address	 what	 we	may	 call	 the	 ‘commensurability’	 in	 Hepburn’s	
outlook.	 It	 is	 a	merit	 of	 that	 outlook	 that	 it	 ties	 in	well	with	 Fuller's	 idea	 that	 ‘wonder	
excites	 our	 ontological	 imaginings	 in	 ways	 that	 enhance	 our	 capacity	 to	 seek	 deeper	
patterns	 in	 the	 universe	 (R.	 C.	 Fuller,	 2006,	 p.	 2).	 With	 Hepburn’s	 explanation	 of	
metaphysical	 imagination	 we	 may	 arguably	 be	 better	 equipped	 to	 understand	 this	
particular	 capacity	 and	 some	 of	 its	 potential	 shortcomings:	 for	 instance,	 consider	 this	
quote	from	Fuller:	
	
A	 life	 shaped	by	wonder	 is	 thus	more	 likely	 to	 steer	a	middle	course	between	a	
purely	secular	life	and	a	narrowly	religious	life.	On	the	one	hand	wonder	prompts	
us	to	diverge	from	a	purely	secular	outlook	on	 life.	 It	entices	us	to	entertain	the	
possibility	 that	 our	 highest	 fulfilment	 might	 require	 adapting	 ourselves	 to	 a	
metaphysical	reality.	Yet,	on	the	other	hand,	wonder	encourages	an	open-ended	
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Fuller's	 approach	 to	 wonder	 is	 a	 positive	 one,	 as	 he	 clearly	 speaks	 of	 the	 merits	 of	
wonder,	 its	 link	 to	 spirituality	 and	 how	 a	 life	 shaped	 by	 wonder	 will	 prevent	 us	 from	
adopting	narrow	doctrines	and	creeds.	This	 is	believable	 if	 the	 imagination	prompted	 is	
akin	 to	 that	of	Hepburn’s	metaphysical	 imagination	because	according	 to	Hepburn,	 the	
credibility	of	such	 imaginings	depends	on	whether	we	can	render	them	sustainable	and	
coherent.	If	left	unchecked	the	imagination	involved	is	more	akin	to	that	of	fancy	and	we	
face	 an	 increased	 likelihood	 of	 deluding	 ourselves.	 To	 understand	 this	 in	 depth	 it	 is	
necessary	 to	 explore	 what	 we	mean	 when	 we	 use	 the	 word	 ‘fancy’.	 Fancy	 appears	 in	
Milton’s	poem	Paradise	Lost	where	Milton	refers	to	it	as	his	‘internal	sight’	(Milton,	1998,	








Fancy,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 has	 no	 other	 counters	 to	 play	 with,	 but	 fixities	 and	
definites.	The	Fancy	is	indeed	no	other	than	a	mode	of	Memory	emancipated	from	
the	 order	 of	 time	 and	 space;	 while	 it	 is	 blended	 with,	 and	 modified	 by	 the	












adjective,	 the	 property	 of	 being	 pretentiously	 fine;	 as	 verb,	 the	 pursuit	 of	 a	






carries	with	 it	a	slight	negative	connotation.	The	notion	that	 fancy	as	a	verb	signals	 the	
pursuit	 of	 a	 frivolous	 preference	 or	 that	 fancy	 highlights	 the	 product	 of	 the	 fantastic	
points	in	the	same	direction.	
	 To	explore	 this	 further	we	might	 say	 that	 to	be	whimsical	 is	 to	display	a	certain	
unpredictability	 or	 erratic	 behaviour	 that	 in	 some	 instances	 fosters	 amusement.	 If	 true	
this	 supports	 the	notion	 that	 fancy	carries	with	 it	a	 certain	negative	connotation	 in	 the	
sense	that	a	person	giving	herself	up	to	the	fancy	or	who	is	fanciful	is	someone	easily	led	
astray	 or	 deceived.	 To	 illuminate	 this	 in	 a	 better	way	we	might	 say	 that	 Jane	Austen’s	
character	Mrs	 Bennet	 from	Pride	 and	 Prejudice	 qualifies	 as	 a	whimsical	 character	 or	 a	
person	endowed	with	a	 fanciful	mind	due	 to	her	excitable	behaviour	 together	with	her	
imagined	susceptibility	to	tremors	and	palpitations.		




A	 woman	 fancying	 she	 had	 swallowed	 a	 pin	 in	 a	 piece	 of	 bread,	 cried	 and	
lamented	as	though	she	had	an	intolerable	pain	in	her	throat,	where	she	thought	
she	 felt	 it	 stick;	 but	 an	 ingenious	 fellow	 that	 was	 brought	 to	 her,	 seeing	 no	
outward	 tumour	nor	alteration,	 supposing	 it	 to	be	only	a	 conceit	 taken	at	 some	











modification	 because	 it	 becomes	 hard	 to	 see	 how	 ontological	 imaginings	 following	 an	
episode	 of	wonder	will	 necessarily	 remain	 on	 the	 virtuous	 path	 revealing	 a	 vision	 that	
does	not	descend	into	a	mishmash	of,	as	Hepburn	would	say,	‘agreeable	sensory	stimuli	
or	reverie’	(Hepburn,	1996,	p.	192).	In	defence	of	Fuller,	one	can	say	that	since	he	makes	
no	 claims	 that	 the	 revelations	 of	 an	 experience	 of	 wonder	 have	 authority	 beyond	 the	
individual	experiencing	it,	his	account	still	stands.	Furthermore,	that	during	wonderment	
one	 ventures	 upon	 ontological	 imagining	 does	 not	 necessarily	 mean	 that	 one	
automatically	renders	them	true	and	even	if	one	does	Fuller	does	not	state	that	whatever	
is	 experienced	 carries	 a	 truth-value	 that	 extends	 beyond	 the	 individual.	 In	 this	 sense,	
Fuller	keeps	the	experience	within	the	dimension	of	the	personal;	however	if	we	search	
for	the	kind	of	truth	that	transcends	personal	metaphysical	imaginings	brought	about	by	
an	 episode	 of	 wonder	 which	 we	 might	 add	 still	 can	 be	 deluded	 or	 simply	 a	 case	 of	






I	 propose	 to	 adopt	 and	 retain	his	 three-fold	 view	of	 aesthetic	 perception.	 Furthermore	
Hepburn’s	point	about	 the	metaphysical	 insecurity	we	 face	when	we	put	 the	three-fold	










Scruton	gives	his	account	of	 imagination	 in	his	1974	book	Art	and	Imagination,	which	 is	
geared	towards	the	formulation	of	‘a	theory	of	aesthetic	judgement	and	appreciation	in	
terms	of	an	empiricist	philosophy	of	mind’	 (Scruton,	1974,	p.	1).	Art	and	 Imagination	 is	
divided	 into	 three	 parts	 of	 which	 the	 second	 deals	 specifically	 with	 the	 topic	 of	
imagination.	My	focus	will	be	primarily	on	this	particular	section	in	Scruton’s	work	and	I	
shall	not	deal	with	the	first	part	of	his	book,	which	engages	with	aesthetic	description	and	




equals	 unasserted	 thought	 and	 qualifies	 as	 that	 ‘which	 goes	 beyond	 what	 is	 believed’	
(Scruton,	1974,	97).	This	is	to	say	that	‘in	imagination	one	is	engaging	in	speculation,	and	
one	 is	 not	 typically	 aiming	 at	 a	 definite	 assertion	 as	 to	 how	 things	 are.	 In	 imagination,	
therefore,	 one	 goes	 beyond	what	 is	 strictly	 given’	 (Scruton,	 1974,	 p.	 98).	 Furthermore	
Scruton	thinks	that	imagination	is	a	rational	activity	because:		
	










daughter	 on	 to	 the	 scene	 who	 at	 the	 time	 of	 me	 writing	 these	 lines	 is	 fascinated	 by	




In	 this	 regard	 we	 may	 say	 that	 my	 daughter	 can	 also	 be	 doing	 something	 with	 her	
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imagination	 or	 imaginatively,	 using	 her	 ‘imagination	 in	 the	 performance	 of	 some	 task	
(whether	it	be	fulfilling	a	practical	aim,	or	acquiring	some	particular	piece	of	knowledge)	






Forming	 an	 image	 (‘picturing’);	 imagining	 in	 its	 various	 forms	 (imagining	 that…	
imagining	what	 it	would	be	 like	 if…,	 imagining	what	 it	 is	 like	to…,	some	of	 these	
constructions	are	propositional,	some	not;	some	relate	to	knowledge	that…	some	





The	 interesting	thing	here	 is	concerned	with	what	forming	an	 image	or	picturing	means	
and	 Scruton’s	 idea	 of	 using	 the	 imagination	 to	 see	 something	 including	 an	 aspect	 of	
something.		
	 Scruton	 holds	 that	 forming	 an	 image	 or	 picturing	 can	 be	 grouped	 under	
imagination	because	 like	 imagination	 it	 is	 subjected	 to	 the	will	understood	as	when	we	
receive	the	request	to	‘imagine	or	form	an	image	of	something’	(Scruton,	1974,	p.	95)	we	






Scruton	 points	 out	 it	might	 very	well	 be	 that	 it	was	 precisely	 the	 inability	 to	 flesh	 out	
these	two	aspects	of	 imagination	that	 led	Coleridge	to	conclude	that	‘imagination	is	the	
prime	source	of	truth’	(Scruton,	1974,	p.	107).	By	highlighting	the	complex	phenomena	of	
‘seeing	 an	 aspect’	 under	 the	 umbrella	 of	 imagination	 Scruton	 offers	 a	 very	 nuanced	












	It	 is	not	 seeing	 that	X’s	 face	 is	 the	 face	of	a	 sad	man	 (for	example),	or	 that	 the	
music	is	the	kind	of	music	that	would	be	produced	by	a	sad	person	(for	example),	
or	that	living	on	Hill	Farm	tends	to	make	people	sad	(for	example),	that	constitutes	
this	 kind	 of	 seeing,	 although	making	 these	 judgements	may	 help	 to	 put	 us	 in	 a	
position	to	‘see’	the	sadness	that	is	there.	







In	 the	 last	 part	 of	 this	 citation	 Scruton	 refers	 to	 the	notion	of	 seeing	 an	 aspect	 and	 to	
expand	 on	 this	 Scruton	 states	 that	 ‘”seeing	 an	 aspect”	 cannot	 be	 analysed	 in	 terms	 of	
“seeing	that’’	because	it	does	not	reduce	to	a	set	of	beliefs	about	 its	object,	nor	even	a	
set	 of	 perceptual	 beliefs’	 (Scruton,	 1974,	 p.	 109).	 In	 this	 sense	 there	 is	 a	 problem	with	
what	 category	 ‘seeing	as’	belongs	 to	because	 it	 is	a	matter	of	perception.	To	elaborate	
Scruton	 brings	 to	 attention	 the	 ambiguous	 figure	 of	 the	 ‘duck-rabbit’,	 which	 we	
encountered	earlier	 in	 connection	with	my	daughter’s	experience	of	wonder.	We	 recall	
that	 the	 ‘duck-rabbit’	 is	 an	 image	 in	which	 both	 a	 duck	 and	 a	 rabbit	 can	 be	 identified	
which	 we	 of	 course	 may	 find	 amusing	 but	 the	 picture	 holds	 a	 deeper	 secret.	 When	 I	
showed	the	‘duck-rabbit’	to	my	daughter	Mai	for	the	first	time	she	immediately	identified	
the	 duck	 but	 only	 later	 with	 a	 certain	 amount	 of	 puzzlement	 (perhaps	 even	 wonder)	
recognised	the	rabbit.	Her	puzzlement	is	entirely	justified	because	the	‘duck-rabbit’	brings	
out	 the	perhaps	unsettling	 truth	 that	although	we	might	see	 the	picture	differently	 the	
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picture	does	not	 change.	What	 is	 it	 that	 changes	 then	we	might	ask?	Well,	we	change.	
Our	 perception	 changes	 once	we	 like	Mai	 realise	 that	 the	 image	 holds	more	 than	 the	
depiction	of	 a	 duck.	We	 realise	 that	 the	duck	 like	 the	 rabbit	 are	merely	 aspects	 of	 the	
image.	
	 Scruton	 ends	 his	 discussion	 on	 ‘seeing	 as’	 by	 stating	 that	 ‘”seeing	 as”	 is	 like	 an	
“unasserted”	visual	experience:	 it	 is	 the	embodiment	of	a	 thought	which,	 if	 “asserted”,	
would	 amount	 to	 a	 genuine	 perception,	 just	 as	 imagination	 if	 “asserted”,	 amounts	 to	
genuine	belief’	(Scruton,	1974,	p.	120).	This	last	point	is	important	to	Scruton	because	a	
part	 of	 his	 project	 in	 Art	 and	 Imagination	 is	 to	 show	 that	 ‘‘the	 unasserted’	 nature	 of	
‘seeing	as’	dictates	the	structure	of	aesthetic	experience‘	(Scruton,	1974,	p.	120).	In	this	




my	 depiction	 of	 the	 ancient	Greek	 poet	 and	musician	Orpheus	 it	 is	 quite	 possible	 that	
some	people	would	disagree	with	me	and	find	my	efforts	fanciful	and	encourage	me	to	
imagine	him	differently.	 In	other	words	aspect-seeing	 is	 subject	 to	 change	and	 is	not	 a	







his	 cousin	 Richie’s	 face,	 his	 own	 face	 and	 a	multitude	 of	 other	 faces	 in	 the	 bathroom	
mirror	 in	 conjunction	 with	 the	 stark	 realisation	 of	 a	 seemingly	 inescapable	 human	
mortality.	 To	 say	 that	 the	 faces	 he	 saw	 and	 his	 realisation	 of	 human	 mortality	 were	
literally	there	in	the	mirror	is	an	overstatement.	It	will	be	far	more	believable	to	say	that	








	 The	 same	 can	 be	 said	 about	 Sam	 Keen’s	 experience	 of	 wonder	 following	 being	










whenever	 I	 found	myself	 in	a	crowd	of	people.	Her	face	would	appear	momentarily	but	
long	enough	for	me	to	realise	that	she	was	there.	The	first	couple	of	times	I	saw	her	I	was	
to	say	 the	 least	surprised	and	entertained	a	sense	of	suspension	because	 I	was	 then	as	
much	as	now	not	accustomed	to	see	dead	people	walking.	In	each	case	I	made	an	effort	
to	approach	my	 friend	but	before	 I	 could	 reach	proximity	 suitable	 for	 conversation	 she	
would	 fade	 away	 and	 become	 someone	 else.	 At	 subsequent	 sightings	 (and	 this	 in	
particular	 when	 seeing	 her	 had	 become	 a	 part	 of	 my	 quotidian	 life)	 I	 merely	
acknowledged	her	presence	and	went	about	my	business	and	 in	 these	cases	she	would	
usually	vanish	at	a	distance	of	5-8	meters	as	quickly	as	 she	came	about.	How	 is	one	 to	
think	 about	 such	 events?	 My	 prevailing	 theory	 is	 that	 due	 to	 my	 fading	 eyesight	 I	
unfortunately	have	developed	a	problem	with	distinguishing	or	 identifying	 faces	 from	a	
distance	and	it	is	particularly	difficult	for	me	to	distinguish	between	faces	in	a	fast	moving	
crowd	because	my	eyes	cannot	adapt	 to	 the	 fast	changing	environment.	 In	conjunction	
with	 the	 ‘trauma’	 or	 ‘thauma’	 of	 my	 friend’s	 death,	 which	 might	 have	 left	 me	 more	
troubled	than	I	realised	at	the	time,	‘seeing’	her	in	the	crowd	was	merely	a	projection	of	
what	 in	 a	 fashion	occupied	my	mind.	My	 friend	was	not	 there	 in	 the	 crowd	 in	 a	 literal	
sense	but	very	much	present	as	a	fabric	of	my	imagination.	In	this	sense	I	did	not	perceive	
the	 external	world	 directly,	 but	what	 I	 saw	was	 influenced	 by	 the	 thing	 that	 perceives	
which	in	this	case	was	myself.	
	 Was	this	an	experience	of	wonder?	I	think	yes,	because	experiences	such	as	these	












	 From	 these	 examples	 I	 think	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 propose	 a	 link	 between	what	 is	
absent	in	imagination	as	unasserted	thought	and	that	which	in	wonder	is	newly	present.	
Let	 us	 attempt	 further	 to	 spell	 out	 in	 what	 sense	 what	 is	 literarily	 absent	 in	 ordinary	
aspect	perception	is	momentarily	present	in	wonder.	





transformed.	 This	 resonates	with	 de	 Pasquale’s	 experience	 because	 it	 can	 be	well	 said	
that	 seeing	 the	 faces	 in	 the	 mirror	 that	 should	 not	 be	 there	 and	 the	 subsequent	
realisation	 of	 his	 mortality	 displaced	 him/diminished	 his	 sense	 of	 self,	 which	 indicates	
transfiguration.	 The	 same	 is	 afoot	 in	 Keen’s	 example	 where	 we	 can	 say	 that	 he	 is	
displaced	 by	 his	 newfound	 gratitude,	 wondering	 expectancy	 and	 view	 of	 the	
extraordinary	 in	 the	 ordinary.	We	 can	 also	 say	 that	 it	 takes	 place	 in	 the	 third	 example	
involving	me	seeing	my	departed	 friend	 in	various	crowds.	Here	 it	 can	be	argued	 that	 I	
was	displaced	by	the	sudden	realisation	that	I	might	just	unconsciously	be	colouring	what	
I	 see	by	projecting	the	memory	of	my	friend’s	 face	onto	 faces	 I	could	not	distinguish	 in	
the	crowds	due	to	my	fading	eyesight.	

















argue	 that	 it	 alone	 does	 not	 justify	 his	 wonderment,	 but	 rather	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
extraordinariness	of	seeing	the	 faces	 in	 the	mirror	 in	conjunction	with	his	 realisation	of	
mortality	‘displaces’	him.	
	 Keen’s	example	follows	a	similar	pattern.	I	think	it	is	entirely	appropriate	for	him	
in	his	 situation	 to	wonder	but	not	merely	because	a	 stranger	handed	him	a	mysterious	
knife.	His	wonder	is	appropriate	because	the	handover	of	the	knife	in	conjunction	with	his	
new	 found	 sense	 of	 gratitude;	 wondering	 expectancy	 and	 acknowledgement	 that	
something	 extraordinary	 happened	 in	 the	 otherwise	 ordinary	 world	 of	 Maryville	
‘displaced’	him.	
	 The	 same	 can	 be	 said	 about	 my	 own	 case	 involving	me	 seeing	 the	 face	 of	 my	
deceased	 friend	 in	 the	crowd.	One	could	 think	 it	entirely	appropriate	 for	me	 to	be	 in	a	
state	of	wonder	following	the	first	sighting	and	this	not	merely	because	I	saw	the	face	of	
my	 departed	 friend	 in	 the	 crowd.	My	wonder	was	 appropriate	 because	 in	 conjunction	
with	seeing	my	friend’s	face	I	seriously	questioned	the	reality	of	what	I	perceived,	which	
brought	 about	 the	 unsettling	 and	 displacing	 realisation	 that	 I	 am	 living	 in	 a	 world	 of	
appearances	where	to	put	it	bluntly	the	world	for	me	is	in	part	fabricated	by	me.	Now	the	
kind	of	displacement	I	am	advocating	here	does	not	entail	a	complete	loss	of	the	sense	of	
coherence	 nor	 does	 it	 compel	 us	 to	 accept	 a	 solipsistic	 stance	 signalling	 that	 nothing	
exists	 outside	our	own	minds.	What	 I	 am	proposing	 is	merely	 an	 altered	 state	of	mind	
that	for	some	time	leaves	us	unhinged	in	the	sense	that	we	are	experiencing	a	disruption	
in	our	ordinary	perception	or	perhaps	an	expansion	of	it	where	we	become	aware	of	not	
only	a	hitherto	unknown	possibility	which	 includes	 there	being	more	 to	 reality	 than	we	
think	but	indeed	that	this	‘more’	might	just	at	least	in	part	be	created	by	ourselves.	 	
	 Where	does	this	 leave	us?	It	 leave	us	with	a	preliminary	acceptance	criterion	for	
wonderment	 stating	 that	 for	 someone’s	 wonder	 to	 be	 appropriate	 or	 to	 wonder	
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appropriately	involves	that	one	has	something	to	wonder	at	which	is	extraordinary,	vivid	

















see	him.	Am	I	right?	 I	mean…	The	parking	 lot	here.	Not	much	to	see.	 	But	 if	you	
imagine	yourself	a	visitor,	somebody	who	isn’t	familiar	with	these	autos	and	such,	
somebody	still	with	 the	capacity	 for	wonder.	Someone	with	a	 fresh	perspective.	
That’s	what	 it	 is,	Larry.	Because	with	the	right	perspective,	you	can	see	Hashem,	
you	know,	reaching	into	the	world.	He	is	in	the	world,	not	just	in	shul.	It	sounds	to	
















The	scene	 is	hilarious,	absurd	and	 important	 to	our	endeavour	because	as	much	as	 the	
rabbi	can	see	the	wonder	in	the	parking	lot	it	is	impossible	for	the	protagonist	and	indeed	
the	audience	 to	accept	 that	 it	 even	 in	 some	vague	 sense	can	give	 rise	 to	wonderment.	






is	 referring	 to	 religious	 wonderment,	 which	 emerges	 through	 acknowledging	 the	
existence	of	God	and	recognising	his	handiwork	in	everything	around	us,	even	in	the	most	




wonderful.	Now	by	 emphasising	 there	 being	 ‘objects	 of	wonder’	 and	 ‘objects	 bereft	 of	




bypass	 that	 it	might	be	 so	 to	him,	meaning	 that	we	 cannot	 ignore	 the	workings	of	 the	
individual	subject	when	it	comes	to	experiences	of	wonder.	 In	the	interest	of	advancing	
our	understanding	of	wonder	 I	propose	a	compromise	 involving	what	we	could	call	 the	
“density”	of	wonder	meaning	 that	 some	objects	 like	 for	 example	 the	 comet	Hale-Bopp	
which	was	visible	from	the	northern	hemisphere	in	1997	are	‘more	densely	packed’	with	
wonder;	understood	as	such	objects	are	more	 likely	to	 induce	wonder	 in	comparison	to	
the	rabbi’s	parking	 lot.	My	reason	for	saying	so	 is	 that	objects	or	phenomena	 like	Hale-






reflected	upon	quickly	 lift	us	out	of	our	 immediate	context	and	engage	our	 imagination	
on	a	metaphysical	level	reminding	us	about	the	vastness	of	space	and	the	tiny	and	fragile	
part	we	occupy.	 In	 this	 sense	we	are	moving	away	 from	the	either/or	attitude	 towards	
wonder	 and	 towards	 an	 approach	 involving	 a	 more/less	 attitude	 in	 order	 to	
accommodate	the	 idea	that	there	are	some	objects	 like	Hale-Bopp,	which	we	can	more	
easily	 accept	 as	 wonderful,	 while	 others	 seem	 like	 truisms	 or	 objects	 whose	
wonderfulness	is	entirely	idiosyncratic	to	the	wonderer.	
	
A	 different	 aspect	 of	 Scruton’s	 philosophy	 involves	 what	 we	 might	 call	 ‘continuity	












this	 is	 the	 case	 because	 if	 something	 is	 truly	 wonderful	 it	 is	 likely	 to	 produce	 in	 the	




idea	 of	 aesthetic	 experience	 and	 to	 illustrate	 how	 let	 us	 again	 focus	 on	 de	 Pasquale’s	
wonderment,	 which	 comes	 across	 as	 sincere	 because	 his	 experience	 produced	 a	 deep	
reverence	for	human	mortality	that	would	later	shape	his	philosophical	outlook	and	how	
he	 lives	his	 life.	Likewise	Keen’s	wonderment	 looks	sincere	because	for	weeks	following	
his	being	handed	the	mysterious	knife	he	experienced	gratitude	to	the	stranger	and	what	








‘cultivating	 a	 habit	 of	 wonder’.	 Cultivating	 such	 a	 habit	 is	 a	 notion	 that	 is	 somewhat	
supported	 by	 at	 least	 two	 philosophers	 of	 wonder,	 namely	 Verhoeven	 and	 Opdal.	
Verhoeven	thinks	that	one	might	have	a	 ‘talent’	for	wonder,	which	hints	to	us	a	certain	
disposition	 or	 capability	 that	 may	 or	 may	 not	 be	 advanced	 or	 developed	 further.	 The	
same	 goes	 for	 Opdal	 who	 suggests	 that	 children’s	 wonderment	 might	 turn	 into	
philosophical	reflection	over	time	indicating	not	only	the	possibility	of	an	evolution	of	an	
individual’s	 relationship	 with	 wonder	 including	 perhaps	 an	 increased	 sophistication	 of	
what	is	wondered	at	but	possibly	also	the	habitual	return	to	the	wonderful.	
	 How	 is	one	 to	cultivate	a	habit	of	wonder?	One	way	might	be	 is	 to	educate	 the	
imagination.55	We	can	cultivate	a	habit	of	wonder	because	we	can	train	our	imagination	
to	such	an	extent	that	we	become	accustomed	to	looking	for	the	richest	possible	account	
of	 something.	 This	 is	 to	 say	 that	 we	 cultivate	 an	 outlook	 that	 is	 generous	 enough	 to	
present	us	with	a	variety	of	aspects	or	perspectives	of	which	some	may	exhibit	what	we	
might	 call	 the	 ‘unasserted	 extraordinariness’	 of	 a	 particular	 object,	 phenomenon	 or	
event,	 which	 on	 occasions	 leaps	 out	 as	 asserted	 and	wonderful.	 To	 put	 it	 differently	 I	
believe	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 we	 can	 train	 ourselves	 to	 have	 an	 eye	 for	 the	 ordinary	 as	 a	




we	might	explore	 in	connection	with	wonder.	 In	his	account	of	the	 imagination	Scruton	













wonder	 for	 its	 own	 sake?	 I	would	 argue	 against	 this	 because	 although	 one	might	 take	
pleasure	in	the	object	of	wonder	a	part	of	the	enjoyment	we	feel	can	also	be	linked	to	the	
very	 ‘displacement’	 or	 ‘diminishing	 of	 self’,	 as	 I	 have	 termed	 it,	 which	 the	 wonderful	
object	 facilitates.	What	 makes	 wonder	 joyful	 is	 in	 other	 words	 not	 only	 the	 object	 of	




during	 wonder.	 If	 this	 is	 the	 case	 it	 helps	 us	 grasp	 how	 wonder	 can	 be	 cognitively	
advantageous.		
	 Moving	on	we	might	also	say	that	a	part	of	the	enjoyment	of	wonder	 lies	 in	the	




the	 wonderful	 object	 gives	 us.	 To	 exemplify	 this	 we	 might	 return	 to	 Shakespeare’s	
character	 Horatio	 who	 experienced	 both	 fear	 and	 wonder	 during	 his	 paranormal	
encounter	with	the	ghost	of	the	dead	king	but	also	the	drive	for	inquiry	and	to	discover	
the	reason	why	the	apparition	walked	the	night.	The	same	can	be	said	about	Robert	Boyle	
and	 his	 wonder	 at	 the	 luminous	 meat	 brought	 to	 him	 from	 the	 larder	 by	 one	 of	 his	
servants.	 A	 part	 of	 his	 joy	 was	 no	 doubt	 the	 appearance	 of	 the	 meat	 itself	 given	 its	
unusual	 qualities,	 but	 another	 source	 of	 his	 enjoyment	 was	 his	 own	




picture	 of	 imagination	 and	 its	 role	 in	 wonderment	 that	 has	 emerged	 in	 this	 chapter.	
Amongst	what	has	been	disclosed	in	the	section	involving	Scruton’s	approach	the	idea	of	
displacement/diminishing	 of	 self	 seems	 most	 striking	 because	 not	 only	 does	 it	 help	
explain	why	wonderment	 is	 a	 powerful	 and	 intense	 experience;	 it	 also	 hints	 to	 us	 that	
inherent	to	wonderment	there	is	a	potential	for	learning	something	be	it	something	new	






The	 goal	 of	 this	 chapter	 has	 been	 to	 show	 in	what	 capacity	 the	wonderful	 experience	
involves	 the	work	 of	 the	 imagination.	We	 began	 by	 looking	 at	 a	 range	 of	 literature	 of	
wonder	 where	 imagination	 is	 involved	 in	 order	 to	 further	 clarify	 the	 rationale	 for	
investigating	 imagination	 in	 connection	 with	 wonder.	 Subsequently	 a	 general	
introduction	 to	 imagination	 was	 given	 followed	 by	 three	 different	 approaches	 to	
imagination	 represented	 by	 Mary	 Warnock,	 Ronald	 Hepburn	 and	 Roger	 Scruton.	
Warnock’s	Romantic	approach	revealed	that	imagination	is	what	animates	our	perception	
and	makes	 us	 able	 to	 go	 beyond	 what	 is	 directly	 in	 front	 of	 us.	 Additionally	Warnock	
brought	 to	 light	 that	 imagination	 is	 connected	 to	 creativity	 and	 that	 educating	 the	
imagination	 is	 important	because	using	 the	 imagination	draws	not	only	on	 the	 intellect	
but	also	on	our	emotions	and	feelings	and	plays	a	role	in	how	we	can	liberate	ourselves	
from	the	wanton	life	and	become	director	of	our	own	life.	Warnock’s	contribution	to	the	
philosophy	 of	 imagination	 enabled	 us	 to	 expand	 our	 understanding	 of	 wonder	 by	 first	
highlighting	the	animating	or	life-giving	aspect	of	the	wonderful	experience.	In	this	regard	
it	was	brought	 forward	 that	 the	 imagination	 is	 active	 in	wonderment	where	we	 seek	a	
satisfying	cognitive	schema	of	what	we	experience	but	fail	to	obtain,	such	that	the	object	
of	concern	 is	never	 fully	beheld	or	understood.	Furthermore	 it	was	highlighted	that	the	
intensity	of	the	wonderful	experience	could	be	explained	by	the	notion	that	in	wonder	we	
realise	 that	 despite	 the	work	 of	 the	 imagination	 a	 completely	 satisfying	 picture	 of	 the	
object	 of	 wonder	 simply	 does	 not	 arrive.	 By	 addressing	 Warnock’s	 notion	 of	 the	
universality	of	 imagination	 in	 relation	 to	wonder	 it	became	clear	 that	since	 imagination	
plays	a	part	 in	wonder,	wonder	carries	a	 certain	universality	as	well.	 In	 this	 respect	we	
entertained	the	idea	that	it	is	the	work	of	imagination	in	wonder	that	helps	turn	childish	
wonder	into	philosophical	reflection	and	that	attaining	an	education	that	is	‘wonder	full’	
could	 deepen	 one’s	 sense	 of	 wonder.	 By	 addressing	 wonder	 as	 a	 conveyer	 of	 the	
universal	we	also	found	that	because	of	the	labour	of	imagination	in	wonder,	wonder	can	
give	rise	to	the	idea	that	the	object	of	wonder	has	a	general	significance	beyond	itself	—	
that	 it	 is	universally	 important,	and	 in	this	respect	we	 looked	to	the	notion	that	we	are	
mortal	creatures	and	that	we	live	in	a	world	that	is	grand	and	beautiful.	
	 By	paying	attention	to	Hepburn’s	notion	of	metaphysical	imagination	as	‘layered’,	
we	 found	 that	 the	 first	 layer	 of	 wonder	 enables	 us	 to	 gather	 data	 and	 appreciate	
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something	 as	 wonderful;	 the	 second	 layer	 enables	 us	 to	 see	 the	 object	 of	 wonder	 as	
significant	and	the	third	layer	allows	for	individual	interpretations	of	the	object	of	wonder	
conveying	 how	 the	 world	 fundamentally	 is	 structured.	 In	 connection	 with	 Hepburn’s	
approach	we	also	addressed	the	notion	of	imagination	as	conveyer	of	truth	and	the	idea	
that	because	imagination	is	at	work	in	wonderment,	wonder	is	a	conveyer	of	truth.	Here	
it	 was	 brought	 to	 light	 that	 while	 it	 is	 conceivable	 that	 there	 is	 a	 revelatory	 or	 noetic	
quality	to	wonder	caution	must	be	exercised	when	it	comes	to	ascribing	a	truth-value	to	
the	 wonderful	 experience	 because	 metaphysical	 imagination	 has	 the	 ability	 to	 bring	
about	 equally	 cogent	 but	 incompatible	 views	 of	 how	 the	 world	 fundamentally	 is	 put	
together.	 The	 notion	 of	 commensurability	 was	 likewise	 addressed	 in	 connection	 with	
Hepburn’s	 approach	 and	 we	 found	 it	 quite	 compatible	 with	 Fuller’s	 idea	 that	 wonder	
activates	our	imagination	and	encourages	us	to	seek	deeper	patterns	in	the	universe.	
	 Via	 Scruton’s	 approach	 to	 imagination	 we	 became	 aware	 that	 imagination	 is	
important	 to	 aesthetic	 appreciation	 and	 can	 be	 viewed	 as	 unasserted	 thought,	 which	




for	 example	 to	 see	 the	 sadness	 in	 someone’s	 face.	 The	 notion	 of	 aspect	 seeing	 is	
significant	 because	 we	 are	 in	 effect	 putting	 forth	 a	 hypothesis	 based	 on	 what	 we	 see	
without	 in	 any	 straightforward	 sense	 believing	whatever	 it	 is	 that	we	 see	 to	 be	 there.	
Seeing	an	aspect	of	something	or	 ‘seeing	as’	 is	akin	to	an	unasserted	visual	experience,	
meaning	 that	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 appreciating	 something	 aesthetically	 it	 should	 not	 be	
taken	literally.	
	 Scruton’s	 approach	 to	 imagination	also	helped	us	advance	 the	understanding	of	
imagination’s	role	in	wonderment,	as	it	enabled	us	to	craft	a	link	between	what	is	absent	
in	imagination	as	unasserted	thought	and	what	in	wonder	is	newly	present.	In	wonder	we	
experience	 the	 world	 as	 newly	 present	 and	 we	 do	 this	 because	 we	 are	 displaced,	
understood	in	the	sense	that	our	frame	of	reference	is	displaced	allowing	us	for	perhaps	
merely	a	moment	to	assert	what	is	normally	unasserted	and	thus	experience	ourselves	as	
transfigured.	 Scruton’s	 approach	 also	 allowed	 us	 to	 consider	 what	 it	 takes	 for	 us	 to	
wonder	 appropriately	 and	 in	 this	 respect	 a	 preliminary	 acceptance	 criterion	 for	
wonderment	was	proposed	stating	that	for	someone	to	wonder	appropriately	she	has	to	
wonder	 at	 what	 is	 extraordinary,	 vivid	 and	 significant	 and	 that	 her	 wonderment,	 as	 it	
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were,	can	be	accepted	by	others.	Scruton’s	approach	to	imagination	likewise	gave	rise	to	
thoughts	 about	 the	 continuity	 between	 intense	 experiences	 and	 subsequent	 living	 in	
relation	to	wonder	and	it	was	brought	forth	that	if	someone	is	experiencing	wonder	in	a	




that	by	 training	our	 imagination	we	can	become	accustomed	to	always	seeking	out	 the	
richest	possible	account	of	something	and	have	an	eye	for	the	ordinary	as	conveyer	of	the	
extraordinary.	In	connection	with	Scruton’s	approach	we	also	examined	if	the	joy	we	feel	
during	 an	 episode	 of	 wonder	 can	 be	 exclusively	 linked	 to	 the	 object	 of	 wonder.	 The	
answer	was	not	necessarily	so,	because	although	it	is	possible	to	find	joy	in	the	object	of	




	 Lastly	 it	 can	be	 said	 that	 the	 three	accounts	of	 imagination	presented	provide	a	
rich	 view	 of	 imagination	 and	 from	 the	 analysis	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 imagination	 plays	 a	






And	 as	 the	 moon	 rose	 higher	 the	 inessential	 houses	 began	 to	 melt	 away	 until	
gradually	 I	became	aware	of	 the	old	 island	that	 flowered	once	 for	Dutch	sailors’	
eyes—a	 fresh,	 green	 breast	 of	 the	 new	 world	 […]	 for	 a	 transitory	 enchanted	
moment	 man	 must	 have	 held	 his	 breath	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 this	 continent,	
compelled	 into	 an	 aesthetic	 contemplation	 he	 neither	 understood	 nor	 desired,	






travel	and	philosophy	that	are	particularly	wonder	provoking	 I	hope	not	only	 to	 further	
solidify	 how	 the	 imagination	 is	 active	 in	 wonderment	 but	 also	 how	 an	 experience	 of	
wonder	may:	1)	influence	our	perception;	2)	increase	our	moral	scope	and	sensitivity;	and	







portrait	Rudolf	 II	 as	Vertumnus,	second,	 the	wonder	 that	may	 spring	 from	seeing	Earth	
from	space,	and	third,	 the	microscope	and	the	telescope,	which	 like	the	X-ray	might	be	
labelled	 technological	wonders	or	artefacts	of	wonder.	Enrichment	of	perception	owing	




Arcimboldo	 and	 his	 1591	 portrait	 Rudolf	 II	 as	 Vertumnus	 (figure	 4.1)	 (Daston	 &	 Park,	
1998,	 p.	 211).	 The	 portrait	 is	 important	 to	 the	 present	 study	 first	 of	 all	 because	 it	 is	
extraordinary	 in	the	sense	that	 fruits	and	vegetables	 from	various	seasons	make	up	the	
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depiction	of	 Rudolf	 II	 illustrating	 that	 he	 is	 one	with	Vertumnus	 the	Roman	 god	of	 the	
seasons	 and	 so	 reigns	 forever	 having	 within	 him	 ‘the	 eternal	 spring	 of	 the	 mythical	
Golden	Age’	(Daston	&	Park,	1998,	p.	211).		
	 Secondly	 the	 painting	 is	 relevant	 to	 wonder	 because	 despite	 the	 allure	 of	 the	
minutely	 detailed	 fruits	 and	 vegetables	 their	 arrangement	 portrays	 Rudolf	 II	 with	 a	
striking	resemblance.		
	 Thirdly	 the	 painting	 evokes	 wonder	
because	 of	 its	 ingenuity.	 One	 cannot	 but	
marvel	at	the	almost	unfathomable	finesse	it	
takes	for	an	artist	to	bring	a	painting	like	this	
to	 life.	 Just	 to	 come	 up	 with	 the	 motif	 is	




at	 the	 painting	 itself	 but	 also	 at	 the	






creation	 the	 painting	 would	 have	 been	 controversial,	 representing	 the	 antithesis	 to	
centuries	of	Christian	 thinking	where	wonder	and	meaning	 in	 life	were	 to	be	sought	by	
obtaining	knowledge	of	God	and	how	to	live	a	Christian	life.	In	other	words	the	painting	
speaks	 of	 rebirth	 and	 the	 patterns	 of	 thought	 we	 today	 would	 attribute	 to	 the	
renaissance	mind.	 It	 speaks	 of	 a	world	 newly	 born	 and	of	 a	 perspective	on	 the	human	
condition	filled	with	possibilities	and	the	promise	of	transmutation.	
	 In	 support	 of	 these	 claims	 one	 might	 for	 example	 link	 the	 painting	 with	 the	
humanist	 ideas	 of	 Pico	 della	 Mirandola	 who	 as	 we	 recall	 from	 the	 first	 chapter	 gave	








conjure	 up	 imaginings	 of	 human	 beings	 as	 creatures	 ‘grown	 out	 of	 the	 planet’	 who	
depend	 on	 its	 continuing	 survival	 and	 ‘wellbeing’.	 To	 continue	 this	 line	 of	 thought	 we	
might	 say	 that	 the	portrait	depicts	a	certain	 ‘earthliness’	 in	connection	with	human	 life	
which	may	to	some	provoke	imaginings	of	an	alternative	way	of	life,	quite	different	from	
the	 one	 lived	 in	 for	 example	 polluted	 megacities	 of	 concrete,	 glass	 and	 steel.	 It	 may	
inspire	an	outlook	different	from	that	of	the	humanist	Pico	della	Mirandola	who	we	recall	
argued	that	human	beings	are	free	because	our	nature	is	not	set	in	stone.	It	may	inspire	
us	 to	 ponder	 if	 our	 happiness	 is	 linked	 to	 what	 we	 might	 call	 twenty-first	 century	
romanticism	where	themes	such	as	ecological	sustainability,	green	energy	and	veganism	
together	with	a	close	connection	to	the	land	are	important	themes.		






importance	 of	 this	 image	 I	 shall	 look	 at	 a	 selection	 of	 excerpts	 from	 the	 short	 2012	
documentary	 film	 Overview.	 The	 film	 is	 directed	 by	 Guy	 Reid,	 produced	 by	 Planetary	
Collective	 and	besides	 being	 a	 stand-alone	project	 it	 functions	 as	 a	 prelude	 to	 the	 film	
Planetary	and	features	an	array	of	commentators	from	different	backgrounds	who	share	
their	views	on	the	understanding	and	implications	of	seeing	planet	Earth	from	space.		
	 The	first	excerpts	 I	am	going	to	 look	at	 involve	statements	belonging	 in	order	of	












a	 wonderful	 experience	 that	 instructs	 to	 get	 into	 what	 we	 call	 the	 Big	 Picture	
Effect	or	the	Overview	Effect.	
(Reid,	2012,	Edgar	Mitchell)	









that	 for	 him	 seeing	 the	 image	 of	 the	 Earth	 hanging	 in	 space	 for	 the	 first	 time	 was	 a	
profound	 experience.	 Mitchell	 who	 actually	 went	 into	 space	 and	 saw	 the	 Earth	 from	
space	 elaborates	 by	 calling	 the	 experience	 beautiful	 and	 wonderful	 and	 brings	 to	 our	
attention	 the	effect	known	as	 the	Overview	Effect.57	 Loy	 reflects	on	 the	 implications	of	
seeing	 Earth	 from	 space	 for	 the	 first	 time	 and	 explains	 that	 for	 him	 it	 was	 a	 shocking	
event	 that	 changed	 our	 perspective	 and	 generated	 a	 new	 kind	 of	 self-awareness.	 Loy	
continues:		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	Within	 the	Western	 tradition	 I	 think	 it	 is	quite	new	and	quite	 shocking	because	
there	has	been	much	more	the	sense	of	separation.	But	if	you	look	at	other	non-
Western	 cultures	 especially	 in	 Asia	 the	 emphasis	 on	 those	 has	 always	 been	 on	
realisation	 that	 the	 self	 and	 the	world	 is	 not	 separate	 from	each	other	but	 that	
they	are	really	interconnected,	that	the	individual	self	and	the	species	as	a	whole	
is	a	manifestation	of	the	larger	whole.		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Reid,	2012,	David	Loy)	
	
As	 for	Mitchell’s	experience,	 it	 seems	evident	 that	 in	wonder	 the	 imagination	 is	 ignited	












via	 the	 Buddhist	 concept	 of	 Savikalpa	 Samadhi58	 he	was	 later	 able	 to	 express	 in	more	
detail	as	experiencing	the	world	with	ecstasy	and	a	sense	of	total	unity	and	oneness.	
	 I	would	argue	 that	 the	 self-awareness	or	enhanced	perception	 the	 image	of	 the	




	 Upon	 considering	 the	 excerpts	 from	 Overview	 and	 the	 interpretations	 I	 have	
offered	I	think	we	are	in	a	position	to	say	that	just	like	Arcimboldo’s	painting	of	Rudolf	II	
as	Vertumnus	 the	 image	of	 Earth	 situated	 in	 the	 void	may	 induce	wonder,	 prompt	our	







possible	 to	 see	 objects	 that	 are	 too	 small	 for	 the	 naked	 human	 eye	 to	 capture.	 It	was	
constructed	 towards	 the	end	of	 the	16th	 century	and	although	 there	are	 controversies	
about	 its	 original	 inventor	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 spectacle-maker	 Zacharias	 Janssen	 and	
astronomer	 Galileo	 Galilei	 were	 involved	 in	 its	 development	 (Doron,	 2012,	 p.	 180).	













on	 the	 face	 of	 the	 earth	 a	 small	 world	 that	 was	 entirely	 new,	 and	 gave	 us	 the	




Through	 the	 microscope	 Joblot	 experiences	 the	 world	 anew	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 beings	
whose	 existence	 he	 hitherto	 had	 been	 completely	 unaware	 of	 suddenly	 sprung	 to	 life	
before	his	‘augmented	eyes’.	It	is	not	hard	to	
imagine	 that	 such	 an	 experience	must	 have	
been	 wonder-filled	 and	 to	 capture	 some	 of	
its	 essence	 we	 might	 consider	 Philippe	
Crassous’	 2010	 capture	 of	 a	 hydrothermal	
worm	 via	 a	 scanning	 electron	 microscope	
(figure	 4.2)	 (Crassous,	 2010).	 Hydrothermal	
worms	are	deep-sea	creatures	about	the	size	
of	 bacteria,	 and	 are	 mainly	 found	 close	 to	
hydrothermal	 vents	 in	 the	 ocean	 and	 they	
look	 absolutely	 monstrous.	 Crassous’	
dramatic	 depiction	 not	 only	 sends	 a	 clear	
message	 about	 how	 far	 microscopy	 has	
evolved	in	terms	of	revealing	details	of	objects	too	miniscule	for	us	to	sense	unaided	but	
also	provide	us	with	an	idea	of	the	kind	of	wonder	people	must	have	experienced	upon	
observing	 microscopic	 beings	 for	 the	 first	 time.	 Additionally	 one	 might	 point	 out	 that	




something	 that	 we	 without	 the	 aid	 of	 a	 microscope	 would	 totally	 miss	 out	 on—
encourages	wonderment.	 It	 ignites	 the	 imagination	 and	 enriches	 our	 perception	of	 the	










intertwined	 with	 our	 everyday	 lives.	 One	 could	 argue	 that	 the	 development	 of	
microbiology	 and	 its	well-known	 importance	 to	 contemporary	medicine	 and	healthcare	
takes	 the	 punch	 out	 of	 this	 argument.	 One	 could	 also	 press	 the	 point	 that	 since	 the	
invention	of	 the	microscope	 the	microscopic	world	has	been	 researched	 so	 extensively	




things.	 Thus	 to	 say	 that	 the	microscopic	world	has	 lost	 its	wonder	 is	 an	overstatement	
because	we	are	far	from	being	able	to	explore	everything	and	even	if	 it	was	possible	to	
have	 fully	 explored	 the	 world	 of	 miniscule	 things	 it	 would	 still	 be	 wonder-filled	 to	




16th	century	German/Dutch	spectacle-maker	Hans	Lippershey	 is	credited	for	 inventing	 it	
(King,	 1955,	 p.	 30)	 but	 it	 was	 the	 improvements	 to	 the	 instrument	 by	 Galileo	 and	 his	
application	of	it	to	the	field	of	astronomy	that	with	our	present	purpose	in	mind	makes	it	






book	 of	 the	 Mathematical	 Professor	 at	 Padua,	 who	 by	 the	 help	 of	 an	 optical	
instrument	 […]	 hath	 discovered	 four	 new	 planets	 rolling	 about	 the	 Sphere	 of	
Jupiter	 […]	 so	 upon	 the	 whole	 subject	 he	 hath	 first	 overthrown	 all	 former	




Like	 the	microscope	 the	 telescope	 allows	 us	 to	 see	 parts	 of	 the	world	 that	 is	 normally	
hidden	 to	 us	 and	 upon	 discovering	 such	 parts	 the	 idea	 of	 how	 the	world	 looks	 and	 is	
ordered	 is	 at	 risk	 of	 being	 overthrown	 or	 transfigured.	What	Wotton	 speaks	 of	 in	 the	
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letter	to	the	Earl	of	Salisbury	is	a	testimony	to	this	effect.	Galileo’s	telescopic	observations	
involved	 Jupiter’s	 four	 major	 moons	 Io,	 Europa,	 Ganymede	 and	 Callisto	 and	 their	
existence	cast	the	geocentric	model	of	the	world	and	the	practice	of	astrology	into	doubt	
because	 neither	 of	 these	 could	 account	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 these	 moons.	 This	 was	 a	
monumental	discovery	and	 similar	 to	 the	wonder	 the	educated	people	of	 Europe	must	
have	 experienced	 when	 they	 learned	 that	 Christopher	 Columbus	 had	 found	 a	 vast	
continent	 to	 the	west	 and	 so	 had	 to	 change	 the	map	 of	 the	 known	world,	 the	 people	
around	Galileo	must	have	marvelled	at	his	telescopic	observations	and	their	implications.	




must	 have	 encouraged	 imaginings	 of	 an	 alternative	 architecture	 of	 the	 universe	 and	











4.2	 Wonder,	 Imagination	 and	 the	 Development	 of	 Moral	 Scope	
and	Sensitivity	
Some	experiences	of	wonder	 ignite	 the	 imagination	 and	 can	 give	 rise	 to	 a	new	kind	of	
perception	that	develops	moral	sensitivity	or	encourages	an	increase	in	moral	scope.	To	




ignorance’	 that	has	 enjoyed	much	debate	within	philosophical	 and	political	 circles	 as	 it	
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contributes	 towards	 the	 clarification	of	how	we	might	order	 a	 just	 society.	 Then	 I	 shall	
look	to	the	concept	of	 ‘speciesism’	advocated	by	moral	philosopher	Peter	Singer,	which	
has	 contributed	 towards	 an	 increased	 awareness	 of	 animal	 rights	 and	 how	we	 human	








you	 desired.	 Superduper	 neuropsychologists	 could	 stimulate	 your	 brain	 so	 that	
you	would	 think	and	 feel	 you	were	writing	a	great	novel,	or	making	a	 friend,	or	
reading	 an	 interesting	 book.	 All	 the	 time	 you	would	 be	 floating	 in	 a	 tank,	 with	
electrodes	attached	to	your	brain.	Should	you	plug	into	this	machine	for	life,	pre-
programming	 your	 life’s	 experiences?	 If	 you	 are	 worried	 about	 missing	 out	 on	
desirable	experiences,	we	can	suppose	that	business	enterprises	have	researched	
thoroughly	 the	 lives	 of	many	 others.	 You	 can	 pick	 and	 choose	 from	 their	 large	
library	or	smorgasbord	of	 such	experiences,	 selecting	your	 life’s	experiences	 for,	
say,	the	next	two	years.	After	two	years	have	passed,	you	will	have	ten	minutes	or	
ten	 hours	 out	 of	 the	 tank,	 to	 select	 the	 experiences	 of	 your	next	 two	 years.	Of	
course,	while	 in	 the	 tank	 you	won’t	 know	 that	 you’re	 there;	 you’ll	 think	 it’s	 all	
actually	happening.	Others	can	also	plug	in	to	have	the	experiences	they	want,	so	














rise	 to	 wonderment	 because	 as	 much	 as	 the	 thought	 experiment	 can	 be	 criticised	 as	
science	 fiction	 or	 detached	 from	 reality	 the	 question	 of	 what	 we	 would	 choose	 in	 a	













1974,	 p.	 43).	 This	 may	 sound	 excessive	 but	 according	 to	 Nozick	 if	 a	 person	 has	 been	
plugged	 into	 the	 machine	 for	 a	 long	 time	 it	 becomes	 impossible	 to	 determine	 the	
character	 of	 such	 a	 person,	which	 to	 an	 extent	 reflects	 a	 person	who	no	 longer	 exists.	
Because	 the	person	 in	 the	 tank	 is	being	 fed	artificial	experiences	of	her	own	choice	we	
cannot	determine	 if	 she	 is	good-hearted,	 caring,	 courageous,	 intelligent,	patient	and	so	
on.	At	best	 she	 is	but	a	 thing	 in	a	 tank	or	an	 indeterminate	blob	 to	use	Nozick’s	words	
(Nozick,	 1974,	 p.	 43).	 One	 may	 ask	 but	 what	 if	 the	 person	 in	 the	 tank	 could	 be	
experiencing	 wonder?	 Would	 that	 not	 make	 the	 choice	 to	 plug	 into	 the	 machine	
attractive?	 Not	 necessarily	 because	 it	 prompts	 difficult	 questions	 such	 as	 whether	 the	
experience	of	wonder	is	an	end	in	itself	or	important	in	itself,	not	forgetting	if	wonder	is	
attractive	merely	 because	 it	 is	 pleasurable	 and	 if	 wonder	would	 be	 attractive	 if	 it	 was	
accompanied	by	an	emotional	upheaval	closer	to	fear	rather	than	joy.	
	 Moving	 on	 the	 thought	 experiment	 can	 also	 give	 rise	 to	 a	wondering	 reflection	
about	 reality;	 to	 what	 extent	 contact	 with	 a	 deeper	 reality	 matters	 to	 us;	 and	 it	 may	
prompt	us	to	reflect	upon	what	the	world	is,	what	and	who	we	are	and	to	what	end	we	
have	ordered	our	lives.	In	Nozick’s	view	the	experience	machine	deprives	us	from	being	in	
touch	 with	 a	 deeper	 reality	 because	 of	 its	 artificiality.	 One	 could	 argue	 that	 a	 deeper	
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reality	 in	 theory	 could	 be	 simulated	 but	 such	 a	 simulation	would	 be	 a	man-made	 one	






to	what	end	we	organise	our	 lives.	 In	 this	sense	the	wonder	we	might	experience	 from	
engaging	with	Nozick’s	experiment	 resonates	well	with	Fuller’s	outlook	on	wonder	as	 it	
encourages	us	to	 live	a	 life	 ‘attuned	to	the	widest	possible	world	of	personal	fulfilment’	









argues	 that	 if	we	were	 to	build	an	 ideal	 just	 society	 it	 is	 vital	 first	of	all	 to	establish	an	
original	position,	that	is	a	position	that	nullifies	the	biases	of	the	‘builders’.	Human	beings	
unfortunately	 have	 a	 tendency	 to	 exploit	 one	 another	 or	 to	 make	 unjust	 rules	 and	
regulations	that	somehow	favour	a	particular	kind	of	people	or	a	particular	way	of	life.	In	





does	 he	 know	 his	 fortune	 in	 the	 distribution	 of	 natural	 assets	 and	 abilities,	 his	
intelligence	 and	 strength,	 and	 the	 like.	 Nor	 again,	 does	 anyone	 know	 his	
conception	 of	 the	 good,	 the	 particulars	 of	 his	 rational	 plan	 for	 life,	 or	 even	 the	
special	 features	 of	 his	 psychology	 such	 as	 his	 aversion	 to	 risk	 or	 liability	 to	
optimism	or	pessimism.	More	than	this,	I	assume	that	the	parties	do	not	know	the	
particular	 circumstances	 of	 their	 own	 society.	 That	 is,	 they	 do	 not	 know	 its	
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economic	or	political	situation,	or	the	level	of	civilization	and	culture	 it	has	been	
able	 to	 achieve.	 The	 persons	 in	 the	 original	 position	 have	 no	 information	 as	 to	
which	generation	they	belong	[…]	As	far	as	possible,	then,	the	only	particular	facts	
which	the	parties	know	is	that	their	society	 is	subject	to	circumstances	of	 justice	
and	whatever	 that	 implies.	 It	 is	 taken	 for	 granted,	 however	 that	 they	 know	 the	
general	 facts	 about	 human	 society.	 They	 understand	 political	 affairs	 and	 the	
principles	of	economic	theory;	know	the	basis	of	social	organization	and	the	laws	






while	 knowing	 that	 she	 has	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 society	 she	 is	 ‘designing’	 in	 some	
unknown	 form	 and	 to	 labour	 towards	 a	 society	 that	 is	 not	 in	 her	 favour	 would	 be	
counterintuitive.	In	this	sense	the	experiment	will	make	the	homophobe	ponder	whether	
it	 is	 just	to	restrict	 the	rights	of	citizens	 in	the	 ideal	society	based	on	sexual	orientation	
now	that	she	may	end	up	being	a	homosexual	living	in	that	very	society	herself.	Likewise	








not	 so	 much	 because	 it	 promotes	 certain	 political	 liberal	 values	 but	 because	 the	
participant	 quickly	 becomes	 aware	 of	 any	 biases	 or	 unjust	 personal	 preferences	 she	
harbours	in	relation	to	the	imagined	just	society.	To	suddenly	face	such	an	awareness	is	
displacing	and	leads	to	a	diminishing	of	self	because	although	we	can	say	that	through	the	
experiment	 the	 participant	 might	 gain	 a	 new	 understanding	 of	 herself	 this	 particular	
understanding	or	enlargement	of	her	world	also	encompasses	an	awareness	of	ignorance	
about	 herself	 including	 perhaps	 how	 she	 has	 come	 to	 harbour	 the	 particular	 biases	 or	
personal	preferences	she	happens	to	have	in	the	first	place	and	why	it	is	that	they	have	
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remained	hidden	until	now.	Such	awareness	 intensifies	 the	cognitive	 focus	because	 the	





likely	 to	 induce	wonder,	 but	 can	we	 say	 that	 the	experience	of	wonder	emerging	 from	
engaging	 in	 Rawls’s	 thought	 experiment	 also	 facilitates	 an	 increase	 in	 moral	 scope	 or	
sensitivity?	Yes	and	no	 I	would	say.	Yes	because	 the	 increased	self-awareness	 including	
the	awareness	of	ignorance	can	be	seen	as	a	bulwark	against	overconfidence	or	absolute	
surety,	which	fuels	many	an	unjust	moral	conviction,	and	 it	 leaves	one	open	to	wonder	
both	 in	an	epistemic	and	moral	 sense.	No	because	 it	 is	quite	possible	 that	because	 the	
thought	 experiment	 is	 destabilising	 some	 people	 would	 simply	 refuse	 to	 wonder	 and	
deploy	 psychological	 defence	 mechanisms	 in	 order	 to	 preserve	 emotional	 stability.	
Furthermore	one	might	say	that	the	particular	openness	to	wonder	that	the	experiment	






Moving	 on	 let	 us	 now	 look	 to	 the	 term	 ‘speciesism’	 coined	 in	 1970	 by	 psychologist	









this	 effect.	 Furthermore	 it	 can	 be	 pointed	 out	 that	 human	 beings	 without	 much	
consideration	 at	 least	 in	 some	 parts	 of	 the	 world	 use	 animals	 for	 research	 and	 that	
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countless	 animals	 have	 in	 the	 past	 suffered	 and	 perished	 due	 to	 scientific	
experimentation	aiming	at	producing	knowledge,	human	medicine	or	cosmetics.	
	 Now	 realising	 what	 speciesism	means	 and	 that	 one	 qualifies	 as	 a	 speciesist	 by	
endorsing	 animal	 suffering	 through	 consumer	 habits	 can	 for	 some	 call	 up	 at	 least	






it	 provokes	 a	 re-examination	 of	 one’s	 outlook	 on	 the	 position	 of	 human	 beings	 in	 the	
world	including	perhaps	the	viability	of	traditional	western	ideas	concerning	the	position	
of	human	beings	in	the	‘hierarchy	of	things’.	What	we	are	talking	about	here	is	the	kind	of	
ideas	 that	have	helped	 shape	 the	western	 approach	 to	 animals	 such	as	Aristotle’s	 idea	








and	 are	 there	merely	 as	means	 to	 an	 end.	 That	 end	 is	man’	 (Kant,	 1963,	 p.	 239-240).	
Understanding	that	one	is	a	speciesist	is	a	process	that	is	likely	to	fuel	wonder,	ignite	our	
imagination	but	will	it	necessarily	bring	about	an	increase	in	moral	scope	and	sensitivity?	




that	 is	 never	 questioned	 and	 which	 does	 not	 recognise	 the	moral	 importance	 of	 non-
human	animals.	In	other	words	they	are	simply	not	compelled	to	change	or	even	to	play	
with	 the	 thought	 that	 giving	 non-human	 animals	 moral	 status	 is	 a	 sign	 of	 moral	
advancement.	Additionally	we	may	speak	of	the	refusal	to	wonder	and	the	idea	that	for	




	 Taken	 this	 into	consideration	 I	 think	 it	 fair	 to	say	 that	becoming	aware	 that	one	
qualifies	as	a	speciesist	invites	wonder	and	the	intense	use	of	the	imagination	but	it	need	
not	 increase	moral	scope	and	sensitivity.	An	increase	in	such	is	 in	this	respect	not	a	key	
component	 or	 constituent	 of	wonder	 but	 at	 best	 a	 possible	 effect	 or	 result	 of	 it.	 Now	
despite	 this	 formulation	 some	 might	 still	 think	 that	 I	 have	 spoken	 too	 warmly	 about	
Nozick’s	 experience	 machine,	 Rawl’s	 veil	 of	 ignorance	 and	 the	 concept	 of	 speciesism	
advocated	 by	 Ryder	 and	 Singer	 and	 how	we	 through	 our	 engagement	with	 them	may	
experience	wonder,	the	flight	of	the	imagination	and	that	this	in	some	cases	may	result	in	
an	 increase	 in	moral	 scope	 and	 sensitivity.	 It	 can	 be	 argued	 that	my	 argument	merely	
speaks	 to	 the	already	morally	 inclined	but	 such	an	objection	seems	 to	 take	 for	granted	
that	the	amoral	person	exists,	a	position	which	is	worthwhile	examining.	In	fact	it	is	quite	
possible	that	the	amoral	person	is	a	modern	myth	because	giving	up	living	the	ethical	or	
moral	 life	equals	giving	up	 finding	 robust	 reasons	 for	action	 i.e.	 reasons	 that	 transcend	
purely	 selfish	 and	 egoistical	 attitudes	 or	 unexamined	 emotions	 and	 feelings.	 Of	 course	
one	could	argue	that	this	deprivation	of	reasoning	is	indeed	the	modus	operandi	for	many	
people	 but	 such	 an	 attitude	 does	 not	 entitle	 us	 to	 say	 that	 such	 people	 are	 amoral.	 It	
merely	 suggests	 the	 sidetracking	 of	 moral	 reasoning	 and	 the	 prevalence	 of	 immoral	
behaviour.	To	be	immoral	does	not	mean	that	one	is	beyond	morals	but	merely	indicates	
that	a	person	behaves	inconsiderately	with	no	or	little	care	for	self	and	others.	Thus	we	
are	 still	 able	 to	 say	 that	 for	 some	 the	wonder	 that	will	 emerge	 from	engaging	with	 for	
example	 the	 concept	 of	 speciesism	 can	 give	 rise	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 moral	 scope	 and	
sensitivity.			












implies	may	need	some	time	in	order	to	 ‘sink	 in’.	The	point	 is	that	an	 increase	 in	moral	
scope	 and	 sensitivity	 following	 an	 experience	 of	 wonder	 needs	 not	 take	 place	 in	 the	
moment	 of	 wonder	 but	 can	 happen	 over	 time.	 Taking	 this	 into	 consideration	 I	 should	
think	 that	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 amoral	 person,	 immune	 to	 the	 possible	 transfiguring	












mentioned	that	during	 the	weeks	after	 this	 strange	meeting	Keen	experienced	what	he	
refers	 to	 as	 a	 pervasive	 sense	 of	 gratitude	 to	 the	 stranger	 who	 handed	 him	 the	 knife	
together	 with	 a	 rather	 mysterious	 ‘wondering	 expectancy’	 brought	 about	 by	 the	
realisation	that	this	wonderful	happening	took	place	in	the	ordinary	world	of	Maryville.	In	




say	 that	 it	 strictly	 speaking	 is	 not	 a	 part	 of	 what	 we	 can	 call	 the	 core	 components	 of	
wonder.	It	is	a	state	of	mind	that	can	spring	from	wonder	which	persists	over	time60	thus	
qualifying	 as	 a	 sort	 of	 “lingering	wonder”	 involving	 in	 some	 instances	 (like	 in	 Keen’s)	 a	
pervasive	sense	of	gratitude	and	a	wondering	expectancy.		









because	 there	 is	 judging	 from	 Keen’s	 recollection	 a	 strong	 feeling	 component	 to	 the	




few	hours	 a	mood	has	 general	 or	 diffuse	 intentional	 objects	 and	may	persist	 for	 hours	
over	days	to	weeks	and	months	(Ben-Ze'ev,	2010,	p.	55).		
	 An	additional	key	 feature	of	 the	wondrous	afterglow	could	be	 that	 it	 ignites	 the	






91).	 In	 this	 light	 Keen’s	 gratitude	 to	 the	 stranger	 means	 something	 more	 than	 being	
thankful	to	someone	for	receiving	a	gift	in	an	ordinary	sense.	It	bears	witness	to	a	person	
who	by	having	a	knife	presented	to	him	as	a	gift	from	a	complete	stranger	for	some	time	
has	opened	up	 to	 a	world	beyond	 the	physical.	Or	 to	put	 it	 differently	 it	 suggests	 that	
through	his	experience	Keen	became	open	to	a	metaphysical	and	ontological	dimension	









intellectual	 one	 (Kidd,	 2014).	 For	 Kidd	 shallow	 wonder	 corresponds	 to	 the	 kind	 of	
wonderment	that	scientists	and	unweavers	of	the	rainbow	such	as	Dawkins	defend	and	
he	 argues	 that	 although	 such	 wonderment	 can	 be	 powerful	 it	 merely	 inspires	 further	
scientific	 work.	 To	 harbour	 a	 deep	 sense	 of	 wonder	 is	 for	 Kidd	 to	 engage	 with	 the	
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experience	 of	 wonder	 brings	 to	 life	 the	 shallow	 wonderer	 will	 dismiss	 it	 as	 broken	
knowledge	 and	 attempt	 to	 rectify	 it	 within	 her	 current	 scientific	 perspective.	 The	
experience	of	wonder	does	not	bring	about	(or	at	least	is	not	recognised	by	the	wonderer	




person	 qua	 being	 a	 scientist	 forever	 will	 be	 bereft	 of	 deep	 wonderment.	 It	 is	 quite	
possible	 to	be	committed	 to	 scientific	work	and	 the	accumulation	of	 knowledge	and	at	
the	same	time	see	the	importance	of	the	metaphysical;	the	ethical	and	besides	minding	




	 In	 the	 attempt	 to	 push	 Kidd’s	 idea	 further	 we	 might	 speculate	 if	 there	 is	 a	
connection	between	Kidd’s	notion	of	 ‘shallow’	and	 ‘deep’	wonder	and	Scruton’s	 idea	of	
imagination	as		‘seeing’	and	‘seeing	as’.	According	to	Kidd	‘Shallow’	wonder	gives	rise	to	
an	epistemic	imperative	understood	as	we	attempt	to	gain	knowledge	about	a	particular	
matter.	 ‘Deep	 wonder’	 is	 an	 entirely	 different	 thing	 because	 during	 an	 experience	 of	
‘deep	 wonder’	 an	 ethical	 imperative	 emerges	 which	 encourages	 us	 to	 act	 and	 live	





as’	 that	 allows	 us	 to	 recognise	 and	 embrace	 for	 example	 the	 vulnerability,	 mortality,	
sameness,	 needs,	 importance	 or	 value	 of	 the	 other.	 To	 exemplify	we	might	 argue	 that	









which	never	 could	have	been	witholden	 from	them	but	by	 the	hand	of	 tyranny.	
The	 French	 have	 already	 discovered	 that	 the	 blackness	 of	 the	 skin	 is	 no	 reason	
why	 a	 human	 being	 should	 be	 abandoned	 without	 redress	 to	 the	 caprice	 of	 a	
tormentor.	It	may	one	day	come	to	be	recognized	that	the	number	of	the	legs,	the	









For	 a	man	of	his	 time	and	position	 to	 recognise	 the	 value	of	people	whose	 skin-colour	
varies	 from	 his	 and	 to	 extend	 this	 value	 to	 non-human	 animals	 by	 highlighting	 the	
importance	of	their	possible	capability	of	suffering	definitely	speaks	towards	it,	because	it	





is,	 he	 puts	 forth	 an	 aspect	 of	 such	 creatures	 unfamiliar	 to	 or	 ignored	 by	 many	 of	 his	
contemporaries	and	indeed	many	people	today.	In	addition	we	might	say	that	reading	the	
Introduction	 to	 the	 Principles	 of	Morals	 and	 Legislation	 today	 can	 be	 a	 highly	 edifying	
experience	 because	 it	 easily	 provokes	 a	 deep	 sense	 of	 wonder	 that	 sets	 ablaze	 our	
imagination	 as	 ‘seeing	 as’	 enabling	 us	 to	 recognise	 the	 importance	 of	 for	 example	 the	
suffering	of	animals	and	so	in	effect	elevates	us	onto	ethically	speaking	higher	grounds.		
	 In	 this	 light	wonder	 comes	 across	 as	 an	 enduring	matter	 and	 so	here	we	 find	 a	
possible	 connection	 between	 deep	 wonder	 and	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 wondrous	 afterglow;	
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however	 the	 two	 concepts	 are	 not	 necessarily	 identical.	 Deep	 wonder	 is	 enduring,	
involves	 an	 ethical	 imperative	 and	 ignites	 the	 imagination,	 but	 even	 though	 the	
experience	 is	 likely	 to	 hold	 an	 emotional	 component	 it	 is	 quite	 possible	 that	 this	
component	 undergoes	 modification.	 I	 say	 this	 because	 all	 of	 the	 major	 ethical	
philosophical	 traditions	 including	 virtue	 ethics,	 deontology	 and	 utilitarianism	 represent	
the	 exercise	 of	 emotional	 control	 and	 finding	 reasons	 for	 action.	With	 this	 in	mind	we	
have	 an	 incitement	 to	 view	 deep	 wonder	 as	 an	 attitude,	 a	 disposition	 or	 simply	 the	
outcome	of	 philosophical	 reflection.	A	wondrous	 afterglow	 looks	 different	 in	 the	 sense	
that	 it	 is	 enduring,	 involves	 the	 metaphysical	 but	 need	 not	 involve	 the	 ethical.	 The	
imagination	 is	 clearly	 active	 during	 the	 experience	 and	 there	 is	 a	 strong	 emotional	
component	 to	 it,	 which	 lasts	 over	 time,	 giving	 us	 the	 incitement	 to	 classify	 the	whole	
experience	as	a	mood.		
	 The	intense	use	of	the	imagination	stands	as	an	important	communality	between	
deep	wonder	and	a	wondrous	afterglow	for	without	 it	 the	 finer	points	of	 the	 individual	
experiences	 are	 unlikely	 to	 be	 perceived.	 To	 give	 a	 few	 examples,	 it	 will	 be	 hard	 to	
experience	 deep	 wonder	 in	 connection	 with	 Nozick’s	 experience	 machine	 without	 an	
intense	 use	 of	 the	 imagination	 because	 it	 is	 the	 imagination	 that	 reveals	 to	 us	 the	
problems	of	plugging	into	the	machine.	It	is	the	same	intense	use	of	the	imagination	that	
reveals	 injustice	 in	 connection	 with	 Rawls’	 thought	 experiment	 the	 veil	 of	 ignorance.	
Furthermore	we	might	say	that	it	is	the	intense	use	of	the	imagination	that	in	connection	
with	 the	 concept	 of	 speciesism	 enables	 us	 to	 abstract	 ourselves	 from	 the	 habits	 and	
customary	 beliefs	 that	 otherwise	 promote	 the	 practice	 of	 speciesism.	 Concerning	
imagination	and	a	wondrous	afterglow	we	can	say	that	 it	 is	courtesy	of	the	 imagination	
that	Keen	is	able	to	experience	gratitude	and	a	wondering	expectancy	because	unless	the	
imagination	was	active	he	would	not	be	able	to	put	before	his	mind’s	eye	even	in	a	vague	
sense	who	he	was	grateful	 to	 and	what	he	was	grateful	 for	not	 to	 forget	what	he	was	
expecting	in	all	his	wonder.	
	 Does	 this	 enable	 us	 to	 say	 that	 it	 is	 the	 intense	 activity	 of	 the	 imagination	 that	
makes	these	experiences	happen?	Not	quite,	because	it	can	be	argued	that	although	the	
intense	 use	 of	 the	 imagination	 is	 important	 the	 gradual	 deepening	 of	 wonder	 or	 the	







By	 engaging	 with	 Arcimboldo’s	 Rudolf	 II	 as	 Vertumnus;	 seeing	 Earth	 from	 Space;	 the	
microscope	 and	 the	 telescope	 this	 chapter	 has	 brought	 forth	 that	 an	 experience	 of	






	 Finally	 we	 explored	 the	 relationship	 between	 a	 wondrous	 afterglow	 and	 deep	
wonder	and	found	that	although	there	are	overlaps	between	the	experiences	differences	
can	 be	 detected.	 Deep	wonder	 comes	 with	 an	 ethical	 imperative	 and	 seems	 to	 be	 an	
attitude,	 disposition	 or	 the	 outcome	 of	 philosophical	 reflection	 whereas	 a	 wondrous	
afterglow	need	not	involve	the	ethical	and	appears	to	be	a	mood.	
	 We	have	now	reached	the	end	of	our	exploration	of	the	implications	of	the	role	of	
the	 imagination	 in	 wonder	 and	 the	 time	 has	 now	 come	 to	 situate	 wonder	 in	 a	 wider	
context.	 In	the	next	chapter	 I	aim	to	further	explore	wonder	through	a	Neo-Aristotelian	
lens	involving	the	relatively	recent	ethical	term	‘human	flourishing’	and	the	idea	of	virtue.	









This	 chapter	draws	on	 the	 findings	on	wonder	 from	 the	previous	 chapters	 and	aims	 to	
show	 that	wonder	 can	contribute	 towards	human	 flourishing	or	 in	 short	 flourishing.	To	
make	this	work	it	is	important	to	understand	what	flourishing	means.	Different	disciplines	
have	 contributed	 to	 the	 literature	 on	 flourishing	 and	 to	 ensure	 a	 reasonable	
understanding	of	flourishing	one	could	have	focussed	on	classical	hedonism:	a	‘theory	of	
value	 in	which	 pleasure	 is	 the	 sole	 good	 and	 pain	 the	 sole	 evil’	 (Sumner,	 1996,	 p.	 83).	
Alternatively	one	could	turn	to	psychologist	Martin	Seligman	and	adopt	an	approach	to	
happiness	and	flourishing	which	emphasises	a	high	degree	of	personalisation	(Seligman,	
2011).	 Likewise	one	could	approach	 flourishing	 from	an	economical	angle	and	 focus	on	
the	satisfaction	of	basic	economic	needs	as	the	foundation	of	happiness	(Layard,	2011).	
Another	path	to	understanding	flourishing	could	be	obtained	by	paying	direct	attention	to	
quality	of	 life	measures	and	how	healthcare	 is	using	 such	 to	determine	what	wellbeing	
consists	of	(Brock,	1993).	Nevertheless	in	this	chapter	I	shall	draw	a	picture	of	flourishing	
from	 altogether	 different	 sources.	 More	 specifically	 I	 will	 initially	 engage	 with	 three	
contemporary	Neo-Aristotelian	philosophical	approaches	to	flourishing	of	which	the	first	
involves	the	work	of	philosopher	Douglas	Rasmussen	who	offers	thoughts	on	flourishing	
focussing	 predominately	 on	 the	 individual.	 Secondly	 I	 shall	 engage	 with	 philosopher	
Alasdair	MacIntyre	whose	notion	of	flourishing	highlights	the	social	aspect	of	human	life	
and	 is	 grounded	 in	 the	 idea	 that	we	are	dependent	 rational	 animals	with	 the	ability	 to	
become	 independent	 practical	 reasoners.	 Finally	 I	 will	 draw	 attention	 to	 philosopher	
Martha	 Nussbaum	 whose	 account	 of	 flourishing	 has	 a	 political	 ring	 and	 includes	 the	
notion	 of	 the	 ‘thick,	 vague	 conception	 of	 the	 good’,	 by	which	 she	 offers	 a	 basic	 list	 of	








picture	 of	 human	 flourishing	 that	 emerges	 from	 engaging	 with	 these	 contemporary	
thinkers	 will	 be	 utilised	 as	 a	 reference	 point	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 this	 chapter	 which	
examines	how	wonder	can	be	a	source	of	flourishing.	The	second	half	starts	with	a	brief	
investigation	 of	 what	 it	 means	 for	 something	 to	 be	 a	 source	 of	 flourishing	 and	 I	 shall	
engage	with	a	selection	of	candidates	that	have	been	selected	partly	because	they	are	of	
particular	value	to	me	but	also	because	they	demonstrate	the	diversity	of	factors	that	can	
act	 as	 sources	 of	 human	 flourishing.	 They	 include	 literacy,	 friendship,	 humour	 and	
physical	exercise.	Following	this	brief	engagement	I	shall	argue	that	wonder	also	qualifies	
as	a	source	of	flourishing	by	looking	at	how	wonder	may	evoke	reverence	and	gratitude,	
and	 help	 foster	 an	 imaginative	 attitude	 and	 a	 disposition	 to	 wonder	 that	 embraces	




This	 section	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	 philosopher	 Douglas	 Rasmussen’s	 Neo-Aristotelian	
approach	 to	 human	 flourishing	 from	 his	 article	 ‘Human	 Flourishing	 and	 the	 Appeal	 to	
Human	Nature’	(Rasmussen,	1999).	This	article	is	 important	because	whilst	 it	appeals	to	
human	 nature	 it	 also	 recognises	 human	 individuality.	 As	 Rasmussen	 puts	 it	 ‘the	
fundamental	 intuition	behind	 this	project	has	been	not	only	 that	 it	 is	 the	 flourishing	of	
individual	 human	 beings	 that	 ultimately	 matters	 but	 the	 individuality	 of	 flourishing	 as	
well’	 (Rasmussen,	 1999,	 p.	 43).	 Rasmussen	 offers	 a	 contemporary	 outlook	 on	 human	
flourishing	involving	some	central	features	of	Aristotle’s	philosophy	(Rasmussen,	1999,	p.	
2).	 Among	 these	 central	 features	 we	 find	 the	 concept	 of	 Eudaimonia,	 which	 has	 been	
traditionally	 and	 inaccurately	 translated	 into	 ‘happiness’	 and	 thus	 communicating	 the	
idea	that	it	refers	to	a	subjective	good	rather	than	an	objective	one	which	it	was	for	the	
ancients	 Greeks	 (Rasmussen,	 1999,	 p.	 2)	 (MacIntyre,	 1998,	 p.	 59).	 Because	 of	 this	
Eudaimonia	is	often	misperceived	as	only	a	subjective	good	and	not	an	objective	one.	In	
addition	Rasmussen	stipulates	that	human	flourishing	 is	a	technical	and	complex	notion	
and	 that	 its	 exact	 meaning	 is	 somewhat	 obscured	 by	 a	 variety	 of	 different	 theories	
concerning	the	human	good.	Furthermore	Rasmussen	informs	us	that	human	flourishing	
is	 a	 relatively	 new	 term	 in	 ethics	 and	 is	 a	 crucial	 part	 of	 the	Neo-Aristotelian	 ethicist’s	
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endeavour	 to	 establish	 an	 alternative	 to	 consequentialistic	 and	 deontological	 ethics	
(Rasmussen,	1999,	p.	1-2).		
	 More	 specifically	 Rasmussen’s	 Neo-Aristotelian	 approach	 to	 human	 flourishing	
involves	a	view	of	the	human	good	that	is	1)	objective,	2)	inclusive,	(3)	individualised,	(4)	








human	 conduct	 is	 done	 and	 though	 flourishing	 is	 dependent	 on	 human	 agency	 for	 its	
success	its	status	as	ultimate	end	is	not	agent	dependent’	(Rasmussen,	1999,	p.	3).	
	 2.	 Despite	 being	 the	 ultimate	 end	 of	 human	 conduct	 human	 flourishing	 in	
Rasmussen’s	view	is	an	inclusive	end	that	does	not	reduce	the	value	of	anything	else	to	
that	 of	 mere	means	 (Rasmussen,	 1999,	 p.	 3).	 Furthermore	 Rasmussen	 points	 out	 that	
human	 flourishing	 is	 to	 be	 viewed	 as	 the	most	 final	 end	 understood	 as	 an	 end	 that	 is	
never	sought	for	the	sake	of	anything	else	as	it	includes	all	final	ends.	In	this	light	human	
flourishing	 includes	and	incorporates	basic	goods	such	as	knowledge,	health,	friendship,	









	 3.	 Rasmussen	 views	 human	 flourishing	 as	 individualised	 and	 diverse.	 ‘No	 two	
cases	of	human	flourishing	are	the	same	and	they	are	not	interchangeable’	(Rasmussen,	
1999,	p.	 6).	Unlike	 the	daily-recommended	 intake	of	 vitamins	 and	minerals	 the	generic	
goods	 and	 virtues	 of	 human	 flourishing	 cannot	 be	 determined	 according	 to	 a	 natural	
backdrop	 and	 applied	 in	 the	 same	 manner	 across	 different	 human	 lives.	 My	 wife’s	
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flourishing	for	example	is	not	completely	the	same	as	mine,	meaning	that	 if	we	have	to	
determine	 what	 makes	 a	 human	 being	 flourish	 a	 certain	 degree	 of	 personalisation	 is	
called	 for.	 In	 Rasmussen’s	 view	 it	 is	 only	 when	 an	 individual’s	 particular	 talents,	
potentialities	and	circumstances	are	jointly	engaged	that	the	good	and	virtues	mentioned	
earlier	become	real,	or	as	he	puts	it,	achieve	determinacy	(Rasmussen,	1999,	p	6).		
	 4.	 In	Rasmussen’s	perspective	human	flourishing	 is	also	agent-relative	and	this	 is	
to	 be	 understood	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 is	 always	 the	 good	 for	 some	 person	 or	 other	
(Rasmussen,	1999,	p.	6).	 In	addition	 it	 is	 important	to	realise	that	one	does	not	flourish	
automatically	 and	 that	 a	 person	 is	 not	 merely	 a	 placeholder	 for	 flourishing.	 In	
Rasmussen’s	 view	 the	 value	 of	 human	 flourishing	 is	 found	 in	 and	 exhausted	 by	 those	
activities	of	 a	person	 that	 constitute	 that	person’s	 flourishing’	 (Rasmussen,	1999,	p.	 6).	
What	 this	 means	 is	 that	 there	 is	 an	 intimate	 relationship	 between	 flourishing	 and	 a	
person’s	life.	Rasmussen	explains	that	the	status	of	human	flourishing	as	ultimate	end	or	
value	 comes	 from	within	 and	 is	 obtained	 only	 in	 relationship	 to	 a	 person’s	 life.	 In	 this	
sense	human	flourishing	does	not	refer	to	some	value	we	can	point	to	but	is	something	
that	 involves	 a	 reference	 to	 the	 individual	 for	 whom	 it	 is	 good.	 At	 first	 glance	 agent-
relativity	may	 seem	 confusing	 because	how	 can	human	 flourishing	 uphold	 its	 objective	
image	and	at	the	same	time	claim	this	intimate	relationship	with	the	individual?	The	two	
notions	seem	to	be	poles	apart	and	incommensurable.	Rasmussen	defends	his	position	by	
pointing	 out	 that	 unlike	 the	 kind	 of	 utilitarianism	 advocated	 by	 philosophers	 such	 as	
Henry	Sidgwick	and	John	Stuart	Mill	his	conception	of	human	flourishing	does	not	rely	on	
the	 ambition	 of	 establishing	 an	 ethical	 system	 that	 is	 impersonal	 and	 agent-neutral.	
According	to	Rasmussen	such	ethical	theorising	is	unsound.	As	he	puts	it:	
	
There	 is	 no	 great	 divide	 in	 the	nature	of	 things	 between	 the	 facts	 that	 can	 and	
cannot	 be	 ethically	 relevant.	 Particular	 and	 contingent	 facts	 can	 be	 ethically	
important.	 Of	 course,	 some	 may	 be	 more	 important	 than	 others	 in	 achieving	
human	 flourishing,	 but	 this	 cannot	 be	 determined	 from	 one’s	 armchair	 alone.	
Certainly,	 there	 is	 for	 this	 neo-Aristotelian	 view,	 no	 basis	 for	 holding	 that	





The	 important	 point	 here	 is	 that	 just	 because	 something	 is	 considered	 a	 value	 to	 an	
individual’s	personal	project	and	no	one	else’s	it	is	by	no	means	morally	irrelevant.	In	fact	
Rasmussen	emphasises	the	opposite	 is	the	case	and	he	argues	that	such	values	deserve	
attention	 simply	 because	 of	 their	 relation	 to	 the	 individual.	 Consider	 the	 climber	 Alex	
Honnold	who	without	the	use	of	rope	scale	cliffs	such	as	the	northwest	face	of	Half	Dome	
in	 Yosemite	 National	 Park,	 US.	 Most	 people	 would	 probably	 find	 his	 climbing	 activity	
unnecessarily	 risky	or	even	 immoral	but	 for	Alex	Honnold	 free	solo	climbing	 is	valuable	
and	so	according	to	Rasmussen	morally	relevant	when	we	judge	his	character	because	we	
are	talking	about	the	flourishing	of	Alex	Honnold	and	not	for	example	mine.	
	 Rasmussen	also	mentions	a	more	 subtle	 confusion	with	agent-relativity	and	 this	
involves	 the	problem	of	whether	 something	can	be	of	value	 in	 its	own	right	and	at	 the	
same	 time	 be	 agent-relative	 (Rasmussen,	 1999,	 p.	 9).	 According	 to	 Rasmussen	 this	
objection	makes	 the	mistake	 of	 confusing	 instrumental	 value	with	 agent-relative	 value	





the	 lives	 they	 live.	 In	 this	 sense	 there	 can	 be	 no	 talk	 about	 incompatibility	 concerning	
something	being	valuable	in	its	own	right	and	agent-relative	because	the	value	of	goods	
and	 virtues	 is	 not	 a	 matter	 of	 their	 being	 means	 or	 instruments	 of	 flourishing	 but	 as	
Rasmussen	writes	 ‘their	being	expressions	or	 realisations	of	 it’	 (Rasmussen,	1999,	p.	9).	
Furthermore	the	notions	that	human	flourishing	is	the	ultimate	value	and	that	 it	can	be	
perceived	 as	 agent-relative	 are	 quite	 compatible.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 goal	 is	 the	
flourishing	 of	 each	 individual	 and	 its	 value	 is	 found	 in	 the	 activities	 that	 ‘comprise	 the	
fulfilment	 of	 individual	 human	 beings’	 (Rasmussen,	 1999,	 p.	 9).	 In	 this	 sense	 it	 is	
important	to	understand	that	human	flourishing	is	not	something	that	competes	with	the	
good	 of	 individual	 humans	 but	 essentially	makes	 up	 the	 very	 flourishing	 of	 their	 lives.	
Thus	 the	good	of	 individuals	 is	 their	 individual	 flourishing	and	 individual	 flourishing	and	
human	flourishing	are	essentially	the	same.	
	 Confusion	 may	 also	 appear	 in	 relation	 to	 agent-relativity	 because	 it	 can	 be	




one’s	behaviour	 (Rasmussen,	1999,	p.	10).	 In	this	sense	 it	 is	possible	that	acting	 for	the	
good	 of	 another	 could	 prove	 to	 be	 as	 Rasmussen	 writes	 only-good-for-you	 and	 not	
necessarily	anyone	else.	Parents	going	out	of	their	way	to	nurture	their	children	or	friends	
helping	one	another	exemplify	how	flourishing	can	be	agent-relative	and	involve	concern	
for	 others.	 According	 to	 Rasmussen	 it	 is	 even	 plausible	 to	 perceive	 agent-relativity	 as	
compatible	 with	 concerns	 for	 others	 in	 situations	 that	 are	 not	 viewed	 as	 situations	 of	







	 5.	 According	 to	 Rasmussen	 human	 flourishing	 is	 also	 a	 self-directed	 activity	
meaning	 that	 self-direction	 is	 necessary	 ‘to	 the	 very	 character	 of	 human	 flourishing’	
(Rasmussen,	 1999,	 p.	 10-11).	 In	 other	 words	 there	 would	 be	 no	 point	 to	 human	
flourishing	 if	 self-direction	was	not	a	part	of	 it.	 In	addition	Rasmussen	 insists	 that	 ’self-
direction	 is	 the	 central	 necessary	 constituent	 or	 ingredient	 of	 human	 flourishing	 –	 that	
feature	 of	 human	 flourishing	 without	 which	 no	 other	 feature	 could	 be	 a	 constituent’	
(Rasmussen,	1999,p.	11).	 The	 idea	 is	here	 that	one	does	not	 flourish	automatically	and	
that	 regardless	 of	 one’s	 achievements	 in	 life	 self-direction	 is	 crucial	 to	 all	 acts	 of	
flourishing	(Rasmussen,	1999,	p.	11).	To	flourish	as	a	human	being	is	something	that	one	
does	 and	 one	 has	 to	 make	 an	 effort	 to	 ‘discover	 the	 goods	 and	 virtues	 of	 human	
flourishing	as	well	as	to	achieve	and	implement	them’	(Rasmussen,	1999,	p.	11).	
	 6.	 By	 nature	 human	 beings	 are	 social	 animals	 (Rasmussen,	 1999,	 p.	 12).	
Rasmussen	 points	 out	 that	 our	 maturation	 requires	 a	 life	 with	 others	 and	 unlike	
mushrooms	we	 do	 not	 reach	maturity	 all	 by	 ourselves.	 A	 human	 being	 is	 a	 being	with	
other-orientated	 potentialities	 and	 our	 flourishing	 depends	 on	 their	 actualisation	
(Rasmussen,	1999,	p.	12).	 In	 this	 sense	 it	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	having	concerns	 for	
others	or	to	entertain	social	concern	is	crucial	because	human	flourishing	is	achieved	with	
and	among	others.	Rasmussen’s	point	 is	 that	we	are	not	abstract	 individuals	but	beings	
tied	to	society	and	community	and	that	as	he	puts	it	‘much	of	what	is	crucial	to	our	self-
conception	 and	 fundamental	 values	 is	 dependent	 on	 our	 upbringing	 and	 environment’	
(Rasmussen,	 1999,	 p.	 13).	 In	 this	 respect	 one	might	wonder	 if	 it	 is	 at	 all	 possible	 for	 a	
	 168	
hermit	 to	 flourish	 or	 if	 this	 is	 simply	 ruled	 out	 per	 definition.	 Rasmussen	 does	 not	 say	
anything	 specific	 about	 this	 but	 he	 does	 offer	 a	 few	 clues	 to	 his	 position	 on	 the	 issue.	
Rasmussen	 is	 a	 neo-Aristotelian	 and	 in	 this	 article	 he	mentions	 the	 Aristotelian	 notion	











	 This	 concludes	 the	 presentation	 of	 Rasmussen’s	 view	 of	 flourishing.	 However	
there	is	more	to	be	said	about	his	account	and	I	shall	now	move	on	and	briefly	examine	
his	 interpretation	 of	 the	 role	 of	 practical	 wisdom	 and	 the	 appeal	 to	 human	 nature	
inherent	to	the	neo-Aristotelian	conception	of	human	flourishing.	
	 Rasmussen	 emphasises	 that	 in	 addition	 to	 acknowledging	 the	 above-mentioned	
six	components	it	is	important	to	recognise	the	role	of	practical	wisdom	and	the	appeal	to	
human	nature	in	human	flourishing.	 In	Rasmussen’s	view	practical	wisdom	refers	to	the	
excellent	 or	 virtuous	 use	 of	 practical	 reason;	 practical	 reason	meaning	 the	 intellectual	
faculty	exercised	 in	relation	to	guiding	conduct	 (Rasmussen,	1999,	p.	16).	To	appreciate	
the	 importance	of	practical	wisdom	 in	Rasmussen’s	approach	 to	human	 flourishing	 it	 is	
vital	 to	 remember	 that	 he	 advocates	 the	existence	of	 a	 plurality	 of	 goods.	Given	 these	





of	 instrumental	 value	 (Rasmussen,	 1999,	 p.	 14).	 Goods	 such	 as	 health,	 creative	
achievement,	 friendship,	beauty,	pleasure,	and	knowledge	and	virtues	such	as	 integrity,	
courage,	 temperance,	 and	 justice	 all	 seem	 necessary	 for	 human	 flourishing	 and	 are	 in	
Rasmussen’s	 view	 to	 be	 considered	 valuable	 in	 themselves	 as	 opposed	 to	 having	 the	
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status	of	mere	means	(Rasmussen,	1999,	p.	14).	Furthermore	Rasmussen	mentions	that	
each	 is	 but	 one	 of	 the	 components	 of	 flourishing	 and	 because	 human	 flourishing	 is	
individualised	each	one	must	be	achieved,	maintained,	and	enjoyed	in	a	way	that	allows	
them	 to	 be	 ‘integrated	 with	 everything	 else	 that	 makes	 up	 the	 flourishing	 life	 of	 the	
individual	 whose	 flourishing	 we	 are	 talking	 about’	 (Rasmussen,	 1999,	 p.	 14).	 For	
Rasmussen	human	flourishing	is	clearly	linked	to	the	individual	and	goods	and	virtues	are	
achieved	 via	 considering	 one’s	 set	 of	 ‘circumstances,	 talents,	 endowments,	 interests,	
beliefs,	 and	 histories	 that	 descriptively	 characterize	 the	 individual	 [including	 that]	
individual’s	 community	 and	 culture’	 (Rasmussen,	1999,	p.	 14).	Now	 this	particular	 view	









a	 serious	 critique	 of	 the	 role	 of	 nature	 in	 human	 flourishing	 labelled	 the	 ‘naturalistic	






in	 terms	 of	 facts	 pertaining	 to	 their	 nature’	 (Rasmussen,	 1999,	 p.	 33).	 Furthermore	 it	
reveals	 that	 ‘for	 the	 class	 of	 beings	 that	 have	 natural	 ends	 or	 functions,	 goodness	 is	
ontological	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 is	 a	potentiality	 that	 is	 actualised’	 (Rasmussen,	1999,	p.	
33).	What	Rasmussen	stipulates	here	is	quite	controversial	because	it	means	that	‘it	is	not	




Whilst	 Rasmussen’s	 account	 provides	 a	 good	 entry	 point	 to	 human	 flourishing	 and	
therefore	is	relevant	to	our	enquiry	into	wonder	there	are	potential	problems	associated	
with	his	view.	
	 The	 first	 concern	 I	 shall	 voice	 is	 related	 to	 Rasmussen’s	 idea	 that	 a	 full	
examination	of	human	nature	may	reveal	only	what	is	basically	and	generically	good	for	
human	beings	 in	 terms	of	 their	 flourishing.	 Essentially	 I	 think	Rasmussen	 is	 right	 about	
this	 but	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 it	 is	 hard	 if	 not	 impossible	 to	 know	when	one	has	
reached	a	full	or	 just	sufficient	understanding	of	human	nature.	Thus	 it	 is	essential	 that	
one	 should	 continue	 to	examine	human	nature	 as	 it	 could	potentially	 reveal	 important	
and	 yet	 unrecognised	 features	 of	 our	 shared	 human	 nature	 and	 may	 give	 us	 a	 more	
detailed	account	of	what	we	should	care	about	 in	 relation	to	 the	kinds	of	creatures	we	
are	and	how	we	flourish	in	the	widest	possible	understanding.		
	 The	 second	 concern	 I	 have	 about	 Rasmussen’s	 account	 of	 human	 flourishing	 is	
about	 his	 idea	 that	 individual	 flourishing	 is	 achieved	 via	 considering	 one’s	 set	 of	
circumstances,	 talents,	 endowments,	 interests,	 beliefs,	 and	 histories	 that	 descriptively	
characterise	 the	 individual	 including	 that	 individual’s	 community	 and	 culture.	
Rasmussen’s	view	seems	agreeable	but	could	perhaps	benefit	from	further	specification.	
To	 illustrate	 this	 one	might	 for	 example	 focus	 on	 the	 problem	 concerning	 the	 task	 of	
finding	 out	 one’s	 talents	 and	 endowments,	 which	 can	 be	 hard	 to	 determine	 with	





discouraged	 from	 further	 education,	 never	would	 have	 pursued	 a	 career	 in	 philosophy	
and	consequently	later	on	never	have	written	about	his	‘Wonder	Full	Life’	in	the	inspiring	
way	 that	 he	does.	 This	 example	 illustrates	 potential	 problems	with	 these	 sorts	 of	 tests	
and	how	they	are	used	as	guides	in	people’s	lives.	Regardless	of	the	quality	of	a	particular	
test	and	the	quality	of	its	application	it	can	be	ventured	that	the	results	it	delivers	must	
always	 be	 met	 with	 a	 critical	 eye.	 The	 danger	 is	 that	 the	 result	 is	 taken	 to	 be	 a	 fact	
understood	as	something	absolute	and	unchangeable	over	time	and	so	can	be	used	with	
certainty	 to	 determine	 the	 future	 for	 a	 person.	Wonder	 is	 called	 for	 because	 it	 can	 be	
argued	 that	such	a	 test	aims	 to	 flesh	 the	very	nature	of	a	person,	which	 is	problematic	
because	the	person	who	is	tested	is	situated	in	a	spot	between	actuality	and	potentiality.	
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Who	 is	 to	 say	 for	 sure	how	a	person	can	develop	and	 to	what	extent	past	and	current	
challenges	cannot	be	overcome	and	extend	a	person’s	flourishing?	This	points	to	the	idea	
that	 if	 one	 does	 not	 wonder	 at	 attempts	 claiming	 certainty	 about	 one’s	 talents	 or	
endowments	it	could	potentially	have	a	colossal	negative	influence	on	one’s	flourishing.	
	 A	 similar	 point	 about	 criticality	 can	 be	 made	 about	 Rasmussen’s	 emphasis	 on	
community	and	culture	in	his	approach	to	human	flourishing,	which	brings	me	to	my	third	
and	final	concern	in	relation	to	Rasmussen’s	account	of	human	flourishing.		
	 To	 recapitulate	 Rasmussen	 thinks	 that	 goods	 and	 virtues	 are	 achieved	 via	
considering	 one’s	 set	 of	 circumstances,	 talents,	 endowments,	 interests,	 beliefs,	 and	
histories	 that	 descriptively	 characterise	 the	 individual	 including	 that	 individual’s	
community	and	culture	(Rasmussen,	1999,	p.	14).	In	this	regard	I	think	it	 is	necessary	to	
depict	 in	 greater	 detail	 in	 what	 sense	 communities	 and	 in	 particular	 culture	 influence	
one’s	 flourishing.	 For	 example	 most	 people	 would	 agree	 that	 having	 good	 health	 is	
valuable	 to	 human	 flourishing	 but	 how	 health	 is	 understood	 and	 how	 it	 is	 positioned	
amongst	 the	 various	 other	 goods	 in	 terms	 of	 importance	 may	 differ	 from	 culture	 to	
culture.	 To	 give	 an	 example,	 consider	 the	 ancient	 state	 of	 Sparta	 which,	 owing	 to	 its	
militaristic	 focus,	 viewed	health	and	 fitness	of	 the	citizens	 to	be	of	utmost	 importance.	
This	 entailed	 that	 children	 were	 examined	 for	 their	 health	 and	 fitness	 and	 those	 that	
were	 considered	 ‘puny	 and	 deformed’	 were	 thrown	 into	 a	 chasm	 to	 die,	 effectively	
practising	a	 form	of	eugenics	 (Cartledge,	2001,	p.	84)	 (Richard,	2005).	Furthermore,	 the	
primary	obligation	for	a	Spartan	citizen	was	to	be	a	good	soldier	whose	worth	exceeded	
that	of	several	men	belonging	to	other	cities	 (Connolly,	2006,	p.	38).	 It	 is	quite	possible	
that	given	 this	particular	 culture	his	view	of	health	differs	 significantly	 from	that	of	 the	
average	person	today.	This	example	clearly	illustrates	the	importance	and	role	of	culture	
in	 depicting	what	makes	 a	 ‘good’	 good,	 and	 its	 influence	 on	 human	 flourishing.	 As	 the	
anthropologist	Adam	Kuper	points	out	in	his	book	Culture:	The	Anthropologist’s	Account:	
‘Cultural	 identity	 can	 never	 provide	 an	 adequate	 guide	 for	 living.	 We	 have	 multiple	
identities,	and	even	if	we	have	a	primary	one	we	may	not	want	to	conform	to	it’	(Kuper,	
2000,	 p.	 247)	What	 Kuper	 in	 effect	 is	 stating	 is	 that	when	 one	 is	 concerned	with	 how	
human	beings	may	flourish	it	is	important	to	adopt	a	critical	attitude	to	culture	including	
the	culture	one	is	situated	in.		





of	human	 flourishing,	but	 I	 think	 it	 strange	 that	Rasmussen	 says	nothing	about	wonder	
and	the	individual’s	capacity	for	wonder	because	when	it	comes	to	the	kind	of	individual	
flourishing	 he	 advocates	 there	 is	 indeed	 much	 for	 the	 individual	 to	 wonder	 about	
including	 what	 human	 nature	 consists	 of	 and	 in	 what	 sense	 such	 a	 nature	 demands	









idea	 that	 we	 are	 vulnerable	 dependent	 rational	 animals	 with	 the	 ability	 to	 become	
independent	 practical	 reasoners.	MacIntyre’s	 contribution	 to	 the	 debate	 about	 human	
flourishing	 is	 important	 to	our	present	 investigation	about	wonder	because	he	 furthers	
the	 enquiry	 into	 human	 nature	 and	 what	 we	 have	 in	 common	 rather	 than	 where	 we	
differ.	Dependent	Rational	Animals	is	in	MacIntyre’s	own	words	a	work	of	correction	and	
signals	a	departure	from	his	earlier	approach	to	moral	philosophy	(MacIntyre,	1999,	p.x).	
One	 significant	 departure	 involves	 the	 attempt	 to	 integrate	 what	 he	 calls	 Aristotle’s	
metaphysical	biology62	 in	his	approach	 to	ethics,	which	 is	a	notion	he	 repudiated	 in	his	
earlier	 book	 After	 Virtue.	 What	 this	 means	 is	 that	 instead	 of	 attempting	 to	 give	 an	
account	of	virtue	 that	situates	virtue	within	social	practices,	 the	 lives	of	 individuals	and	
the	 lives	 of	 communities	 (which	 was	 the	 focus	 in	 After	 Virtue)	 Dependent	 Rational	













settle	 the	 debate	 on	 human	 flourishing.	 The	 debate	 is	 ongoing	 and	 MacIntyre’s	 book	
contains	as	he	admits	a	good	deal	of	unfinished	philosophical	business	(MacIntyre,	1999,	
p.	xii).	Given	the	limited	space	available	for	our	purposes	here	I	will	present	a	selection	of	
important	 points	 put	 forth	 by	 MacIntyre	 that	 can	 contribute	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	











also	 been	 utilised	 in	 naming	 a	 class	 consisting	 only	 of	 nonhuman	 animals	 (MacIntyre,	





argues	 that	 just	 like	 human	beings	 some	 animals	 such	 as	 dolphins	 have	 intentions	 and	
reasons	for	action	and	that	these	highly	intelligent	animals	are	able	to	pursue	goods	such	
as	 learning	how	to	 interact	with	other	dolphins	 (and	sometimes	human	beings)	 in	ways	
that	 contribute	 towards	 their	 flourishing	 (MacIntyre,	1999,	p.	 22).	Concerning	 the	 term	
‘flourishing’	 MacIntyre	 explains	 further	 that	 he	 is	 committed	 to	 give	 in	 some	 form	 a	
naturalistic	account	of	what	is	good	for	a	particular	species.	However	he	does	this	in	the	
spirit	of	caution	as	he	does	not	think	the	meaning	of	‘good’	can	be	produced	solely	from	a	




p.	 79).	 In	 this	 sense	 he	 seems	 sceptical	 towards	 an	 account	 of	 the	 good	 following	 an	
investigation	of	nature,	but	at	the	same	time	he	seems	critical	towards	purely	subjective	
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most	 often	 to	 others	 that	we	 owe	 our	 survival,	 let	 alone	 our	 flourishing,	 as	we	




It	 seems	 quite	 clear	 from	 the	 quotation	 that	MacIntyre	 thinks	 human	 beings	 are	 both	
vulnerable	and	dependent.	Furthermore	he	believes	that	it	is	often	to	others	we	owe	our	
survival	and	flourishing.	In	addition	the	quotation	offers	a	list	of	‘encounters’	highlighting	






	 By	 stating	 that	 human	 beings	 may	 encounter	 ‘mental	 defect	 and	 disturbance’	
MacIntyre	also	points	to	a	vulnerable	mental	dimension	of	human	existence.	Recognising	
that	 we	 are	 mental	 creatures	 and	 that	 this	 part	 is	 vulnerable	 is	 significant	 for	 our	
flourishing.	To	illustrate	just	how	we	are	vulnerable	in	a	mental	sense	one	might	point	to	
the	 symptoms	 people	 experience	 in	 relation	 to	 workplace	 stress.	 According	 to	 Work	
Stress,	 the	 UK	 National	 Work	 Stress	 Network,	 stress	 at	 work	 cause	 everything	 from	
irritability,	 aggressiveness,	 isolation	 and	 insomnia	 to	 raised	 blood	 pressure,	 stomach	
disorders,	 anxiety	 and	 low	 self-esteem	 (WorkStress	 &	 Network,	 2011).	 To	 experience	
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symptoms	 such	 as	 these	 clearly	 indicates	 a	 vulnerable	mental	 dimension,	 which	 could	
compromise	our	flourishing.		
	 Continuing	to	draw	on	the	social	dimension	of	human	life	MacIntyre	also	refers	to	
human	 aggression	 and	 neglect	 as	 factors	 that	 expose	 our	 vulnerability.	 We	 flourish	
amongst	other	people	but	it	is	not	always	that	other	people	provide	the	support	we	need	
in	 order	 to	 flourish.	 A	 child	 born	 into	 an	 abusive	 family	 where	 she	 faces	 inadequate	
nutrition	and	violence	would	testify	to	this	effect.	This	example	shows	how	human	beings	
as	 social	 creatures	 are	 vulnerable	 and	 how	 neglect	 from	 fellow	 human	 beings	 may	
influence	our	flourishing	negatively.	
	 I	 shall	 now	 turn	 to	 address	 a	 third	 point	 in	 MacIntyre’s	 philosophy,	 which	 is	
concerned	with	the	importance	of	becoming	an	independent	practical	reasoner	and	how	
the	development	of	virtues	makes	this	possible.	
	 Human	beings	 share	 their	 practical	 lives	 and	 in	order	 to	 flourish	 as	 the	 kinds	of	
beings	we	are	we	pursue	goods.	MacIntyre	explains	that	what	is	‘good’	is	what	we	ascribe	
to	 what	 benefits	 humans	 as	 the	 kind	 of	 creatures	 they	 are	 and	 what	 benefits	 human	
beings	in	virtue	of	their	particular	roles	within	particular	contexts	of	practice	(MacIntyre,	
1999,	p.	65).	However	as	there	are	many	different	kinds	of	goods	we	are	forced	to	make	
choices,	 which	 (for	 better	 or	 worse)	 arises	 from	 the	 human	 capacity	 for	 evaluating	



















There	 is	more	 to	be	 said	 about	 virtue	 and	 I	 shall	 address	 the	 topic	 further	 later	 in	 this	
chapter.	However	I	think	it	is	important	to	stress	that	there	is	a	moral	dimension	inherent	
to	the	kind	of	flourishing	advocated	here	and	it	shows	itself	by	paying	attention	to	human	
vulnerability,	 dependence	 and	 how	 our	 ability	 to	 function	 as	 independent	 practical	
reasoners	rises	from	the	development	of	virtues.	
	 I	will	now	raise	one	 last	point	about	MacIntyre’s	philosophy,	which	 is	concerned	
with	the	political	because	how	we	organise	ourselves	influences	our	flourishing.	What	is	
especially	noteworthy	about	MacIntyre’s	account	of	human	flourishing	 in	this	respect	 is	




102).	 Furthermore	MacIntyre	 argues	 that	 if	 we	 are	 not	 aware	 of	 these	 structures	 the	
quality	of	our	practical	judgement	and	reasoning	are	at	risk.	He	writes:	
	
	 The	 virtues	 which	 we	 need	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 both	 our	 own	 goods	 and	 the	
	 goods	of	others	through	participation	 in	such	networks	only	 function	as	genuine	











some	 of	 these	 relationships	 promote	 human	 flourishing	 and	 others	 do	 not.	Macintyre	
explains	that	some	relationships	are	constitutive	in	the	sense	that	without	them	it	would	
be	 impossible	 to	 attain	 or	 be	 sustained	 in	 attaining	 goods	 (MacIntyre,	 1999,	 p.	 102).	
Friendship	 for	 example	 qualifies	 as	 such.	However	 different	 kinds	 of	 relationships	 exist	
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that	 merely	 voice	 established	 hierarchies	 of	 power	 and	 the	 uses	 of	 power,	 which	 as	
dominating	 and	 depriving	 instruments	 often	 obstruct	 our	 movements	 toward	 goods	
(MacIntyre,	 1999,	 p.	 102-103).	 MacIntyre	 is	 concerned	 with	 dominating	 and	 abusive	
relationships	and	it	can	be	well	said	that	he	desires	for	human	kind	to	establish	a	social	
order	 or	 an	 ‘ecosystem’	 of	 human	 relationships	 that	 promotes	 the	 development	 of	
people	 capable	 of	 living	 flourishing	 lives,	 understood	 as	 people	 who	 can	 reason	
independently	and	practically	(MacIntyre,	1999,	p.105).	In	other	words	in	order	to	be	an	
independent	practical	reasoner	one	must	be	able	to	give	to	others	an	intelligible	account	
of	one’s	 reasoning.	 In	 this	 respect	MacIntyre	adds	 that	 the	 intelligible	account	 required	
need	 not	 be	 theoretical	 and	 one	 does	 not	 need	 to	 match	 the	 reasoning	 powers	 of	 a	
logician	 to	 be	 an	 independent	 practical	 reasoner	 (MacIntyre,	 1999,	 p.	 106).	MacIntyre	
explains	further	that	independent	practical	reasoners	are	concerned	with	means	and	not	
ends.	 Now	 does	 this	 mean	 that	 the	 logician	 is	 concerned	 with	 ends	 while	 practical	
reasoners	are	engaged	in	deliberations	on	means	only?	Not	quite,	because	according	to	
Macintyre	the	independent	practical	reasoner	can	deliberate	about	ends;	however	when	










have	 come	 to	 live	 out	 our	 lives.	 This	 brings	 us	 to	 an	 important	 passage	 in	MacIntyre’s	
book,	which	reads:	
	
If	 I	am	to	 flourish	 to	 the	 full	extent	 that	 is	possible	 for	a	human	being,	 then	my	
whole	 life	 has	 to	 be	 of	 a	 certain	 kind,	 one	 in	 which	 I	 not	 only	 engage	 in	 and	
achieve	 some	 measure	 of	 success	 in	 the	 activities	 of	 an	 independent	 practical	
reasoner,	 but	 also	 receive	 and	 have	 a	 reasonable	 expectation	 of	 receiving	 the	
attended	care	needed	when	I	am	very	young,	old	and	ill,	or	injured.	So	each	of	us	
achieves	 our	 good	 only	 if	 and	 insofar	 as	 others	 make	 our	 good	 their	 good	 by	
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Macintyre	highlights	 that	 for	 a	human	being	 to	 flourish	 to	 the	 fullest	 it	 is	 important	 to	






shall	 end	 my	 presentation	 on	 MacIntyre	 and	 continue	 to	 comment	 and	 criticise	 his	
approach	to	human	flourishing	insofar	as	it	is	relevant	to	wonder.	
	
Despite	 the	 advancements	 that	 MacIntyre	 offers	 his	 approach	 does	 not	 represent	 a	
complete	 account	 of	 human	 flourishing	 and	 there	 is	 room	 for	 improvement.	 One	 area	
that	might	require	more	attention	concerns	the	problem	of	giving	an	account	of	the	good.	
MacIntyre	is	committed	to	give	some	form	of	a	naturalistic	account	of	what	is	good	but	at	
the	 same	 time	 he	 does	 not	 think	 that	 such	 an	 account	 can	 be	 purely	 naturalistic.	 In	
addition	 he	 seems	 to	 be	 sceptical	 about	 individual	 accounts	 and	 accounts	 that	 are	





altogether	 different	 approach	 to	 human	 flourishing.	 Meanwhile	 let	 us	 consider	




out	 that	MacIntyre’s	 philosophy	 resembles	 in	 its	 outlook	on	morality	 too	much	 that	 of	




have	 the	 same	 aspirations	 for	 a	 complex	 modern	 multi-cultural	 city-state	 counting	
millions	 of	 subjects.	 In	 such	 societies	 social	 institutions,	 as	 anthropologist	 George	
Silberbauer	 explains,	 are	 highly	 elaborated,	 specialised	 and	 although	 integrated	 as	
components	 of	 the	whole	 socio-cultural	 system	 they	 are	 relatively	 separated	 from	 and	
impervious	to	one	another	(Silberbauer,	2001,	p.	17).	This	complicates	matters	to	such	a	





think	 that	 such	 corporations	will	 change	 their	 attitudes	 to	 profit	 and	 human	 capital	 in	
favour	 of	 approaches	 to	 those	 that	 incorporate	 the	 notion	 of	 human	 flourishing?	 This	
seems	hard	to	imagine	because	after	all	business	is	an	economic	pursuit	and	ethics	is	not	
the	 point	 of	 gravity	 in	 business	 operations	 (Silberbauer,	 2001,	 p.	 17).	 To	 counter	 the	
accusations	of	MacIntyre’s	outlook	being	utopian	 in	 this	case	one	might	argue	that	 it	 is	
possible	that	a	company	or	firm	can	be	supportive	of	human	flourishing	and	at	the	same	
time	 make	 profit.	 Imagine	 if	 a	 group	 of	 human	 flourishing	 supporters	 successfully	
campaigned	 against	 purely	 profit-orientated	 firms	 and	 start	 a	 trend	 amongst	 the	
population	 of	 a	 large-scale	 society	 that	 made	 citizens	 boycott	 purely	 profit-orientated	




possibility	 that	 having	 a	 successful	 profit-orientated	 business	 can	 coincide	 with	
advocating	human	flourishing.	In	this	sense	MacIntyre’s	‘utopia’	could	be	realised,	but	it	










relationships	 we	 are	 engaged	 in	 are	 crucial	 for	 our	 flourishing.	 Furthermore	 we	 must	
acknowledge	 that	 not	 all	 of	 these,	 be	 they	 family	 relationships	 or	 relationships	 with	
powerful	 large-scale	 institutions	 such	 as	 private	 corporations,	 religious	 communities	 or	
political	 movements	 necessarily	 support	 our	 flourishing.	 In	 this	 sense	 MacIntyre	
encourages	 us	 to	 evaluate	 how	we	organise	 ourselves	 in	 society	 and	 to	 think	 about	 to	
what	end	our	relationships	aspire.	
	 This	ends	the	commentary	on	MacIntyre	and	I	would	like	to	finish	by	saying	that	
overall	 I	 think	 MacIntyre’s	 contribution	 to	 the	 human	 flourishing	 debate	 is	 estimable	










as	 the	 ‘Capability	 Approach’	 or	 ‘Capabilities	 Approach’	 has	 evolved	 into	 a	 theoretical	
paradigm	(Nussbaum,	2011,	p.	ix).	Provisionally	the	approach	can	be	used	as	a	means	to	
comparative	 quality-of-life	 assessment	 and	 to	 theorising	 about	 basic	 social	 justice	 that	
holds	 central	 the	 question	 of	what	 each	 person	 is	 able	 to	 do	 and	 to	 be.	 The	 approach	
takes	each	person	to	be	an	end	and	is	not	merely	concerned	with	the	wellbeing	of	people	
but	also	what	opportunities	are	available	to	each	person	(Nussbaum,	2011,	p.	18).	In	this	
regard	 the	 approach	 offers	 an	 alternative	 to	 traditional	 quality	 of	 life	 models	 which	
promotes	 the	 notion	 that	 the	 quality	 of	 life	 of	 a	 nation	only	 improves	when	 the	Gross	
Domestic	Product	per	capita	increases	(Nussbaum,	1999,	p.	33;	2011,	p.x).	
	 Since	the	1990’s	The	Capabilities	Approach	has	enjoyed	increased	popularity	and	
has	had	an	 impact	on	 international	agencies	concerned	with	welfare	such	as	 the	World	
Bank	and	United	Nations	Development	Programme.	Most	nations	now	produce	their	own	
capability-studies	of	the	wellbeing	of	people	in	different	regions	and	groups	in	their	own	
societies	 (Nussbaum,	 2011,	 p.	 x).	 Testifying	 also	 to	 this	 increased	 popularity	 are	 the	
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numerous	articles	and	books	on	the	topic	and	the	launch	of	the	Human	Development	and	
Capability	 Association	 in	 2004.63	 The	 association	 has	 an	 annual	 meeting,	 publishes	 a	
journal	labelled	the	Journal	of	Human	Development	and	Capabilities	and	sponsors	a	wide	












the	 following	 focus	on	the	 ‘thick,	vague	conception	of	 the	good’	and	what	she	calls	 the	
basic	 list	 of	 human	 functional	 capabilities	 formulated	 in	 her	 article	 ‘Aristotelian	 Social	
Democracy’	 (Nussbaum,	1990).	 In	order	 to	appreciate	Nussbaum’s	position	 it	 is	 vital	 to	






the	 good	 provides	 a	measure	 for	 actions	 and	 viewpoints.	 However	 conceptions	 of	 the	
good	 vary	 among	human	beings	 and	 there	 are	 different	 opinions	 about	what	 the	 right	
conception	 of	 the	 good	 is.	 In	 order	 to	 solve	 this	 problem	 philosophers	 have	 sought	 to	
justify	their	conception	of	the	good	by	referring	to	abstract	formulas,	which	would	leave	






















M.	Alexander	has	 expressed	 it	 ‘could	be	 compatible	with	different	moral,	 religious	 and	
philosophical	doctrines’	(Alexander,	2008,	p.	66).	Nussbaum	explains	that	her	approach	is:	
	
Both	 internal	 to	 human	 history	 and	 strongly	 evaluative	 and	 its	 aim	 is	 to	 be	 as	
universal	as	possible,	to	set	down	the	basis	for	our	recognition	of	members	of	very	
different	 traditions	 as	 human	 across	 religious	 and	 metaphysical	 gulfs.	 […]	 The	
account	 is	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 process	 of	 self-interpretation	 and	 self-clarification	
that	 makes	 use	 of	 the	 story-telling	 imagination	 far	 more	 than	 the	 scientific	
intellect.	The	basic	idea	of	the	thick	vague	theory	is	that	we	tell	ourselves	stories	
of	 the	 general	 outline	 or	 structure	 of	 the	 life	 of	 a	 human	 being.	 We	 ask	 and	

















is	 a	 first	 approximation	 to	what	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 part	 of	 any	 human	 being’s	 life	 and	 is	








certain	extent	mortality	 is	what	defines	and	 set	 the	 framework	 for	humans.	 Should	we	
encounter	 an	 immortal	 anthropomorphic	 being	 (as	 Nussbaum	 calls	 it)	 ‘its	 way	 of	 life	
would	be	so	different	from	our	own	that	we	had	to	categorise	it	differently’	(Nussbaum,	
1990,	p.	219).	The	same	would	happen	if	we	encountered	‘a	mortal	being	that	showed	no	
tendency	 to	 avoid	 death	 or	 to	 seek	 to	 continue	 its	 life’	 (Nussbaum,	 1990,	 p.	 219).	We	
















1. Hunger	and	thirst.	Despite	small	variations	 in	the	diets	being	situated	 in	a	particular	
culture	 all	 human	beings	 are	 equally	 dependent	 on	 food	 and	drink	 in	 order	 to	 live.	
Furthermore,	 all	 human	 beings	 have	 appetites	 that	 are	 indices	 of	 need.	 Nussbaum	





2. Need	 for	 shelter.	 The	naked	human	body	 is	 fragile	and	without	protection	 from	the	
elements	unlike	so	many	of	our	fellow	animals	whose	furry	or	scaly	exterior	provides	
protection.	 It	 is	a	 fact	 that	 the	naked	human	being	would	not	survive	 for	 long	 in	an	
environment	without	 refuge	 from	 ‘excessive	heat	of	 the	 sun,	 from	 rain,	 from	wind,	
from	snow	and	frost’	(Nussbaum,	1990,	p.	220).		
3. Sexual	 desire.	 Even	 though	 sexual	 desire	 comes	 short	 of	 eating	 and	 drinking	 it	 is	 a	
feature	 in	 practically	 every	 human	 being’s	 life.	 To	 be	 asexual	 would	 be	 a	 sign	 of	 a	
being	 that	was	 far	 from	human	since	 ‘sexual	desire	 is	and	has	all	along	been	a	very	
strong	basis	 for	the	recognition	of	others	different	from	ourselves	as	human	beings’	
(Nussbaum,	1990,	p.	221).	
4. Mobility.	Human	beings	 are	partly	 constituted	by	our	 ability	 to	move	 from	place	 to	
place	and	 this	not	merely	with	 the	help	of	 the	vast	body	of	 transportation	we	have	
invented	but	also	with	the	aid	of	‘our	very	own	bodies’	(Nussbaum,	1990,	221).	Not	to	
be	able	 to	move	or	being	prevented	 from	moving	 is	 a	 source	of	discontent	and	 ‘an	
anthropomorphic	 being	who	without	 disability,	 chose	 never	 to	move	 from	 birth	 to	





such	experiences	might	 vary	across	 cultural	borders	and	 the	experience	 itself	may	vary	
from	individual	to	individual	the	capacity	can	be	viewed	as	a	universal	human	trademark.	
Furthermore	 Nussbaum	 argues	 that	 the	 aversion	 to	 pain	 is	 a	 part	 of	 being	 human.	






All	 human	beings	have	 sense-perception,	 the	 ability	 to	 imagine	 and	 the	 ability	 to	 think	
and	making	distinctions.	Furthermore	Nussbaum	writes	with	a	reference	to	Aristotle	that	
we	have	the	ability	to	reach	out	for	understanding.	In	relation	to	this	if	a	group	of	people	








overlapping	 experience	 that	 is	 of	 great	 importance	 for	 the	 formation	 of	 emotions	 and	
desires,	 and	 that	 is	 a	 major	 source	 of	 our	 ability	 to	 see	 ourselves	 in	 the	 emotional	
experiences	of	those	whose	lives	are	otherwise	very	different	from	our	own’	(Nussbaum,	
1990,	 p.	 221).	 She	 furthermore	 argues	 that	 should	we	 encounter	 a	 group	 of	 apparent	
humans	and	discover	that	they	never	had	been	babies	or	did	not	know	of	the	experience	
of	dependency,	need	and	affection,	one	can	argue	that	‘their	form	of	life	was	sufficiently	




All	 human	 beings	 participate	 or	 at	 least	 try	 to	 participate	 in	managing	 their	 own	 lives.	
They	 form	or	acquire	a	conception	of	 the	good	and	 (more	or	 less)	 lay	out	a	 strategy	 in	
terms	 of	 how	 they	 should	 live.	 This	 involves	 being	 able	 ‘to	 choose,	 evaluate	 and	 to	
function	accordingly’	 (Nussbaum,	1990,	p.	222).	Bearing	 in	mind	the	diversity	of	human	













beings	 is	 shaped	 (in	 an	open	ended	way)	 by	what	we	 find	ourselves	 able	 to	 recognise’	
(Nussbaum,	1990,	p.	222).	Furthermore	Nussbaum	points	out	that	‘we	value	the	form	of	
life	that	is	constituted	by	these	recognitions	and	affiliations	–	we	live	to	and	with	others,	
and	 regard	 a	 life	 not	 lived	 in	 affiliation	 with	 others	 to	 be	 a	 life	 not	 worth	 living’	





Human	 beings	 represent	 one	 species	 among	 many	 other	 different	 species	 including	
plants.	We	live	as	Nussbaum	says	in	a	complex	interlocking	ordered	universe	(Nussbaum,	
1990,	p.	222).	This	both	supports	us	and	limits	us	in	many	ways	but	what	is	important	to	
recognise	 is	 the	 fact	 that	we	 are	 dependent	 on	 this	 particular	 order	 and	many	 human	
beings	 find	 that	 we	 owe	 this	 order	 respect	 and	 concern.	 Nussbaum	 argues	 a	 creature	







conception	of	humanness	or	 to	acknowledge	a	 fundamental	gulf	 in	 forms	of	 life	among	









Human	 beings	 regardless	 of	 their	 culture	 and	 place	 of	 living	 have	 a	 tendency	 to	make	
room	for	recreation	and	laughter.	Human	beings	are	recognised	as	the	animal	who	laughs	
and	 Nussbaum	 states	 furthermore	 that	 ‘laughter	 and	 play	 are	 frequently	 among	 the	
deepest	 and	also	 the	 first	modes	of	our	mutual	 recognition’	 (Nussbaum,	1990,	p.	 223).	
Children	play	and	laugh	in	Africa	as	well	as	in	Norway.	It	is	not	a	feature	connected	to	a	
specific	culture	or	race.	Should	one	encounter	a	child	unable	to	laugh	and	play	then	surely	
it	would	be	a	 sign	of	a	deep	disturbance.	Should	 this	 situation	be	permanent	 then	 ‘the	
consequence	may	be	that	we	will	prove	unable	to	consider	the	child	capable	of	leading	a	
fully	human	life’	(Nussbaum,	1990,	p.	223).	An	entire	society	deprived	of	this	ability	would	
seem	strange	and	 frightening	 to	us.	Nussbaum	argues:	 ‘We	certainly	do	not	want	a	 life	







beings.	 ‘If	 a	 person	 walks	 across	 the	 room,	 no	 other	 follows	 automatically.	 When	 we	
count	the	number	of	human	beings	 in	a	room,	we	have	no	difficulty	 figuring	out	where	
one	begins	and	the	other	ends’	(Nussbaum,	1990,	p.	223).	Nussbaum	argues	that	this	is	a	







Nussbaum	 writes	 ‘Due	 to	 separateness	 each	 human	 life	 has	 its	 own	 context	 and	
surroundings’	 (Nussbaum,	 1990).	 Objects,	 places,	 a	 history,	 particular	 friendships,	
locations,	sexual	ties	are	linked	to	the	individual	and	according	to	Nussbaum	this	is	how	a	
person	to	some	extent	is	able	to	identify	herself.	Nussbaum	acknowledges	that	societies	




There	 is	no	 life,	 short	of	 a	 life	of	 total	 imprisonment,	 and	perhaps	
not	even	that	life,	that	really	does	fail	to	say	the	words	“mine”	and	
“not-mine”	in	some	idiosyncratic	and	non-shared	way.	What	I	touch,	
use,	 love,	 respond	 to,	 I	 touch,	 use,	 love,	 respond	 to	 from	my	own	








This	 concludes	 Nussbaum’s	 first	 approximation	 about	 what	 seemingly	 is	 a	 part	 of	 any	
human	 life.	 From	 this	 vantage	 point	 Nussbaum	moves	 on	 to	 the	 second	 stage	 of	 her	
approach	 and	 sets	 out	 to	 ‘specify	 vaguely	 certain	 basic	 functionings	 that	 should,	 as	
constitutive	 of	 human	 life	 concern	 us’	 (Nussbaum,	 1993,	 p.	 224).	 The	 result	 is	 a	 list	 of	
basic	human	functional	capabilities,	which	is	central	to	Nussbaums’s	work	and	because	of	
its	 centrality	 to	 her	 outlook	 and	 because	 I	 will	 refer	 back	 to	 it	 later	 in	 this	 chapter	 in	
connection	with	wonder	I	will	in	what	immediately	follows	cite	but	not	comment	on	the	






2. Bodily	health.	Being	able	 to	have	good	health,	 including	reproductive	health;	
to	be	adequately	nourished;	to	have	adequate	shelter.	
3. Bodily	 integrity.	Being	able	 to	move	 freely	 from	place	 to	place;	 to	be	 secure	
against	violent	assault,	including	sexual	assault	and	domestic	violence;	having	
opportunities	for	sexual	satisfaction	and	for	choice	in	matters	of	reproduction.	
4. Senses,	 imagination,	 and	 thought.	Being	 able	 to	 use	 the	 senses,	 to	 imagine,	






use	 imagination	and	 thought	 in	 connection	with	experiencing	 and	producing	
works	and	events	of	one’s	own	choice,	religious,	literacy,	musical,	and	so	forth.	
Being	able	to	use	one’s	mind	in	ways	protected	by	guarantees	of	freedom	of	
expression	with	 respect	 to	both	political	and	artistic	 speech,	and	 freedom	of	
religious	 exercise.	 Being	 able	 to	 have	 pleasurable	 experiences	 and	 to	 avoid	
nonbeneficial	pain.	
5. Emotions.	 Being	 able	 to	 have	 attachments	 to	 things	 and	 people	 outside	
ourselves;	to	love	those	who	love	and	care	for	us,	to	grieve	at	their	absence;	in	





critical	 reflection	about	 the	planning	of	 one’s	 life	 (This	 entails	 protection	 for	
the	liberty	of	conscience	and	religious	observance).	
7. Affiliation.	 (A)	 Being	 able	 to	 live	 with	 and	 toward	 others,	 to	 recognise	 and	
show	 concern	 for	 other	 human	 beings,	 to	 engage	 in	 various	 forms	 of	 social	
interaction;	 to	 be	 able	 to	 imagine	 the	 situation	 of	 another.	 (Protecting	
institutions	 that	 constitute	 and	 nourish	 such	 forms	 of	 affiliation,	 and	 also	
protecting	the	freedom	of	assembly	and	political	speech.)	(B)	Having	the	social	
bases	 of	 self-respect	 and	 nonhumiliation;	 being	 able	 to	 be	 treated	 as	 a	
dignified	being	whose	worth	is	equal	to	that	of	others.	This	entails	provisions	
of	 nondiscrimination	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 race,	 sex,	 sexual	 orientation,	 ethnicity,	
caste,	religion,	national	origin.	





protection	 of	 free	 speech	 and	 association.	 (B)	 Material.	 Being	 able	 to	 hold	
property	(both	land	and	movable	goods),	and	having	property	rights	on	an	equal	
basis	with	 others;	 having	 the	 freedom	 from	unwarranted	 search	 and	 seizure.	 In	
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	 To	 fully	 appreciate	 Nussbaum’s	 work	 it	 is	 important	 to	 understand	 what	 she	
means	by	capability	and	functioning.	In	Nussbaum’s	term,	capabilities	refer	to	a	person’s	
abilities	 (internal	 capabilities)	 but	 also	 to	 ‘the	 freedoms	 or	 opportunities	 created	 by	 a	
combination	 of	 personal	 abilities	 and	 the	 political,	 social	 and	 economic	 environment	
(combined	 capabilities)(Nussbaum,	 2011,	 p.	 20,21).	 Functionings	 are	 different	 from	
capabilities	and	she	describes	them	as	active	realisations	of	one	or	more	capabilities.	 In	
other	words	 functionings	 give	 capabilities	 their	 end	 (Nussbaum,	2011,	p.	 20,25).	 This	 is	
important	 to	 Nussbaum	 because	 a	 society	 might	 successfully	 promote	 internal	
capabilities	but	‘cut	off	the	avenues	through	which	people	actually	have	the	opportunity	
to	function	in	accordance	with	those	capabilities	(Nussbaum,	2011,	p.	21).		














which	 is	 to	 say	 she	 is	 for	 diversity	 of	 value	 but	 not	 relativistic	 about	 value.	What	 this	
means	is	that	she	does	not	want	all	of	us	to	be	the	same	but	at	the	same	time	she	insists	
that	 there	 are	 certain	 kinds	 of	 lives	 that	 if	 measured	 against	 the	 list	 of	 basic	 human	
functional	 capabilities	 simply	 do	 not	 flourish	 as	much	 as	 others.	 Secondly	Nussbaum	 is	
concerned	with	what	she	calls	entrenched	social	 injustice	and	 inequality	which	 is	to	say	
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that	 she	 is	 concerned	with	 the	 lives	 of	 people	who	 because	 of	 a	 particular	 cultural	 or	
political	 environment	 are	 being	 ‘socialised	 or	 forced	 into	 a	 particular	 way	 of	 life	 that	
compromises	 their	 flourishing’.	 Nussbaum’s	 work	 is	 very	 much	 concerned	 with	 social	





One	may	seek	 to	criticise	Nussbaum’s	approach	by	venturing	 that	 it	 is	merely	a	human	
rights	 approach	 in	 new	 clothing.	 This	 is	 an	 understandable	 criticism	 because	 both	 the	
human	 rights	 approach	and	Nussbaum’s	position	 accept	 that	by	 virtue	of	 being	human	
people	 have	 particular	 entitlements	 and	 that	 it	 is	 worthwhile	 respecting	 such	
entitlements.	Nevertheless	 there	are	differences	between	 the	 two	approaches	and	one	
significant	difference	is	that	Nussbaum’s	approach	acknowledges	that	nonhuman	animals	













all	parents,	 cultures	and	national	values	and	so	 forth	promote	human	 flourishing	and	 if	
they	do	not	we	must	ask	ourselves	why	they	should	be	respected.	
	 Another	potential	problem	with	Nussbaum’s	contribution	to	our	understanding	of	









threshold’	 is	 ambiguous.	 This	 could	 be	 problematic	 because	 unless	 Nussbaum’s	 list	 of	









endorsement	of	universal	values.	 Indeed,	 it	appears	to	endorse	explicitly	at	 least	
one	universal	value,	the	value	of	having	the	opportunity	to	think	and	choose	for	
oneself.	Thinking	about	paternalism	gives	a	strong	reason	to	respect	the	variety	of	
ways	 citizens	 actually	 choose	 to	 lead	 their	 lives	 in	 a	 pluralistic	 society,	 and	
therefore	 to	prefer	 a	 form	of	 universalism	 that	 is	 compatible	with	 freedom	and	
choice	of	most	significant	sorts.	But	religious	toleration,	associative	freedom,	and	
the	 other	 major	 liberties	 are	 themselves	 universal	 values.	 They	 require	 a	




Nussbaum’s	 defence	 points	 out	 something	 important	 about	 her	 approach	 and	 the	
pluralistic	 society	 she	 advocates,	 which	 is	 that	 a	 pluralistic	 society	 depends	 on	 the	
recognition	that	we	wish	to	make	choices	 for	ourselves	and	that	we	do	not	want	other	
people	 to	make	 choices	 for	us,	which	 spells	 out	 a	universal	 value	 important	 to	 all	who	
embrace	pluralism.		
	 Further	 criticism	 of	 Nussbaum’s	 approach	 has	 been	 brought	 forward	 by	
philosopher	Philip	McReynolds	who	thinks	that	 it	 is	problematic	that	Nussbaum	focuses	
on	what	he	calls	public	choices	 in	order	to	help	 individuals	achieve	their	own	 individual	
goods	without	offering	any	strategy	for	how	to	actually	achieve	those	goods.	McReynolds	





(McReynolds,	 2002,	 p.	 148).	 In	 defence	 of	 Nussbaum	 one	 might	 point	 out	 that	 her	
approach	is	simply	not	designed	to	solve	individual	moral	dilemmas	but	it	helps	us	realise	
our	common	humanity	and	how	we	may	flourish	as	human	beings.	One	could	of	course	




that	 some	ways	 can	be	 rightly	 criticised	and	categorised	as	 stupid,	pernicious	and	 false	
(Nussbaum,	 1993,	 p.	 261).	 This	 is	 grounded	 in	 Nussbaum’s	 acknowledgement	 of	
Aristotle’s	work	and	the	importance	of	practical	reason	and	virtues	in	human	flourishing	





This	 concludes	 the	 presentation	 of	 Nussbaum’s	 approach	 to	 human	 flourishing	 and	
because	her	approach	also	represents	 the	 last	contemporary	view	of	human	flourishing	
presented	 in	 this	 chapter	 this	 gives	 me	 an	 opportunity	 to	 summarise	 the	 picture	 of	
human	 flourishing	 that	 has	 emerged.	 We	 started	 by	 looking	 at	 Rasmussen’s	 view	 of	
flourishing	and	here	we	were	 introduced	to	six	 important	features	of	human	flourishing	
informing	us	that	human	flourishing	is	objective,	 inclusive,	 individualised,	agent-relative,	
self-directed,	 social	 and	 emphasises	 practical	 wisdom,	 virtue	 and	 an	 appeal	 to	 human	
nature	 in	 its	 formulation.	MacIntyre	 added	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 human	 flourishing	
given	 his	 attention	 to	 animality,	 vulnerability	 and	 dependency	 and	 advanced	 our	
understanding	 of	 human	 flourishing	 by	 pointing	 out	 the	 complexity	 of	 being	 a	 social	
creature	 and	 the	 significance	 of	 being	 involved	 in	 relationships	 that	 are	 supportive	 of	
human	 flourishing.	 Furthermore	MacIntyre	 emphasises	 the	 importance	of	 becoming	 an	
independent	practical	reasoner	and	how	virtues	make	this	possible.	He	also	presented	us	
with	 some	difficulties	about	human	 flourishing	 including	 the	problem	of	gaining	a	 clear	
view	of	what	human	flourishing	is.	According	to	MacIntyre	it	is	important	to	be	sceptical	
about	 appeals	 to	 nature,	 the	 subjective	 or	 culture	 with	 respect	 to	 portraying	 human	
flourishing.	Macintyre’s	 scepticism	 is	 apt	but	unfortunately	 it	 leads	 to	what	 I	 labelled	a	
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stalemate	and	the	challenge	of	how	to	 further	our	understanding	of	human	flourishing.	
Lastly	 we	 looked	 at	 Nussbaum’s	 approach	 to	 human	 flourishing,	 which	 involves	 the	
formulation	of	a	‘thick	vague	conception	of	the	good’	and	a	‘basic	list	of	human	functional	




changeable	 and	 can	 be	 improved.	 I	 think	 that	 from	 the	 examination	 of	 the	 three	
contemporary	views	of	human	flourishing	a	picture	has	emerged	that	can	sufficiently	aid	














	 Literacy	 can	be	 considered	 a	 source	of	 human	 flourishing	because	 the	 ability	 to	




addition	 the	 independent	 charity	 organisation	 The	 National	 Literacy	 Trust	 states	 that	
literacy	has	a	 significant	 impact	on	a	person’s	happiness	and	 success	and	 if	 a	person	 is	
equipped	with	good	 literacy	 skills	 she	 is	not	only	better	equipped	 to	 take	advantage	of	
opportunities	 that	 life	 offers	 but	 also	 ‘more	 likely	 to	 have	 higher	 self-esteem,	 better	
health,	 better	 jobs	 and	 higher	 wages	 than	 those	 with	 poor	 literacy	 skills’	
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argue	 that	 there	 is	mounting	 evidence	 from	 psychology	 and	medicine	 stating	 that	 our	
attitudes	towards	friendship	are	important	and	influence	individual	wellness,	vitality	and	
longevity	 (Compton	 &	 Hoffman,	 2013,	 p.	 132).	 Founder	 of	 the	 positive	 psychology	
movement	Psychologist	Martin	Seligman	is	of	a	similar	attitude	as	he	thinks	friendship	to	
be	 a	 strong	 asset	 to	 health	 (Seligman,	 2011,	 p.	 209).	 However	 as	 contemporary	
philosopher	 Mark	 Vernon	 argues	 in	 his	 book	 The	 Philosophy	 of	 Friendship	 the	 term	
‘friendship’	 is	 complex	 and	 ambiguous	 (Vernon,	 2005,	 p.	 2)	 and	 thus	we	must	 exercise	
caution	 in	 our	 appraisal.	 Aristotle	 recognises	 three	 kinds	 of	 friendship	 based	 on	 utility,	
pleasure	and	virtue	 in	 the	Nicomachean	Ethics	 and	argues	 that	 friendship	 is	one	of	 the	
most	 indispensible	requirements	of	 life	for	no	one	would	choose	to	 live	without	friends	
even	 if	 they	 had	 all	 other	 goods	 ready	 at	 their	 disposal	 (Aristotle,	 2003,	 VIII	 1).	 Yet	 he	
acknowledges	 that	what	 constitutes	 friendship	 is	 a	matter	 of	 controversy	 and	 ‘there	 is	
much	difference	of	opinion	as	to	the	nature	of	friendship’	(Aristotle,	2003,	VIII.	i.	6).	Given	
the	framework	of	this	thesis	I	do	not	have	the	liberty	to	engage	in	a	detailed	discussion	on	
what	 friendship	consists	of	but	 for	our	present	purposes	 it	will	also	suffice	 to	point	out	
that	 viewing	 friendship	 as	 a	 source	 of	 flourishing	 from	 a	 Neo-Aristotelian	 angle	 is	
definitely	a	possibility.	Given	 that	we	are	social	 creatures	 (which	Rasmussen,	Macintyre	
and	Nussbaum	advocate)	there	is	a	point	in	seeing	friendship	regardless	of	the	different	
ways	we	may	conceive	it	as	‘overlapping	expressions	of	the	same	family	of	shared	human	




that	 to	 view	 a	 friend	 as	 another	 self	 is	 to	 flag	 that	 one	 is	 able	 to	 see	 the	 other	 as	 an	
interpretation	or	perhaps	an	explanation	of	the	‘first	self’	in	the	same	way	a	mirror	image	






some	 aspects	 resemble	 computers	 or	 wolves	 or	 that	 there	 are	 overlaps	 but	 what	 is	
important	here	is	the	idea	that	from	looking	to	our	human	friends	we	can	discover	that	
we	 are	 creatures	 of	 a	 particular	 kind	which	 is	 important	 for	 our	 flourishing.	 From	 this	
position	 it	 seems	 quite	 clear	 that	 friendship	 can	 be	 a	 source	 of	 flourishing	 because	
besides	 promoting	 individual	 wellness,	 vitality,	 longevity	 and	 health	 friendship	 clearly	
helps	us	understand	ourselves.	
	
I	 will	 argue	 that	 humour	 or	 to	 have	 a	 sense	 of	 humour	 is	 likewise	 a	 source	 of	 human	
flourishing	seen	from	a	Neo-Aristotelian	perspective.	Compton	and	Hoffman	write	that	in	
general	having	a	good	sense	of	humour	 is	beneficial	and	can	help	people	 ‘recover	 from	
illness,	 cope	 with	 life	 stresses	 and	 anxiety	 about	 death,	 enhance	 immune	 system	
functioning,	 reduce	 the	 psychological	 experience	 of	 pain,	 and	 increase	 the	 chances	 of	
successful	 infertility	 treatments’	 (Compton	 &	 Hoffman,	 2013,	 p.	 137).	 It	 has	 also	 been	
argued	that	should	one	require	the	service	of	healthcare	workers	humour	continues	to	be	
important.	 The	 American	 nursing	 pioneer	 Virginia	 Henderson	 points	 out	 that	 ‘laughter	
and	humour	between	patients	and	healthcare	workers	can	be	as	good	as,	or	better	than,	
a	medication.	 It	can	create	a	warm	‘climate’,	promote	good	 interpersonal	 relationships,	






important	 to	 us	 in	 relation	 to	 our	 flourishing	 because	 as	 anthropologist	Mary	 Douglas	
points	out	 ‘A	 Joke	 is	a	play	upon	 form,	 that	affords	an	opportunity	 for	 realising	 that	an	
accepted	pattern	has	no	necessity’	(Douglas,	1975,	p.	96).	A	humorous	speech	can	also	be	
a	play	upon	form	and	help	us	realise	that	an	accepted	pattern	has	no	necessity.	Consider	





He	has	 ceased	 to	be,	bereft	of	 life,	he	 rests	 in	peace,	he	has	kicked	 the	bucket,	
hopped	the	twig,	bit	the	dust,	snuffed	it,	breathed	his	last,	and	gone	to	meet	the	
Great	Head	of	Light	Entertainment	 in	the	sky,	and	 I	guess	that	we’re	all	 thinking	

















famous	 speech	 show	 Cleese	 manages	 to	 bring	 laughter	 to	 his	 fellow	 mourners	 who	
probably	 never	 expected	 to	 be	 laughing	 at	 Chapman’s	 funeral.	 The	 humorous	 eulogy	











its	 positive	 impact	 on	 our	 health	 and	wellbeing.	 According	 to	 ‘The	 Benefits	 of	 Physical	
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Activity	 for	 Health	 and	 Well-being’	 issued	 by	 C3	 Collaborating	 for	 Health69	 exercise	
reduces	blood	pressure,	 improves	blood	 cholesterol	 levels	 and	 lowers	body	mass	 index	
(BMI).	Furthermore	 figures	 show	that	physical	 inactivity	 is	 the	 fourth-leading	 risk	 factor	
for	global	mortality	and	accounts	for	an	estimate	of	5.2	million	deaths	every	year	(C3	&	
Health,	 2012,	 p.	 4).	 Exercise	 also	 benefits	mental	 health	 including	 the	 improvement	 of	












suggests	 tactics	 for	 arguing	 with	 adversaries.	 The	 ethical	 imperative	 of	 aikido	








one	 could	 for	 example	 examine	 the	 rituals	 and	 etiquette	 involved	 in	 aikido	 or	 the	
influence	of	the	Omoto	religion70	on	the	art	for	guidance	(Young,	1988,	p.	281).	However	
in	 the	 following	 I	 shall	 focus	 on	 a	 quotation	 of	 the	 founder	 of	 aikido	Morihei	Ueshiba,	














We	 have	 now	 looked	 at	 four	 different	 possible	 sources	 of	 flourishing.	 Literacy	 seems	
important,	 as	 it	 is	 the	 basis	 of	 education	 and	 it	 improves	 people’s	 wellbeing	 in	 many	
aspects	of	life	including	health,	income	and	ability	to	contribute	to	peace	and	democracy.	
Friendship	counts	towards	flourishing	because	as	social	creatures	it	influences	individual	
wellness,	 vitality,	 longevity	 and	 health.	 Humour	 can	 also	 be	 a	 source	 of	 flourishing	
because	of	its	positive	effects	on	our	general	health	and	sense	of	wellbeing.	In	addition,	
having	a	 sense	of	humour	 can	help	us	hold	 critical	 attitudes	 towards	what	we	 take	 for	
granted	and	aid	us	in	finding	our	own	flourishing.	Physical	exercise	can	also	be	viewed	as	





This	 section	 attempts	 to	 give	 a	 preliminary	 account	 of	 why	 wonder	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	
source	of	flourishing.	Quite	in	tune	with	the	mythological	origin	of	wonder	we	might	view	
wonder	 as	 a	 courier,	 meaning	 that	 it	 is	 a	 state	 of	 mind	 that	 can	 deliver	 or	 introduce	
something	of	great	 value	 into	our	 lives.	 In	 this	 respect	 I	 shall	 look	 to	how	wonder	may	
facilitate	 other	 states	 of	 mind	 such	 as	 gratitude,	 reverence,	 an	 imaginative	 attitude,	
openness	 and	 humility	 all	 of	 which	 I	 shall	 argue	 can	 contribute	 to	 human	 flourishing.	
These	 candidates	 have	 been	 chosen	 not	 because	 they	 are	 the	 only	 possible	 effects	 of	
wonder	 that	 may	 contribute	 to	 our	 flourishing	 but	 because	 we	 have	 throughout	 this	
thesis	already	touched	on	each	of	them	in	some	form	or	other	in	relation	to	wonder	and	
flourishing.	Secondly	and	important	to	the	specific	focus	of	this	thesis	I	shall	argue	that	to	





flourishing	 let	 us	 begin	 by	 taking	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 what	 gratitude	 is.	 Keen	 holds	 that	
gratitude	is	‘joy’s	twin’	and	an	emotion	that	can	heal	bitterness	(Keen,	2010,	p.	91)	and	by	
recalling	 Nussbaum’s	 work	 we	 find	 that	 under	 point	 five	 on	 her	 list	 of	 basic	 human	
capabilities	 she	 presents	 gratitude	 as	 a	 human	 emotion,	 which	 alongside	 love,	 grief,	
longing	and	justified	anger	enables	us	to	have	attachments	to	things	and	people,	which	is	
crucial	to	our	flourishing.	
	 Additionally	 we	may	 highlight	 that	 positive	 psychologists	 such	 as	 Compton	 and	
Hoffman	praise	the	importance	of	gratitude	in	connection	with	flourishing	and	state	that	
gratitude	 at	 its	 core	has	 the	power	 to	bring	 about	 ‘positive	 connections	 among	people	
and	allow	us	to	express	our	highest	values	and	potential’	(Compton	&	Hoffman,	2013,	p.	
236)	 and	 that	 grateful	 people	 have	 a	 tendency	 to	 be	 happy	 and	 that	 gratitude	 is	
important	 for	 healthy	 personality	 functions	 (Compton	 &	 Hoffman,	 2013,	 p.	 237).	
Psychologists	Robert	A.	 Emmons	and	Charles	M.	 Sheldon	expand	on	 this	by	 stating	 the	
following:		
	
Grateful	 people	 may	 have	 more	 psychic	 manoeuvrability	 than	 the	 ungrateful,	
enabling	 them	 to	 be	 less	 defensive	 and	 open	 to	 life.	 [Gratitude	 is]	 a	 source	 of	




Key	 to	 Emmons	 and	 Sheldon’s	 view	 of	 gratitude	 as	 a	 source	 of	 flourishing	 is	 that	 it	



















gratitude	 can	be	 ‘associated	with	 reverent	wonder	 toward	an	acknowledgement	of	 the	
universe’	(Robert	A	Emmons	&	Shelton,	2002,	p.	460).	Thus	gratitude	links	to	the	ability	to	











that	 one	 extends	 it	 to	 some	 sort	 of	 sentient	 being	 be	 it	 a	 fellow	 human	 being,	 a	 non-
human	animal72	or	 a	presumed	deity.	 Likewise	when	we	 think	of	 something	as	 a	 gift	 it	
usually	implies	that	it	is	given	by	or	to	somebody.	From	this	standpoint	one	might	say	that	
feeling	 gratitude	 in	 relation	 to	 reverent	 wonder	 toward	 an	 acknowledgement	 of	 the	
universe	or	to	feel	gratitude	associated	with	an	acknowledgement	of	our	existence	as	an	
inexplicable	 gift	 is	 peculiar	 because	 in	 doing	 so	 we	 are	 expressing	 gratitude	 without	



























his	 gratitude	 in	 this	 respect	was	well	 placed	 because	 the	 event	 brought	 forth	 in	 him	 a	
sense	 of	 wonder	 or	 made	 him	 wonder	 in	 a	 particular	 way	 which	 contributed	 to	 the	
developing	 of	 an	 inquisitive	 mind	 and	 fostered	 attitudes	 central	 to	 his	 flourishing	
including	 ‘openness,	 availability,	 epistemological	 humility	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	mystery	 of	
being,	and	the	ability	to	admire	and	be	grateful’	(Keen,	1969,	p.	211-212).		
	 It	 can	 also	 be	 argued	 that	 wonder,	 gratitude	 and	 flourishing	 were	 brought	
together	in	Robert	Gleaves’	and	Pam	Glemmer’s	1998	reports	to	Leonid	MAC	concerning	
their	 experiences	 of	 the	 1966	 Leonid	meteor	 shower	which	 I	mentioned	 in	 the	 second	
chapter.	 Both	 Gleaves	 and	 Glemmer	 indicate	 in	 their	 reports	 that	 their	 individual	
experiences	 are	of	wonder	but	 it	might	 also	be	 suggested	 that	 their	 reports	 reveal	 the	
gratitude	they	harbour	for	having	experienced	the	meteor	shower.	Now	both	Gleaves	and	
Glemmer	do	not	use	the	word	‘gratitude’	directly	in	their	reports,	which	naturally	speaks	












shower.	 In	 support	 of	 this	 claim	 stands	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 wonder-joy-tears	 which	
psychologist	William	Braud	describes	as	tears	that	are:	
	
Accompanied	 by	 feelings	 of	 wonder,	 joy,	 gratitude,	 awe,	 yearning,	 poignancy,	






Wonder-joy-tears	 links	wonder	 and	 gratitude	 and	 if	we	 view	Gleaves’	 report	 in	 light	 of	
this	phenomenon	it	can	be	argued	that	he	is	experiencing	perhaps	a	mild	case	of	wonder-










orientates	 the	 spectator	 towards	 a	 larger	 and	 far	 more	 mysterious	 world	 than	 she	
perhaps	previously	 realised.	This	 is	edifying	and	can	be	seen	as	a	good	that	contributes	







that	on	most	nights	most	people	can	behold	 its	beauty	and	 ‘wonder	at	 the	meaning	of	
	 204	
what	[they]	see’	(Carson,	1984,	p.	55).	Gleaves	and	Glemmer	probably	do	not	belong	to	
the	 group	 of	 people	 Carson	 is	 concerned	 about	 but	 are	 likely	 to	 belong	 to	 a	 group	 of	
grateful	stargazing	wonderers	 ready	to	share	their	experiences	with	others.	 If	 this	were	
indeed	so	I	would	say	that	they	via	the	monumental	event	they	witnessed	in	their	youth	
have	discovered	 a	 good	 that	 aids	 them	 in	 their	 flourishing	because	 to	be	 aware	of	 the	
magnificence	and	beauty	of	the	universe	is	to	be	aware	that	we	reside	in	it	and	are	a	part	
of	something	beyond	our	comprehension.	








emotion	 that	 ‘presumes	 something	 greater	 than	 yourself,	 something	 awesome,	
wondrous,	 marvellous	 [yet]	 something	 less	 than	 worship	 but	 considerably	 more	 than	




as	an	effect	of	wonder	or	as	 it	were	 is	 subordinate	 to	 it	because	without	 the	ability	 to	
wonder	 and	 to	 presume	 there	 is	 something	 greater	 than	 oneself	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	
reverence	would	even	emerge.		
	 Additionally	 we	 can	 say	 that	 because	 reverence	 prompts	 awareness	 of	 our	
limitations	and	responsibility	it	is	fair	to	insist	that	wonder	induced	reverence	contributes	
to	human	flourishing.	To	be	aware	of	for	example	human	vulnerability	and	dependence	
(which	 we	 might	 label	 as	 limitations)	 is	 to	 harbour	 an	 important	 understanding	 of	
creature-hood73	and	thus	what	goods	to	be	mindful	about	and	to	look	out	for	as	we	are	
living	 out	 our	 lives	 as	 the	 creatures	 we	 are.	 Having	 a	 sense	 of	 responsibility	 likewise	
contributes	to	human	flourishing	because	to	feel	responsible	for	oneself	and	others	ties	in	






‘narcissism,	 nihilism,	 and	 anarchy’	 and	 helps	 us	 put	 the	 ‘”civil”	 in	 “civilization”’	 (Keen,	
2010,	p.	98).	
	 	
To	 continue	 it	might	 also	 be	 argued	 that	 wonder	 can	 prompt	 an	 imaginative	 attitude,	
which	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 source	 of	 flourishing	 because	 in	 some	 cases	 it	might	 enrich	 a	
person’s	perception	or	moral	scope.	In	support	of	this	I	argued	earlier	that	engaging	with	
Arcimboldo’s	Rudolf	II	as	Vertumnus;	seeing	the	Earth	from	space;	utilising	artefacts	such	
as	 the	microscope	and	 the	 telescope;	engaging	with	philosophical	 thought	experiments	
such	 as	 Nozick’s	 experience	 machine,	 Rawls’	 veil	 of	 ignorance	 and	 the	 concept	 of	


















take	 my	 four	 kids	 camping.	 I	 do	 not	 doubt	 the	 value	 of	 scientific	 knowledge,	





The	 case	 of	 Keen	 follows	 a	 similar	 pattern.	 It	 can	 be	 said	 that	 Keen’s	 experience	 of	
wonder	as	a	 child	gave	 rise	 to	a	wondrous	afterglow	 that	 later	 turned	 into	a	particular	
imaginative	attitude	 that	has	endured	 in	him	 to	 this	day.	We	might	 suggest	 that	 this	 is	
what	enabled	him	to	question	what	goods	were	needed	in	order	for	him	to	flourish	and	
discover	that	they	 included	studying	theology	and	philosophy	of	religion	and	 in	the	 late	
1960’s	giving	up	his	permanent	position	as	professor	of	theology	in	exchange	for	a	life	in	
California	 working	 as	 a	 Freelance	 writer	 for	 magazines	 such	 as	 Psychology	 Today	 and	
eventually	 becoming	 a	 celebrated	 author	 and	 trapeze	 artist	 (London,	 1999).	 This	










	 With	 this	 in	mind	 I	 believe	we	 can	 say	 that	 an	 imaginative	 attitude,	which	may	
spring	from	an	experience	of	wonder,	can	be	a	source	of	human	flourishing.	
	









increased	 openness	 and	 receptivity	 rather	 than	 immediate	 utilitarian	 action’	 (R.	 Fuller,	
2006,	p.	370).	This	points	to	the	notion	that	in	wonder	we	are	invited	to	see	things	from	a	
different	 perspective	 and	 so	 might	 become	 aware	 of	 other	 and	 hitherto	 hidden	






the	world	and	 readiness	 for	 change	 together	with	what	 I	 called	bafflement	about	what	
the	world	is.	Additionally	openness	was	highlighted	in	connection	with	our	dealings	with	
Scruton’s	 approach	 to	 imagination	 and	 the	 notion	 of	 continuity	 between	 intense	
experiences	and	subsequent	living	in	relation	to	wonder.	In	this	respect	I	suggested	that	if	
a	person	is	experiencing	wonder	in	a	true	sense	she	experiences	being	in	a	state	of	mind	
that	 embraces	 perhaps	 a	 sort	 of	 subtle	 or	 beginning	 reverence,	 gratitude	 or	 openness	
that	consequently	may	 influence	her	behaviour	over	time.	The	common	denominator	 is	






because	being	 closed	minded	 is	 surely	one	of	 the	 things	we	would	opt	not	 to	be	 if	we	
were	given	a	choice.	Openness	enables	us	 to	explore	different	 ideas	and	goods	outside	
















of	seeing	humility	as	a	virtue	Aristotle	speaks	of	pride	 in	the	sense	that	 it	 is	virtuous	to	
entertain	 pride	 as	 long	 as	 it	 is	 proper	 or	 in	 accord	 with	 one’s	 own	 excellence.	 By	
Aristotle’s	measure	this	enables	us	to	say	that	it	is	virtuous	for	a	craftsman	who	excels	at	
his	 craft	 to	 be	 proud	 and	 mutatis	 mutandis	 vice-full	 (deficient	 pride/humble)	 if	 he	
refrained	from	being	proud	of	his	excellent	skills.	
	 Aristotle’s	 idea	of	humility	as	a	vice	contrasts	the	view	upheld	by	most	Christian	
ethicists	where	 the	belittling	of	oneself75	 in	 the	 face	of	God	and	his	work,	 ‘loving	one’s	
enemies’	 and	 the	 practice	 of	 ‘turning	 the	 other	 cheek’	 (MacIntyre,	 1998,	 p.	 78)	 is	
considered	virtuous	while	entertaining	pride	a	sin	(vice).76	That	pride	is	considered	a	sin	in	
Christianity	 complicates	matters	because	 it	 illuminates	 the	paradox	of	humility	 and	 the	
difficulty	we	face	in	addressing	it	today.	If	we	accept	the	Christian	view	that	humility	is	a	
virtue	it	 is	tempting	to	ask	if	 it	 is	possible	to	be	proud	of	being	humble.	If	the	answer	is	
yes	 then	 it	 looks	 like	 we	 are	 not	 harbouring	 the	 humility	 we	 are	 proud	 of,	 but	 if	 we	
answer	 no	 we	 acknowledge	 that	 one	 cannot	 be	 proud	 of	 being	 humble,	 which	 is	
problematic	 because	 to	 do	 so	 signals	 a	 disregard	 of	 a	 good,	 praiseworthy	 quality	 or	
feature	that	one	harbours,	which	is	irrational	(Kellenberger,	2010,	p.	338).	
	
The	 discrepancy	 between	 the	 two	 outlooks	 is	 obvious	 and	 brings	 to	 our	 attention	 a	
significant	challenge	in	terms	of	understanding	humility	as	a	virtue.	However	we	need	not	
be	discouraged	because	it	is	not	the	objective	of	this	section	to	accept	and	overcome	this	
challenge.	 A	 viable	 way	 forward	 that	 will	 help	 us	 in	 our	 present	 endeavour	 is	 to	
acknowledge	the	importance	of	the	challenge	but	to	move	around	it	and	address	humility	
from	a	different	angle.	In	this	light	it	might	be	prudent	to	think	of	humility	as	an	emotion	
















themselves	 in	 this	 respect	 and	 one	 of	 them	 involves	 what	 the	 emotion	 of	 humility	






(Sidgwick,	 1874,	 p.	 334-335).	 If	 we	 were	 to	 accept	 this	 view	 we	 must	 attempt	 to	
understand	what	may	give	rise	to	such	an	emotion	because	refraining	from	doing	so	is	to	
invite	 Aristotle’s	 criticism	 and	 stand	 accused	 of	 being	 irrational.	 I	 believe	 that	 the	
experience	of	wonder	can	at	least	momentarily	give	rise	to	the	emotion	of	humility	and	to	
prove	my	 point	we	might	 recall	 Gerald	 Kuiper’s	 report	 of	 his	 students’	 reaction	 to	 the	
1966	 Leonid	 meteor	 shower	 from	 Chapter	 2.	 The	 scientific	 minded	 students	 who	 had	
made	 an	 effort	 to	 record	 the	 number	 of	meteors	 literally	 gave	 up	 their	 project	 and	 as	
Kuiper	writes	simply	stood	and	gazed	in	wonder	once	the	meteors	began	falling	at	a	rate	
of	 approximately	 40	 a	 second.	 If	we	 take	 this	 into	 account	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 say	 that	
courtesy	 of	 the	 meteor	 shower	 the	 students	 besides	 experiencing	 wonder	 also	
experienced	a	sense	of	humility	as	an	effect	of	wonder	and	this	not	merely	because	they	
had	 to	give	up	 their	 study	but	because	 they	 in	 their	wonder	 realised	 the	humbling	 fact	




puts	 our	 planet	 (and	 him)	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 it	 and	 in	 effect	 allows	 a	 sense	 of	 pride	 our	
modern	conception	of	the	universe	is	one	that	mostly	installs	humility.	The	reason	for	this	
is	that	for	all	we	know	we	are	but	the	inhabitants	of	a	small	planet	orbiting	a	bright	star,	
which	 in	 all	 likelihood	will	 not	 shine	 forever.	Where	Aristotle	may	 have	 found	 pride	 in	
being	 from	 somewhere	 central	we	 can	 seemingly	 only	muster	 humility	 because	we	 are	
really	 from	nowhere	 remotely	 central	 given	our	planet	 is	 but	one	amongst	 a	myriad	of	
other	planets,	solar	systems	and	galaxies.	If	Aristotle	knew	what	we	know	about	our	place	





and	point	out	 that	humility	 ‘enhances	social	 relationships	 [and	 is]	 important	 for	 living	a	
life	of	quiet	 joy,	satisfaction,	wisdom,	and	contentment’	 (Compton	&	Hoffman,	2013,	p.	
241).	This	rings	true	because	first	of	all	not	many	seem	to	favour	the	arrogant	personality.	
Second	we	might	 say	 that	 being	 humble	 and	 entertaining	 a	 low	 opinion	 of	 one’s	 own	
merits	can	contribute	to	living	a	life	of	joy,	satisfaction,	wisdom	and	contentment	because	






Moving	 on	 I	 would	 now	 like	 to	 put	 forward	 an	 argument	 for	 the	 conclusion	 that	




something	 to	contribute	 to	human	flourishing	 in	a	strong	sense	 it	must	be	of	particular	
importance	to	it	or	even	crucial	in	the	sense	that	without	it	a	person’s	flourishing	will	be	
compromised.	 Virtue	 understood	 as	 excellence	 that	 has	 to	 manifest	 in	 all	 activities	
(MacIntyre,	 1998,	 p.	 63)	 qualifies	 as	 such	 and	 is	 a	 crucial	 and	 specific	 part	 of	 the	Neo-
Aristotelian	 conception	 of	 flourishing.	 It	 is	 so	 because	 virtue	 is	 a	 good	 that	 cannot	 be	
purchased,	found	or	in	any	way	be	given	and	is	a	quality	that	one	has	to	develop.	Virtue	is	
as	MacIntyre	describes	it	‘not	inborn,	but	a	consequence	of	training’	(MacIntyre,	1998,	p.	
64).	 From	 our	 dealings	 with	 Rasmussen,	 MacIntyre	 and	 Nussbaum	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	
development	 of	 virtues	 is	 an	 important	 part	 of	 human	 flourishing	 and	 especially	 in	
relation	 to	what	Rasmussen	 terms	practical	wisdom,	what	MacIntyre	 calls	 independent	
practical	 reasoning	 and	 what	 Nussbaum	 refers	 to	 as	 practical	 reason.	 In	 addition	
MacIntyre	 informs	us	 that	 the	 development	 of	 virtue	 is	 crucial	 for	 an	 individual	 as	 she	
otherwise	would	not	be	able	to	detach	herself	from	immediate	desires,	which	helps	bring	
about	good	choice-making.	MacIntyre	also	helps	us	to	a	better	understanding	of	virtue	by	
focussing	 on	 the	 virtue	 of	 temperance.	 In	 his	 view	 this	 particular	 virtue	 centres	 on	
avoiding	extreme	behaviour	and	sees	the	eye	of	the	storm	between	self-indulgence	and	
unappreciative	 and	 insensitive	 puritanism.	 One	 could	 argue	 that	 when	 we	 talk	 about	
wonder	as	a	virtue	it	refers	to	wonderment	located	between	the	Scylla	of	excess	and	the	
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to	 harness	 or	 control	 wonder.	 It	 is	 a	 product	 of	 refinement	 where	 one’s	 wonderment	
turns	out	to	be	just	right.		
	 This	particular	line	of	thinking	might	to	some	evoke	Aristotelian	ideas	of	virtue	and	
rightly	 so.	For	Aristotle	virtue	 is	 connected	 to	 the	notion	of	 the	mean,	which	 is	 located	
between	 excess	 and	 deficiency.	 Experiencing	 a	 sense	 of	 wonder	 while	 pondering	 that	
bachelors	are	not	married	is	wondering	in	excess.77	It	is	to	wonder	foolishly	or	immaturely	
and	such	wonder	would	rest	uneasily	with	any	sensible	person.	To	assume	that	there	is	an	
answer	 to	 every	 question	 and	 avoiding	 wonderment	 by	 blindly	 consulting	 experts	 or	
authorities	 to	 obtain	 answers	would	 be	 to	 harbour	 a	 deficient	 sense	 of	wonder	which	
would	equally	sit	ill	with	any	temperate	person.	In	addition	we	might	say	that	the	person	
who	never	wonders	because	she	believes	 there	 is	nothing	 to	wonder	about	or	because	





anything	to	exist’	 (Keen,	2010,	p.	85).	To	give	 further	weight	 to	 the	 level	of	difficulty	 in	








the	right	 time,	and	for	 the	right	purpose,	and	 in	 the	right	way	 is	 the	more	difficult	 task	
and	 not	 within	 everybody’s	 immediate	 reach.	 To	 illustrate	 that	 wonderment,	 when	











to	 Keen	what	 characterises	 the	 psychedelic	 experience	 is	 that	 the	 distinction	 between	
objects	and	moments	 in	time	becomes	blurred.	Things	 flow	together,	 time	slows	down,	
and	the	static	and	distinct	outlines	of	the	world	of	experience	no	longer	apply.	It	involves	
a	breakdown	of	the	boundaries	between	the	senses	and	consequently	making	it	possible	







the	 idea	of	too	much	wonder	(or	wonder	 in	excess)	and	argues	that	despite	the	 infinite	
and	 wonderful	 possibilities	 such	 an	 experience	 offers	 it	 leads	 to	 a	 state	 of	 mind	 that	
removes	 us	 from	 human	 agency,	 individuality,	 concern	 and	 commitment	 to	 social	
relations	 such	 as	 parents	 and	 friends.	 Furthermore	 it	 seduces	 us	 into	 the	 illusion	 that	
there	may	be	an	authentic	existence	without	decisions	and	the	risk	of	failure	and	such	an	
existence	Keen	argues	 ‘belongs	to	the	gods,	and	the	man	who	seeks	 it	 loses	 the	 feel	of	
the	earth	upon	which	he	stands’	(Keen,	1969,	p.	190).	
	 I	 am	 sympathetic	 to	 Keen’s	 take	 on	 the	 psychedelic	 experience	 and	 I	 think	 his	









viewpoint	 seriously	 dampen	 a	 person’s	 prospects	 of	 flourishing.	 Keen’s	 point	 that	 the	
psychedelic	experience	removes	the	voyager	from	commitment	and	concern	for	others	is	
likewise	problematic	 for	 flourishing.	This	becomes	clear	 if	we	consult	Nussbaum’s	entry	
number	 7	 about	 affiliation	 on	 her	 list	 of	 capabilities.	 Here	 Nussbaum	 notes	 that	 an	
essential	part	of	flourishing	is	to	be	able	to	live	with	and	toward	others	and	to	recognise	




‘psychedelic	 flourishing’.	To	be	clear	 I	am	not	stating	 that	 the	psychedelic	experience	 is	
worthless	or	 that	psychedelics	cannot	have	therapeutic	properties	and	be	edifying.	All	 I	
am	 stating	 is	 that	 while	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 psychedelic	 substances	 a	 voyager’s	

























as	 Fuller	 remarks	 a	 life	 that	harbours	no	 sense	of	wonder	 is	 not	 attuned	 to	 the	widest	
possible	world	of	personal	fulfilment78	(R.	C.	Fuller,	2006,	p.	158).	 In	addition	one	might	
point	out	that	given	Father	Ambrose’s	interest	in	religion	his	wonder-deprived	situation	is	
lamentable	 because	 wonder	 and	 religion	 are	 quite	 compatible.	 According	 to	 Fuller	
wonder	paves	the	way	for	spirituality	without	reducing	our	basic	belief	in	the	existence	of	
something	 ‘more’	 to	 narrow	 doctrines	 or	 creeds	 (R.	 C.	 Fuller,	 2006,	 p.	 2).	 Poet	 and	
playwright	D.	H.	Lawrence	would	remind	Father	Ambrose	that	the	sense	of	wonder	is	the	








add-on	 and	 indeed	 perfectly	 compatible	 with	 the	 ideas	 put	 forward	 by	 these	
philosophers.	 If	 we	 think	 of	 Rasmussen’s	 point	 about	 flourishing	 being	 a	 self-directed	




If	one	harbours	deficient	wonderment	 it	would	seem	hard	 for	an	 independent	practical	
reasoner	to	locate	the	goods	that	would	contribute	towards	her	flourishing.	With	regard	
to	 Nussbaum’s	 account	 wonder	 could	 be	 added	 to	 her	 list	 of	 basic	 capabilities.	 For	
example,	her	entry	number	4	could	not	only	address	senses,	imagination	and	thought	but	
























To	 elaborate	 we	 can	 say	 that	 Rogers	 owes	 a	 part	 of	 his	 flourishing	 to	 the	 event	 he	
experienced	because	it	brought	him	beauty	in	the	form	of	a	spectacular	meteor	shower	
and	knowledge	in	the	form	of	the	realisation	that	the	world	he	inhabits	occasionally	gives	
away	 displays	 of	 cosmic	 grandeur	 and	 beauty,	 which	 one	 might	 be	 lucky	 enough	 to	
witness.	If	we	look	to	Nussbaum’s	entry	number	four	on	her	list	of	capabilities	we	can	see	
that	making	use	of	one’s	 senses,	 imagination	and	 thought	 is	 a	 vital	 part	of	her	 view	of	
flourishing.	Rogers	makes	good	use	of	these	precise	qualities	because	he	uses	his	visual	
sense	to	appreciate	the	meteor	shower	and	likewise	he	makes	use	of	his	imagination	and	




and	 that	 this	 contributes	 to	 his	 flourishing	 in	 a	 strong	 sense.	 Rogers	 appropriately	
recognises	 the	 wonderfulness,	 grandness	 and	 beauty	 of	 the	 event	 without	 drawing	
unreasonable	 or	 hasty	 conclusions	 about	 its	 significance	 and	 meaning.	 Amidst	 the	
extraordinary	meteor	 shower,	 the	 various	 dramatic	 responses	 from	 the	 people	 around	






between	the	Scylla	of	excess	and	 the	Charybdis	of	deficiency	and	 thus	he	wonders	 in	a	
virtuous,	excellent	or	balanced	way,	which	is	difficult	and	thus	praiseworthy.	To	balance	
wonder	 is	 a	demanding	activity	 and	 it	 does	not	happen	automatically.	 By	balancing	his	
wonderment	Rogers	shows	his	character,	training	and	ability	to	reason	independently	and	
practically.	 Upon	 seeing	 the	 spectacular	 meteor	 shower	 he	 quickly	 harnesses	 his	
metaphysical	imagination,	and	aligns	his	emotions	to	fit	what	is	happening	consequently	







The	 purpose	 of	 this	 chapter	 was	 to	 show	 how	 wonder	 can	 contribute	 to	 human	
flourishing	or	in	short	flourishing.	To	do	this	we	started	by	engaging	with	three	different	
approaches	to	human	flourishing	represented	by	Douglas	Rasmussen,	Alasdair	MacIntyre	
and	 Martha	 Nussbaum.	 Rasmussen’s	 Neo-Aristotelian	 approach	 to	 human	 flourishing	
revealed	a	view	of	the	human	good	that	is	1)	objective,	2)	inclusive,	(3)	individualised,	(4)	
agent-relative,	 (5)	 self-directed,	 and	 (6)	 social.	 In	 addition	 Rasmussen	 highlighted	 that	
practical	 wisdom	 and	 human	 nature	 are	 significant	 to	 human	 flourishing.	 My	 main	
criticism	of	Rasmussen’s	approach	was	that	there	might	be	more	that	can	be	uncovered	
about	human	flourishing	by	investigating	human	nature,	which	led	to	an	investigation	of	
MacIntyre’s	 approach	 to	 the	 subject.	 MacIntyre’s	 approach	 to	 human	 flourishing	
advances	 our	 understanding	 of	 human	 flourishing	 by	 pointing	 out	 our	 animality,	
vulnerability	and	dependency	on	others.	He	also	emphasises	that	 it	 is	crucial	 for	one	to	
become	an	independent	practical	reasoner	in	order	to	live	a	flourishing	life.	Furthermore	
MacIntyre	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 paying	 attention	 to	 the	 complexity	 of	 being	 a	
social	creature.	 In	 this	 regard	MacIntyre	 is	particularly	attentive	 to	 the	relationships	we	
engage	with	and	how	crucial	these	are	for	our	flourishing.	In	this	sense	it	is	important	to	












	 After	 gaining	 some	 understanding	 about	 what	 human	 flourishing	 involves	 and	
what	might	qualify	as	a	 source	of	 flourishing	 I	 turned	 to	 investigate	 if	wonder	could	be	
viewed	as	such.	The	subsequent	 inquiry	 into	how	wonder	 induced	gratitude,	reverence,	
openness,	humility;	imaginative	attitude	and	finally	virtuous	wonder,	confirmed	that	it	is	
indeed	 possible	 that	 wonder	 promotes	 human	 flourishing.	 The	 section	 on	 virtuous	
wonder	 deserves	 to	 be	 highlighted	 because	 it	 demonstrates	 the	 problems	with	 lacking	
wonder,	with	wondering	in	excess	and	how	wonderment	works	if	practised	in	a	virtuous	
way.	Additionally	it	clarified	that	a	balanced	sense	of	wonder,	which	is	synonymous	with	
virtuous	wonder,	 contributes	 to	human	 flourishing	 in	 a	 strong	 sense	because	 striking	 a	
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